
Essays
2026
June: Ups and downs of great civilizations
2026
2026
January: The flaws of neoclassical economists
2025
November: Talk for Namibian senior civil servants on 2 November 2023 - revisited essay from January 2022
Essay 2026
Ups and downs of great civilizations
Prologue
All my professional life I’ve been intrigued by economic growth, or - better even - sustained economic development. Where does growth come from and how can it be sustained? We know that economic growth is, historically speaking, a fairly recent phenomenon. Surely, across the ages successful civilizations experienced periods of growth and prosperity, enjoying a golden age. However, sooner or later they all were snuffed out by natural or man-made disasters. In sum, global economic growth, if any, was not much above subsistence level. The economic historian Angus Maddison calculated that from the birth of Jesus to 1820, economic growth amounted, on average, to 0.11 percent a century.
But then came the Industrial Revolution which changed everything. Economic growth not just shot up but continued its steady pace upwards. Sustained growth made other things possible: improved livelihood, education and health care for all, social security, and - not least important – technological innovation and flourishing of the sciences and arts.
Why is it that some ancient civilizations created golden ages and why didn’t they last? These intriguing questions are dealt with by Johan Norberg in his new book Peak Human.
Introduction
Peak Human is an intriguing title, as one wonders whether the book is about Olympic records (I write this introduction during this year’s Winter Olympics in Italy), or is it about exceptional intellectual achievements? It is neither, as the author, historian Johan Norberg, deals with the question what we can learn from great civilizations’ rise and fall of their golden ages.
True, Norberg is not the first one to analyse political, cultural or economic ups and downs. Going some time back, one could think of Arnold Toynbee’s A Study of History, let alone Edward Gibbon’s six-volume Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, of which Randolph Churchill read excerpts to Pamela Digby during their wedding night.[1] More recently, Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1988), comes to mind, and Ian Morris’s Why the West Rules - For Now (2010), or Joel Mokyr’s A Culture of Change (2017).
These works don’t follow Norberg’s approach, but they all deal with longitudinal analyses of great powers (Kennedy); historical patterns revealing what may happen in the future (Morris), or how western culture laid the foundation for sustained economic and technological development (Mokyr). The insights and opinions of these scholars will, where appropriate, be referred to in what follows.
In Part I, Norberg’s insights are presented and his description of Athens’ golden age and decline. Part I ends with the question whether Anglosphere will also decline. In Part II, I present three observations nuancing Norberg’s insights.
Part I Peak Human
Now, what does Norberg propose in his entertaining, erudite, and thought-provoking book? Having analysed progress in cultural, political and economic terms of ancient Athens, during which spectacular progress was made in science, technological breakthroughs, political philosophy and economic prosperity, inevitable decline ensued.
After having dealt with Athens and Rome, Norberg presents other successful civilizations, ranging from the Abbasid Caliphate, Song China, Renaissance Italy, the Dutch Republic, to the so-called Anglosphere. All of them took on board useful insights and inventions of their predecessors. After having enjoyed a golden age, all of them, except – for the time being - the Anglosphere, ended in decline caused by internal or external pressures.
When Norberg visited Athens, he was impressed by the spectacular beauty of the Acropolis. But he concludes that, like other remnants of Athens’s great past, nothing much was left of it. This made him wonder what caused past great civilizations to rise so spectacularly, and how could they decline so devastatingly that hardly any trace was left? These two questions comprise Peak Human’s heart of the matter. All these civilizations enjoyed a golden age. In comparing their respective trajectory, Norberg discovered that they shared common characteristics explaining their progress but also decline.
Peak Human came out timely, as we live in an era of authoritarian and populist revival, which prompts the question whether the liberal democracies we know will now also decline and be eclipsed by systems with less liberal characteristics? After all, all past successful civilizations eventually went under.
Golden Ages
What constitutes a golden age? It is, says Norberg, ‘…a period with a... large number of innovations that revolutionize many fields and sectors in a short period of time.’[2] Such a period is associated with confidence, and a culture of optimism, encouraging people to explore new knowledge, experiment with more productive technologies, and exchange the results with others. A golden age is also associated with cultural creativity, scientific discoveries, technological achievements and economic blossoming, resulting in a high average standard of living. Successful civilizations applied different strategies to achieve a golden age. Most of them picked up useful ideas from foreign lands, while others adopted new ideas from translated books containing useful insights. Eventually none of these golden ages could be sustained.
Decline
Eventually, ‘the Great Status Quo Filter’ came for all these golden ages.[3] So what happened? Was there a uniform pattern of decline, or where there differences between them? Indeed, there were differences ranging from manmade (i.e., war) to natural causes such as pandemics and climate-induced famines. Once a crisis struck, often combined with an economic downturn, the reaction was to retreat to the good-old days wherein there were no major upheavals and economic relations were fixed. Or scapegoats were identified. In Athens, as we will see, there was the death-to-Socrates moment during which open intellectual exchange was replaced by conservatism.
These developments put an end to free trade and innovation, and the introduction of economic controls. When states found it difficult to raise taxes they did not hesitate to undermine property rights to take as much as they could. Or states raised money by simply creating it, turning a blind eye to runaway inflation and economic chaos. International trade also suffered which had brought so much wealth and innovation; stagnation was the result.
Societies with potential
Not all societies had the potential for growth; preconditions had to be in place to get the innovation ball rolling. A certain population density was needed to successfully absorb past achievements. People’s preparedness to transform past achievements into technological innovations was required as well. These people often came from other cultures, transferred through trade, travel and migration. Typically, successful societies were maritime ones, curious to discover what would be found beyond their borders.
Indeed, ideas only came to fruition in a conducive environment unobstructed by conservative forces or war. Innovation, risk taking, and investments happened when property rights were being secured and the rule of law prevailed. These institutions had profound effects not just on economic development, but equally so on the sciences and culture. Needless to say, not all cultures were equal. The better ones provided the institutions for positive-sum games; they created liberties and opportunities rather than oppression. However, when decline had set in, these institutions were hollowed out.
Humans are traders but at the same time they are risk-averse tribalists. Risk-averseness explains why people preferred security over adventure, which put a brake on moving society upwards. Societies prospered when they embraced trade and experiments, but declined when losing cultural self-confidence. Indeed, as Mokyr also concludes in A Culture of Growth, culture is a deciding factor in societal transformation.[4] Europe fostered a competitive ‘market for ideas’, as Mokyr calls it, and a willingness to investigate the secrets of nature. This supportive intellectual environment explains how the Industrial Revolution happened in Europe, and not anywhere else. If, on the other hand, conventional wisdom and vested interests are in positions of command, the result is stagnation.
The Industrial Revolution changed the situation forever into one of sustained economic growth, breaking the forces that would have ‘dragged them back to earth’.[5] In the past ten generations everything changed; many of us today have started seeing peace, democratic liberties and a full stomach as normal.
To illustrate Norberg’s analysis, I summarize his description of Athens’ golden age and subsequent decline, here and there added with texts of other scholars. I chose Athens as it is the cradle of Western civilization.
The section about Athens is followed by the intriguing question whether or not the Anglosphere will decline. Finally, In Part II, I will present a few observations nuancing Norberg’s insights.
Athens
Athens’ achievements are mind-boggling. As of the sixth century BC, Athens was the centre of exploding creativity in fields ranging from democratic governance (to use a modern term), philosophy and the arts. Benefiting from foreign and local influences, innovation was all over the place.
Athens’ location helped a lot, in that the city-state was at the crossroads between Egypt, Mesopotamia, and other Mediterranean cultures. Athens great leader Pericles observed that Athens was open to the world. Indeed, Athens promoted openness through international trade, realising that trade created prosperity. Thanks to international trade, Athens, like other Greek cities close to the sea, adapted an alphabet from Phoenicians and picked up sciences, arts and skills from Mesopotamia and Egypt. Meanwhile, Athens built alliances with other city-states and it cleared sea routes from pirates. In short, Athens became an important economic, political and cultural maritime power.
At Thermopylae, under contested[6] Sparta’s leadership, the Greeks were defeated by the Persians. King Leonidas had, in an epic miscalculation, decided to station less experienced men to guard a strategically important mountain trail leading around the pass. The Persian elite forces just marched past them, encircled the defenders of Thermopylae and massacred them. If the Greeks had had more persistence, argues Norberg, the Persian invaders would have run out of supplies and be forced to retreat.
In the end, Athens’ openness and innovation emulated Sparta’s brute force. This gave Athens cultural self-confidence, deepening its freedoms and unleashing its cultural and philosophical golden age. However, before all this unfolded, the city had been burned to the ground.
The second Persian invasion was started by Xerxes. Not taking any chances, a huge Persian army and navy invaded Greece. In just two days, the Persians defeated Spartan defenders at Thermopylae. The road was now open to burn Athens’ wooden structures and temples. In anticipation of this disaster, the citizens had been evacuated. The men fled to the ships by the island of Salamis, west of Athens. What followed had been shrewdly planned by Athenian citizen Themistocles (524-459) who hailed from a simple family.
Themistocles managed to draw the Persian fleet into a narrow strip between Salamis and the mainland. The evening before the battle, he sent a slave to the Persians telling them that Themistocles was fed up with his allies and was willing to betray them, which the Persians believed. The next morning, the Battle of Salamis took place (480 BC). Persians entered the narrows and then suddenly the Greek fleet came out of their hiding and rammed many Persian ships. Xerxes decided to go home. This was Athens’ - and therefore Themistocles’- victory, who meanwhile had joined the ranks of Athens’s political leadership. Norberg concludes:
It is difficult to think of another polis that could have given so much responsibility to a half-foreign upstart [Themistocles; PdH] whose modus operandi was to get the support of the lower classes for constant innovation and change.[7]
At any event, the victory gave Athens the confidence to move with great speed to its golden age. The citizens returned to Athens and started rebuilding it. Athens’ institutions were deepened to promote innovation and its democracy had survived two Persian wars.
Confidence, Athens’ openness to trade, and inspiring innovative and adopted technological achievements of Phoenicians and Egyptians made Athens flourish, not just economically but also politically and scientifically. An important institutional achievement was that many farmers obtained property right of their farms.[8]
These farmers became hoplites; an effective form of infantry. Norberg notes: ‘Among all the things these hoplite-farmers cultivated, public participation in government and constitutional rule were the most important.’[9]
Thanks to trade, the control the aristocracy used to have diluted. Genuine democracy was beckoning. International trade also exposed Athens to other cultures, spurring innovation not just in metal work but also in the arts. The city-state developed foreign trade, importing grain from the Black Sea in exchange for their wine and olives. Gradually, a mighty merchant fleet was built. It made Athens the richest and most beautiful city of the entire Greek world. Athens was also one of very few pre-modern societies where wages of unskilled workers rose above the subsistence level.
Needless to say, the aristocracy lost political clout. The great statesman Solon (630-560 BC) kept Athens together. He created a constitution for Athens in which the different classes were balanced, giving everyone (except women and slaves) a voice in the system. Key in his constitution were protection of liberties and property. Feudal relationships on the land were abolished. Enslaved peasants were liberated. He also proposed the extension of legal protection to all citizens as well as protection of small landowners. Solon also replaced the hereditary monopoly on public offices with a set of property requirements. Lower public offices were opened up to everybody but the poorest; yet they got a seat in the assembly. He promoted monetization of the economy and international trade.
Understandably, aristocrats were not happy with all these changes. Pisistratus established himself as a tyrant, however, a rather benevolent one. But Pisistratus’s successor, his son Hippias, caused unrest. Out of the turmoil, democracy was born but in an unusual way. Cleisthenes (570-508 BC) introduced democracy, inviting the freemen to design the future of the state, which met with great enthusiasm. But it angered the then ruling Spartans. Sparta’s king Cleomenes installed himself on the Acropolis drawing up a new constitution. The Athenians rebelled against it and Cleomenes had to give in. Cleisthenes returned and the Assembly was opened for everyone. Executive positions became available for most citizens, with the exception of the highest positions, which remained reserved for the aristocracy. Council members could only serve twice during their lifetime.
The system worked. The city was open to inspiring debates not just in the Assembly but on theatre stages as well. In this open environment, philosophy blossomed. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, are still referred to in philosophical conversations today.[10] Herodotus is remembered as the first historian to record history in a systematic way. And what about dramatists such as Aeschylus, Sophocles and Aristophanes whose plays are still performed? As already pointed out, Athens’ openness created prosperity and expanded its horizon. The rule of law and the high degree of economic freedom opened the way to specialize and experiment with sculpture, but also with architecture, farming and finance.
Athens’ successes in many fields made it feel superior to neighbouring states. Athens gradually overstretched itself – hubris crept in. This goes in particular for Athens’ ill-fated plan to conquer Syracuse in Sicily (415 BC), in which half its fleet was lost and 400,000 soldiers died.[11] This did even more damage than the plague which had killed a quarter of Athens’ population.
Its imperial ambitions had alienated other Greek states with whom Athens were partners in the Delian League. Thucydides, who had documented the war, introduced the so-called Thucydides trap. This term is used when rising powers threaten an old hegemon. Thucydides argued that the devastating Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) broke out because Sparta feared Athens’ growing power. Athens suffered defeat which deteriorated its character, as Athenians lost their belief in principles, moderation and their analytical mind. Tribalism and fanatical enthusiasm eclipsed open mindedness.
Athens’ democratic system was replaced by a council of thirty Spartan-friendly oligarchs. But it was not the end; Athens’ democracy was not yet defeated. Eight months after the imposition of dictatorship, the thirty tyrants were deposed and democracy was restored. The system would remain intact for another 180 years.[12]
Macedonia was a rising power. Alexander (356-323 BC) rapidly conquered Persia, Mesopotamia, Egypt and Central Asia. Alexander was a brutal ruler - he spread death and destruction throughout conquered lands. It should also be mentioned, however, that he spread a Hellenistic culture that survived him. Take Alexandria, for example, which he established, and its famous library, turning the city into a cosmopolitan scientific centre.
Athenians rebelled against Macedonians but they lacked the money and hoplites to beat them. The year 322 BC marks Athens’s end of democracy and philosophy. At Crannon, located in central Thessaly, the Athenians were defeated; the world’s first democracy had come to an end.
Anglosphere’s decline?
Norberg presents six civilizations having enjoyed a golden age and a subsequent decline. The last civilization presented by Norberg is the Anglosphere, which initially consisted of the United Kingdom (UK) and its colonial offshoots, the United States, Canada, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand. All of them retained the English language and common law. The Anglosphere opened the world for global trade. The offshoots also imported very important institutions such as the rule of law and property rights. They helped create a global civilization – not in terms of values and politics – but in knowledge and skills. The early achievements of the UK and America have not just been adopted by their offshoots, but also by many successful countries around the world. To date, these countries are some of the freest and richest countries on the planet.
How will the Anglosphere end and what would the options beyond look like - this is the question. After all, all golden ages presented by Norberg ended, with the exception of the present Anglosphere. Would it be too early to conclude that Anglosphere’s decline has set in? In answering, and probably having America in mind,- Norberg quotes Abraham Lincoln who observed in his 1838 Lyceum Address:
If it ever reach us [potential ruin; PdH] it must spring up amongst us. It cannot come from abroad. If destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation of freemen, we must live through all time, or die by suicide.[13]
Norberg is not unequivocally answering the question whether the Anglosphere is here to stay, or not. After all, historians are no fortune tellers – they are always wrong about the future, he adds. When Peak Human was published, President Trump was less than one year in office during his second term. It is too early to draw conclusions whether Trump would be America’s destroyer-in-chief, or whether other internal political forces would cause America’s eventual decline, as Lincoln predicted.
Before Trump started to break down the global liberal order we knew, the revolution in communication, transportation and trade, put the inevitability of Anglosphere’s decline in doubt, observes Norberg. Another element worth considering is that America’s greatest economic strength has been its capacity for innovation. In addition, unlike the other golden ages analysed by Norberg, its reach is global rather than regional. Indeed – what the historian Ian Morris calls ‘the West’ - it has maintained a global dominance without parallel in history.[14]
Norberg observes: ‘ ….for the first time in history, they [innovations; PdH] can be quickly adopted around the world. As a result, for the first time in history we do not have progress constrained to one region and one civilization. The whole of mankind has been touched by it.’[15] Morris obnserves that ‘knowing why the West rules gives us a pretty good sense of how things will turn out in the twenty-first century.’[16]
Nonetheless, even before Trump’s second term started signs of decline could be observed. For example, during the early twenty-first century, America experienced what Paul Kennedy in The Rise and Fall of Great Powers called hubris, when the US believed it could introduce liberal democracy under false pretentions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 2008 financial crisis (which started in America) and ensuing global economic recession made other countries doubt America’s financial and monetary credibility. The country’s ballooning public debt may be another harbinger of financial trouble.
Meanwhile, China had the ambition to offer the world a successful alternative, but China is now experiencing home-grown problems, such as a real estate melt-down, deflationary tendencies, youth unemployment, rising inequality, and China’s aging population. And the regime is controlling the economy, choking the private sector’s creativity and dynamism.
Anglosphere’s reach is no longer as global as it used to be. As for international trade, fragmentation of international trade better captures what is going on: international trade continues, but supply chains are being rearranged for resilience, politics (tariff wars), and security concerns. Immigrants are no longer welcome. Nationalism is on the rise, national industrial policies are being designed by many, including European, countries, to make them less dependent on foreign supplies. It seems as if the lessons of the 1920s and 1930s have been forgotten. After all, protectionism cuts a nation off from the world’s brains and skills, which affects its competitiveness and productivity. In this vein Norberg observes, ‘...we have gone from what Thucydides described as the Athenian mindset of being open to acquire something new to the Spartan mentality of shutting the world out to preserve what one already has.’[17]
China, Russia and other totalitarian states join forces to also undermine the global liberal order and spread the same autocratic power they enjoy at home around the world, indeed challenging the American-led world order.
Although the Anglosphere is being undermined by internal and external forces, Norberg prefers concentrating on building our strengths and not believing in concentrating on potential weaknesses.[18] It does not make sense to worry about possible catastrophes; much better is it, says Norberg, to solve problems here and now. The best way to prepare for the future is to have a dynamic culture which would help us to acquire more prosperity, knowledge and technological capacity. In short, an open culture that allows us to continually adapt and innovate around every challenge, is the way forward.[19]
If the Anglosphere were to decline, Norberg wonders where a new golden age could come from. China was a possibility, but not any longer. Could it then be Poland, Vietnam or India? And what about Africa with its young population and abundant natural resources? The answer is that nobody knows, but at any event we do enjoy a global civilization in knowledge and skills.
Norberg concludes that future golden ages will be more diluted, as everyone can emulate ideas that will make societies prosper. This also implies that divides will be cropping up within societies; between cities; regions; businesses and between individuals, i.e., between those who embrace transformation and those who embrace stagnation.
Peak Human’s last sentence says it all: ‘Every civilization has a bit of the Athenian and of the Spartan within it. So do you and I. We decide who we let out.’[20]
Part II Observations
Although Norberg did not suggest presenting a universal explanation of civilizations’ golden ages and subsequent decline, it is nonetheless interesting to nuance some of his insights. I present three observations on them which are briefly summarized after which each of them will be elaborated.
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Norberg concludes that the successful civilizations he describes were, like Athens, bordering a sea or rivers. However, this is not a universally valid conclusion. Neither were all past great civilizations open to surprises and unconventional ideas. The Mongol Empire comes to mind, founded by Genghis Khan in 1206, and becoming the largest land empire in history (so not bordering a sea), connecting East and West, reshaping Eurasian civilization. The Inca Empire, is yet another example of an empire, not fitting Norberg’s insights.
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Economic openness was a shared factor in explaining economic prowess of the civilizations Norberg presents. However, successful economies, such as the United States, Germany and, more recently, South Korea, began building their economies behind tariff walls, only opening to the world once they were robust enough to withstand foreign competition.
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Norberg observes that none of the golden ages he describes lasted longer than two centuries, including the Dutch Republic’s golden age. However, after more than three centuries, the Netherlands still belongs to the league of the world’s 20 highest-income per capita countries, not showing signs of decline. Also, Anglosphere’s decline cannot be concluded. The question is whether decline may be something of the past?
These three observations each require a more detailed elaboration to which I now turn.
In essence, the first observation is that neither all successful civilizations were bordering the sea, nor were they all open-minded. I mentioned the Mongol Empire and the Inca Empire in this vein. I chose the latter empire to underscore my observation.
The Inca Empire, Tawantinsuyu - or The Realm of the Four Parts - was the largest empire in pre-Columbian America. The empire’s origin was situated in the Peruvian Andes sometime during the 13th century. Its capital was Cusco. The population numbers may have varied between 4 and 27 million. However, most estimates are between 6 and 14 million. The empire was preceded by two Andean empires: the Tiwanaku (c. 300-1100 AD), based around Lake Titicaca, and the Wari, or Huari (c. 600-1100 AD), which was located near the city of Ayacucho. Nothing much is left of both; one exception concerns the remains of the Tiwanaku site which includes the Gateway to the Sun, the Ayapana pyramid and sub-terranean temple, located not far from La Paz, Bolivia.
In 1528, Francisco Pizarro visited the empire for the first time and encountered there a wealthy land with bright economic prospects. Upon Pizarro’s return to Spain, he proposed the Spanish monarch to conquer the Incas, which Pizarro did in 1532 after his return to Peru. Accompanied by 168 soldiers, one cannon and 27 horses, Pizarro captured Atahualpa, the last Sapa Inca, at the battle of Cajamarca. The small Spanish force overpowered their adversaries thanks to the Spanish having firearms and horses, both unknown to the Incas. [21] Atahualpa was imprisoned. He offered Pizarro one room full of gold, and two rooms filled with silver, which he accepted.[22] This did not prevent Pizarro from having Atahualpa executed in 1533, thereby ending the empire’s Golden Age.
Let’s return to the empire’s beginning. From 1438 onwards, the 9th Sapa Inca, Pachacuti started a far-reaching expansion. This was when the Inca Empire’s golden age began. At its largest, it included modern Peru, western Ecuador, western and south-western Bolivia, north-western Argentina, the south-westernmost tip of Colombia, and a large chunk of Chile. Various characteristics of preceding Andean civilizations were adopted and further developed by the Incas, such as irrigation technology, terraced agriculture, and storing of surplus harvests.
To foster unity, the Inca rulers established Quechua as the lingua franca. Most conquered peoples accepted their rule, not least since refusal triggered military conquest. The conquered rulers’ children were brought to Cusco where they attended the yachaywasi (The House of Knowledge) to be taught in languages, accounting, astronomy, military and political strategies. They also learned about Inca administration systems, after which they were sent back to their homeland.
In various ways, the empire was unique. It was located in a predominantly Andean difficult territory, and established without the use of the wheel, draft animals, knowledge of iron or steel, or even a system of writing. The empire functioned without money and markets. The Incas took pride in their architecture (such as the Sacsay huaman, still to be admired in Cusco), its extensive road network (Qhapac Ňan), connecting the four parts of the empire, agricultural innovations, and its quipu record keeping, a system of knotted strings.
The empire was well-managed, designed by Pachacuti, laying the groundwork for the empire’s golden age. He established a top-down central government, with the Sepa Inca (descendent of the God of the Sun), as its head, and four provincial governments, Suyus, each governed by an Apu - a term for leaders of high esteem. Pachacuti chose Túpac Inca Yupanqui, a natural-born leader and a great military strategist, as his successor.
The government’s administration was hierarchically organized, from the centre Cusco, via administrative units, Tampu, at the local level, down to the basic Ayllu level, consisting of extended families. Record keeping, such as tax collection, census data, and other relevant information, was done through quipus. Communications between Cusco and the four Parts were maintained by messengers (chasquis) benefitting from the extensive road network. As the Incas did not have a monetary system, taxes consisted of a person’s labour obligation (i.e., mit’a, organised through mandatory corvee labour units, often doubling as military units) to the government.[23] In exchange, the Inca rulers granted their subjects access to land and provided food and drink during official feasts. Mink’a was applied in individual villages for communal work.
Thanks to the conquest of coastal areas, such as Chimor and Nazca, the empire had a large coast line. Nevertheless, the empire was not a maritime one. Overseas contacts were limited, caused by the vulnerability of the reed vessels (caballistos de tetora), and the very large distance between the empire’s coast and civilizations from whose advanced techniques it could have benefitted. Although fish, salt, sea birds, guano, and seaweed added to the Incas well-being, the empire was basically an inward-looking one; its agricultural sector greatly contributed to the population’s well-being.
The empire applied central planning. The state controlled the distribution of land, agricultural production, and resource allocation. Administrative records were kept by civil servants. Exchange of goods was done by way of barter. Through the mit’a system roads, aqueducts, and agricultural terraces were built. In its heyday, i.e., as of Pachacuti and his successors’ rule, the empire was well-run which contributed to political and economic stability.
The economy wasn’t based on the promotion of individual wealth, but aimed at well-being for all. A circular system was in place, in that produced goods by the people flowed to the state, and agricultural surplus from the state back to the people. In times of hardship the government provided emergency food and clothing, free use of aqueducts and terraced plots. In order to boost agricultural productivity, experimental centres were established, where a variety of crops cultivated throughout the empire were improved. This was successful, as the government was able to build a large number of warehouses (qollqas) throughout the empire to store surplus harvests.
Indeed, agriculture was the main economic sector (the potato was the staple food, maize and quinoa, among others, were cultivated widely as well), followed by animal husbandry. Agricultural productivity was based on ancestral knowledge, the improvement of crops, the application of guano, and agricultural tools. Llamas, alpacas, vicunas and guanaco’s were raised for their precious wool and meat. Guanaco meat was the best, but - given strict slaughter restrictions - not always available for the regular citizen, with the exception of the military. However, during ceremonial occasions meat was made available, resulting from the widespread distribution of scarified animals.
The empire may not have been ‘rich’ in a modern sense, yet hardly anybody went hungry. As mentioned, the Inca leadership had a keen interest in improving the agricultural sector’s productivity. Experimental centres just mentioned, promoted diversification of production between the different ecological environments, so that each zone would produce the goods best suited for the soil and climate at hand. All these investments helped to create surplus harvests. The extensive road network, facilitated timely and efficient transportation of goods to the warehouses and, subsequently to the population.
Historian Paul Kennedy observed that victory has repeatedly gone to the side with the more flourishing productive base.[24] An empire can’t be built if its rulers would not have a strong army. The Incas conquered many lands by its large well-trained and well-fed army. Indeed, the Inca army was the most powerful force in pre-Columbian South America. Yet, Incas did not have iron or steel. Their weapons consisted of hardwood helmets and spears, clubs and maces, not much better than those of their opponents.[25] The Incas defeated them by sheer force of their numbers, and by moving swiftly thanks to the empire’s road network. And there was always a warehouse at a short distance to feed the troops.
Even before the Spanish invaded, small pox had already spread throughout the empire. The road network may have contributed to the deadly spread. Other diseases, such as typhoid, influenza, diphtheria and measles, to which the local people were not immune, also contributed to the decimation of the population.
The tight grip the Sepa Incas had during the empire’s golden age had already weakened. Once the Spanish had gained control of the empire, they installed Atahualpa’s brother Manco Inca Yupanqui in power. In 1536, he unsuccessfully attempted to reconquer Cusco. He then retreated to the Andean mountains and established the small Neo-Inca state in Vilcabamba, where he and his successors (initially Titu Cusi, succeeded by Tupac Amaru), ruled for another 36 years. In 1572, Tupac Amaru, was captured and executed by the conquistadores on 24 September of that year. After less than two centuries, the Inca Empire had ended.
Now, how does the Inca Empire’s history compare with what Norberg concludes about the ones he analysed? The Inca Empire was not a maritime empire; neither was it an open society eagerly embracing reason, inventiveness and freedom. The Incas also didn’t absorb advanced technical and intellectual ideas and innovations from more sophisticated overseas civilizations. The Inca rulers were not particularly liberal-minded, unlike the rulers of the civilizations Norberg presents. The empire was strictly ruled by the Sepa Inca, who wielded absolute authority, and by the Apus who governed the Four Parts, ensuring political stability. Barter was applied in economic exchanges, thereby seriously limiting the benefits of trade in which goods and money exchange hands. This was further aggravated by the empire’s inward-orientation, while Norberg’s civilizations greatly benefited from foreign economic contacts.
Conclusion
The Inca Empire was the largest empire in pre-Columbian America. Compared with preceding empires from other continents, the empire lacked political, technical and economic sophistication. Enlightened political philosophy, as developed in Athens, was not part of the Inca playbook. In the economic domain, barter was applied, while 1,800 years’ old Roman coins, for example, had found their way to distant places such as Kerala, India, and Scotland. The Incas had knowledge of astronomy, but other sciences, requiring abstract thinking, were unknown to them. Their architecture is often mentioned as advanced. However, compared with that of e.g., the Egyptians and Romans, not as advanced as theirs.
Nevertheless, what the Incas achieved was simply impressive taken into consideration the limited means (i.e., no wheel, no coins, no alphabet, no advanced technologies borrowed from other civilizations) they had at their disposal and the difficult mountainous lands they governed.
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The second observation challenges Norberg’s insight about openness as a shared phenomenon in explaining economic prowess of the civilizations presented in Peak Human.
Norberg says that the Dutch Republic established the tradition of free trade. And when describing the economic rise of the Abbasid Caliphate, he observes that ‘This was the era when the Islamic world was most open to by victory in science, trade and mobility.’[26] Triggered by victory in the Persian Wars, Athens enjoyed a golden age, giving the city-state the confidence to move ahead under the leadership of the radical democrat Pericles. He said that Athens was open to the world, and foreigners were allowed to live in Athens. Since the city was based on trade, Pericles went on, ‘to us it seems just as natural to enjoy foreign goods as our own local products.’[27] These are just two examples of the civilizations chosen by Norberg that embraced openness and free trade.
However, I observe that not all successful civilizations embraced free trade right from the start. Even the father of liberal economics, Adam Smith (1723-1790) had reservations about free trade - he was not an all-out free trader. He proposed exceptions, for example, by defending tariffs to protect national defence industries to ensure military security. He also welcomed retaliatory tariffs if these could help to negotiate freer trade later.
The economist and political theorist, Friedrich List (1789-1846) championed protection. He argued that although free trade is beneficial among countries of industrial development, but it is not beneficial between those at different levels of development. His thinking greatly influenced Germany’s trade policies, in that he advocated protection for German infant industries.
The great economist and New Liberal, John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) changed his mind about free trade. In 1925, he delivered a lecture entitled Am I a Liberal?, in which he said that he believed in free trade, because, in the long run it was the only policy which was technically sound and intellectually tight. But in that same lecture he also confessed that he no longer believed in the political philosophy of the doctrine of free trade. Four years later, in 1929, Keynes was appointed to the Mac Millan Committee on Finance and Industry, in which he defended import duties and export credits, in support of Britain’s industrial sector.[28]
Even free trader Milton Friedman (1912-2006) admitted that only between the American Civil War and the First World War, the US resembled a laissez faire and free enterprise society as close as one could hope to observe in practice.[29]
South Korea, one of the four successful four Asian Tigers, applied a set of unorthodox economic policies that catapulted the country to a high-income status in a very short time span. But it was not openness that did the trick, as Cambridge economics professor Ha-Joon Chang argues in Bad Samaritans.[30] The secret of its success laid in a judicious mix of protection and open trade, with the areas of protection constantly changing as new infant industries were developed and old infant industries became internationally competitive. Chang illustrates this mixing of protection and openness with Samsung’s rapid growth. The company subsidized its infant electronics subsidiaries for more than a decade with income Samsung made in textiles and sugar refining. If they had faithfully followed market signals in the way developing countries were told to by the Bad Samaritans, Samsung would still be refining imported sugar cane, concludes Chang.
Way back in the eighteenth’s and nineteenth’s century, The United Kingdom and the United States applied protectionist policies to build up their respective industrial sector.[31] Chang brings Alexander Hamilton, America’s first Treasury Secretary, to mind, who, in his 1791 Report on the Subject of Manufactures, argued that the federal government should protect American industry until it was strong enough to compete with foreign companies. Hamilton’s trade policy was firmly established by 1820 and would last beyond The First World War.
Conclusion
In his description of civilizations’ golden age, Norberg does not discuss the beginnings of trade nor the issue of protection. This is an omission. It would have been interesting, certainly for economists, if he had included both in his analyses. Anglosphere’s ‘trail blazers’, the UK and America, applied protection in the build-up phase of their industrial sectors. And so did South Korea among many other modern economies. Free trade can be seen as an ideal-typical form of trade; something to aim for, but never fully attained, as Milton Friedman admitted.
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The third observation concerns the question whether Anglosphere’s decline would be imminent.
The Dutch Republic emerged in the 17th century after a successful rebellion against the Habsburg Empire. The rebellion was led by a group of maverick merchants and radical Calvinists. What this group brought about impressed Norberg: ‘And, most astonishingly, while this brutal and costly war against the Spanish was going on, through an unprecedentedly open intellectual climate, the Dutch developed an extraordinary efflorescence, with world-leading artists like Vermeer and Rembrandt, merchants and financiers who created the world’s first modern economy, and printing houses, scientists and philosophers who kickstarted the Enlightenment.’[32]
When reading Norberg’s description of the Dutch Republic’s golden age and - in particular - its subsequent decline, my initial thought was that after more than three centuries, the Netherlands still belongs to the world’s 20 highest-income per capita countries.
The Dutch Republic created the first modern economy and became the richest country on the planet. This was not just a precursor of what was to come (i.e., the Anglosphere) but since the Republics’ days, the Netherlands remains one of the world’s richest countries in income per capita terms. So, no decline, but ongoing bliss, surely with ups and downs along the way. Thanks to the country’s liberal policies, it continued its upward trajectory. Let me illustrate this with some figures.

What do the tables tell us?
In 1700,The Dutch Republic was the richest country on earth, at some distance followed by the United Kingdom (UK). The year 1848 in table 1 was chosen, as it was the first year UK’s per capita income was higher than the one of the Netherlands. In 1913, for the first time per capita GDP of the United States surpassed all other countries’ per capita income. In 1967, the Netherlands overtook the UK in per capita income terms. Sweden is included in the tables to show how successful this Northern country was in catching up. The same applies to Japan and Asian Tiger South Korera.
All countries included in the tables belong to the league of the world’s 50 highest income countries. The Netherlands occupies slot 15 on the list, confirming my conclusion that, after more than three centuries, the country is still doing very well and not showing signs of decline. This goes, by and large, for all other countries included in the table.2.
A country’s total GDP obviously is a different matter. Here we enter the terrain of global economic and geopolitical power, still dominated by the United States, closely followed by China, while India is breathing down China’s neck, so to speak. True, the European Union has the largest internal market, but this does not translate into global political and military prowess. The simple reason is that the EU is a Union and not a federation of states. European foreign politics is conducted by individual member states, thereby seriously diluting EU’s global political standing.[33] From a monetary vantage point, the Euro may become the world’s reserve currency, which would turn the EU in a monetary hegemon. However, this depends on the way America will be managing the dollar and its ballooning public debt, and what other powerful countries (i.e., China joined by Russia) may undertake to undermine the dollar’s role as the global reserve currency.[34]
Sixteen years ago, Ian Morris published a book with the intriguing title: Why the West Rules - For Now (2010), which caused quite a stir among scientists and opinion makers at the time. As the title of his book suggests decline, it deserves being summarized here.The book goes a very long way back in the history of mankind. He quotes Winston Churchill who observed that the farther backward you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.[35] And this is exactly what Morris did, as his story begins some 15,000 years ago.
The world’s most developed societies have almost always been ones that descended from either the original Eurasian Western or Eastern core.[36] When the Atlantic rose to prominence in the seventeenth century, those people best placed to exploit it - at first chiefly the British[37], then their former colonists in America - created new kinds of empires and economies and unlocked energy from fossil fuels, leaving the East behind.[38] And that, concludes Morris, is why the West rules, however, for now.
Some analysts predict that prosperity will Westernize the East. Asking whether the West still rules will then be a meaningless question, precisely because the whole world will have become Western.[39] Others, however, argue that Western rule will first result in a fragmented global order, with multiple currency zones and spheres of military influence, each dominated by its own cultural traditions. But eventually, China will rule the world and the world will be Easternized.[40]Morris expects that China will probably lead the Eastern Rule, emulating America.[41]
He published this projection in 2010, while acknowledging America’s resilience in recovering from the financial meltdown in 2007/8. At the same time, he also mentions China’s problems, ranging from the upward movement of wages, its aging population, growing inequality between urban and rural China, to the country’s shortage of fossil fuels. Morris then applies his social development index[42] to predict what the situation may be some hundred years from now. If Eastern and Western social development keep on rising at the same speed as in the twentieth century, the East will take the lead in 2103.[43] However, Morris does not suggest that the West (read: the Anglosphere) will decline; he says that the West will continue its upward pace, but overtaken by China. However, the race between West and East will have no finishing line – both will continue to grow.
We already saw that Norberg mentions signs of Anglosphere’s decline. But he does not say that China would become the new hegemon enjoying a new, different, golden age. Instead, he concludes, as we saw, that everyone can emulate ideas that will make societies prosper. But divides will be cropping up within societies; between cities; regions; businesses and between individuals, i.e., between those who embrace transformation and those who embrace stagnation. In sum, Norberg is looking further into the future and, with some optimism, suggests that a variety of golden ages may be beckoning.
My view on the matter is the following. Anglosphere’s liberal economic philosophy resulted in sustained growth and prosperity, including attaining the good life[44] for citizens of countries having adopted this philosophy of openness, global free trade, curiosity, taking new ideas on board and turning them into productivity-enhancing technologies. All this supported by tolerance, checks and balances, the promotion of talent and meritocracy, equality before the law, and protection of private property. As elaborated at the beginning of this section, the countries having adopted these policies are not in decline; instead, they continue their upward trajectory.
Recent economic history also confirms what I just observed. The World Bank’s Commission on Growth and Development (2006) studied the spectacular economic growth of nine emerging economies and four Asian Tigers.[45] Since 1950, they all had grown at more than 7% per annum for at least a quarter century.[46] The Commission wanted to find out what exactly triggered their rapid economic growth.There were six secrets of success: (i) commitment to growth in combination with effective governance, (ii) high saving and investment rates, (iii) fast export growth, (iv) macroeconomic stability, (v) knowledge and technology import, and (vi) market-friendly policies. All 13 countries made the most of the global economy. Sustained growth at this pace was not possible before 1950. It became feasible only because the world economy became more open and more tightly integrated.[47]
Nowadays, global economic openness is under threat as a result of tariff wars, nationalist industrial policies and a general hollowing out of the global rules-based system of doing business. But is it really?On 2 April 2025, president Trump announced increased import tariffs for a very large number of countries which, according to Trump, were ‘screwing’ the United States, threatening America’s national security. Affected countries, including the European Union, struck deals with America resulting in somewhat lower tariffs, but appreciably higher than the ones they enjoyed before April 2025.Well before Trump’s announcement many countries were already rushing into new bilateral or regional trade deals. Based on data of the World Trade Organization, McKinsey reports[48] that 225 bilateral and 82 regional trade agreements have either been concluded and signed[49], or advanced to ratification stages. All involved clearly understood that low import and export tariffs promote not just international trade, but low tariffs also contribute to economic growth and prosperity.
Conclusion
Anglosphere is not in decline. Despite president Trump’s attempts to break down the global rules-based liberal order, affected countries rapidly signed trade deals to mitigate the damage done, understanding that low tariffs promote international trade and, at home, sustained economic growth and prosperity.
Epilogue
Bloomberg Opinion’s columnist Adrian Wooldridge warns that the cost of the breakdown of liberal regimes has invariably been steeper than anybody expected at the time. In the course of the 1920s and 1930s, the collapse of the liberal regimes in Europe led to the rise of Mussolini and Hitler and their imitators. The illiberal regimes that replaced them were horrific, writes Wooldridge, because they rejected liberal constraints on power. And illiberal regimes in the hands of strongmen surround themselves with cronies, plunder the state and feud with rival regimes.[50] The author quotes a study of 51 populist leaders over120 years, which concluded that after fifteen years of their reign, GDP per capita was on average 10 percent lower than in non-populist ones.[51]
For more than two hundred years, liberal policies have been adopted by a rising number of countries. As a result, the world is a better place in various ways.
The general mood now is that what president Trump did in breaking down the global economic order and replacing it by a far less liberal one, is here to stay. This is shortsighted and wrong. History, including economic history, demonstrates that time and again disastrous policies were eventually replaced by liberal policies simply because they have proven their resilience and dynamism.[52] Surely, recovery does not come automatically; it requires citizens to confront failure, resist abuses of power, and showing their misgivings in protests and, above all, through the ballot box.
Would this imply that liberal policies, introduced by the Anglosphere, carry so much political and economic convincing power that they will continue to be embraced by a large majority of countries around the world? Or, as Anne Applebaum wonders in Autocracy,. Inc, would autocracies, such as China and Russia, be able to create a global system that benefits thieves, criminals, dictators and perpetrators of mass murder?[53] If countries fend these threats off and, instead, embrace liberal policies, there would be a good chance that political stability and sustained growth will prevail. Anglosphere’s liberal philosophy will then be preserved and decline will be something of past civilizations.
[1] Purnell, S. 92025) Kingmaker. London: Vigaro Press, 43.
[2] Norberg, J. (2025) Peak Human; What we Can Learn From the Rise and Fall of Golden Ages. London: Atlantic Books, 3.[
[3] Ibid, 435.
[4] Mokyr, J. ( 2017) A Culture of Change; The Origins of the Modern Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[5] Peak Human, 5.
[6] ‘Contested’, as Norberg writes on page 17: ‘At Thermopylae, the Spartans were not 300 but probably more than five thousand with other Greek allies. Sparta decided not to risk their main army far from the hometown and blamed their small number on two ongoing festivals that forced the bulk to stay at home.’
[7] Peak Human, 39.
[8] This was achieved after a natural calamity (i.e., drought) and invaders with deadlier weapons. As a result, the population declined during those dark ages. Consequently, the governing aristocrats had to hand over more power and land to the farm workers who were still left. The latter managed to get property rights to their plots, which they could pass on to their children.
[9] Peak Human, 22.[
10] British philosopher Alfred North Whitehead once described the whole European philosophical tradition as a series of footnotes to Plato.[11] Paul Kennedy observes in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers:’...if a state overextends itself strategically – by, say, the conquest of extensive territories or the waging of costly wars – it runs the risk that the potential benefits from external expansion may be outweighed by the great expense of it all – a dilemma which becomes acute if the nation concerned has entered a period of relative economic decline. Source: Kennedy , P. (1988) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers; Economic Change and Military conflict from 1500 to 2000. London: Fontana Press, xvi.
[12] Thucydides observed that like all democracies, now that they [Athenians; PdH] were terrified, were ready to put everything in order.[
13] Peak Human, 427.
[14] Morris, I. (2010) Why the West Rules – For Now; The Patterns of History and What They Reveal About The Future. London: Profile Books, 11.
[15] Peak Human, 437.
[16] Why the West Rules -For Now, 13.
[17] Peak Human, 430.
[18] Ibid., 442.[19] Morris leaves the question about Anglosphere’s future open, however with a possible gloomy prospect: ‘The great question for our times is not whether the West will continue to rule. It is whether humanity as a whole will break through to an entirely new kind of existence before disaster strikes us down - permanently.’ Source: Why The West Rules - For Now, 36.
[20] Ibid., 445.
[21] Due to the absence of horses in Peru, the Incas did not develop tactics to fight cavalry. Yet they had conquered much terrain thanks to their well-organized and disciplined army that applied superior tactics.
[22] ‘In 1533 he [Pizarro; PdH] kidnapped the Inca king Atahualpa and as ransom ordered his subjects to stuff a room twenty-two feet long, seventeen feet across, and nine feet high with treasure. Pizarro melted the accumulated artistic triumphs of Andean civilization into ingots -13,420 pounds of gold and 26,000 pounds of silver – and then strangled Atahualpa anyway.’ Source: Why the West Rules - For Now, 460.
[23] In 1573, the Mit’a system was adopted by the Spanish colonisers in Bolivia and Peru. Source: De Haan, P. (2020) Whatever Happened to the Third World; A history of the Economics of Development. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 196.
[24] Kennedy, P. (1988) The Rise and Fall of Great Powers; Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000. London: Fontana Press, xxvii.
[25] A favourite strategy was rolling big rocks downhill into the enemy, taking advantage of the mountainous terrain.
[26] Peak Human, 130.
[27] Ibid., 42.
[28] Keynes’s opinion was much to the chagrin of another vocal member of the committee, Lionel Robbins, a London School of Economics free trader. Robbins wanted his dissenting opinion included in the committee’s report, as an annex. Keynes tried very hard to block it, but in the end he reluctantly accepted Robbins’ demand.
[29] De Haan, P. (2025) Great Economists and the Evolution of Economic of Liberalism; How Philiosophy Has Helped Shape Economics. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 172.
[30] Chang, H-J. (2008) Bad Samaritans; The Myth of Free Trade and The Secret History of Capitalism. New York: Bloomsbury Press.
[31] This also applied to Japan when, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the Minister of Industry in the Meji government, Okubo Toshimichi, recognized the need for protection and state-led industrialization as a precondition for catching up with the West.
[32] Peak Human, 288-289.
[33] Chinese politicians ‘see Europe as an economic giant with puny geopolitical leverage, hobbled by its need for consensus among 27 members.’ Source: The Economist, 16 May 2026, 26.
[34] ‘America’s rivals are, for example, experimenting with alternatives to the dollar in international finance. These alternatives do not have to match the dollar in order to erode America’s financial clout. If they can capture even 10% of the market in small and medium-size countries, they can make a big difference...’. Source: The Economist, 26 July 2025, 63.
[35] Why the West Rules – For Now, 13.
[36] The West encompasses all societies that have descended from this westernmost of Eurasian cores, encompassing the Mediterranean Basin and Europe, and - much more recently - the Americas and Australasia. The East refers to all societies that descend from the easternmost of Eurasian cores. Two New World cores in Mexico and Peru have their own fascinating histories, Morris acknowledges, but he concentrates on the West-East divide.
[37] This is what Paul Kennedy observed: ‘Possessing fewer obstacles to change, European societies entered into a constantly upward spiral of economic growth and enhanced military effectiveness which, over time, was to carry them ahead of all other regions of the globe.’ Source: The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, xvii.
[38] Morris writes on page 18 of Why the West Rules -For Now: ‘The West has not been locked into global dominance since the distant past; only after 1800 CE, on the eve of the Opium War, did the West pull temporarily ahead of the East….’
[39] Ibid., 588.
[40] Ibid., 589.
[41] Morris was obviously not alone in his expectation. The economic historian Angus Maddison, among quite a few others, calculated that in 2020, China’s gross domestic product would overtake America’s.
[42] The social development index includes four traits to measure social development: energy capture, organization/urbanization, war-making, and information technology.
[43] Why the West Rules - For Now, 582.
[44] ‘The liberal theory of the good life starts with a negative; prudence requires us to block the roads to hell before building the stairways to heaven.’ Source: Wooldridge, A. (2026) Centrists of the World UNITE!; The Lost Genius of Liberalism. London: Allen Lane, 316.
45] Botswana, Brazil, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Malta, Oman, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.
46] World Bank (2008) The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development. Washington, DC: World Bank.[47] Ibid., 21.
[48] The report was published on 10 December 2025. It said that the trade deals are moderating the impact of recent US tariffs, which have risen from an average weighted tariff of approximately 2.0 percent in 2024 to one of 15.4 percent as of mid-November 2025.
[49] Just one example: the European Union concluded a regional trade deal with Mercosur countries, after 25 years of negotiations.
[50] Centrists of the World UNITE, 307-308.
[51] Ibid., 308.
[52] ‘During its long history, liberalism has suffered from several near-death experiences only to revive and come back stronger than before.’ Source: Centrists of the World UNITE, xx.
[53] Appelbaum, A. (2024) Autocracy, Inc., The Dictators Who Want to Run the World. London: Allen Lane, 159.Dit is een paragraaf. Klik hier om je eigen tekst toe te voegen.
Essay 2026
Tinbergen’s dilemma
Introduction
Articles and books about economics read more like computer manuals than literature. With a bit of wicked imagination one can blame Jan Tinbergen for this observation. After all, he and Norwegian economist Ragnar Frisch invented econometrics, ushering in the econometrics revolution. In 1969, Frisch and Tinbergen received the first Nobel Prize in Economics.[1] The lingua franca of econometrics is mathematics, and - it must be admitted – economists more and more writen in that language.
Is this regrettable? Yes, it is. Young economists will probably not enjoy, like their elderly peers, the writings of dead economists such as John Maynard Keynes, Joseph Schumpeter, Friedrich Hayek, John Kenneth Galbraith and Tibor Scitovsky. They hardly used mathematics in their accessible, elegant and sometimes ironic texts.
Now, what about the Tinbergen dilemma? Almost all important economists have one characteristic in common: they combine their research, based upon scientific principles, with their philosophical convictions. Pareto, Schumpeter, Keynes, Hayek, Samuelson, Friedman, Stiglitz, Krugman, Mazzucato, Piketty and Duflo, to name just a few, analyse economic problems having their philosophical convictions in mind.
Why is this? A Dutch economic methodologist once observed that without these convictions, any economic model would be devoid of a soul - devoid of life.[2] In the same vein, Schumpeter once said that all great economists had a particular vision which gave their academic work direction and colour. Many economists do not conceal the fact that they describe the world in economic terms but want to change it along the lines of their philosophy. Tinbergen was no exception; he applied mathematical models in his economic work in pursuit of stability, welfare, justice, and peace. Now, his dilemma was that mathematical models cannot fully capture the complexities of an economy.
Economics cannot one-on-one be compared with the natural sciences. This is simply because economists study society, which is not dictated by the unchanging laws of nature. Instead, economic dynamics are brought about by unpredictable and ever-changing social, political, psychological and cultural forces. As john Hicks so eloquently observed: ‘The more characteristic economic problems are problems of change, or growth and retrogression, and of fluctuation. The extent to which these can be reduced into scientific terms is rather limited; for at every stage in an economic process new things are happening, things which have not happened before – at the most they are rather like what has happened before.’[3] Yet, Tinbergen devoted his scientific life to get a grip on the dynamics of the economy in pursuit of, indeed, stability, welfare, peace and justice.
Part I Tinbergen’s life and work
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1 From physicist to economist
During the 1920s, Jan Tinbergen (1903-1994) studied physics at Leiden University. He belonged to a small group of brilliant students enjoying the inspirational lectures of professor Paul Ehrenfest (1880-1933), who in 1911 had come from Vienna to Leiden to succeed Hendrik Lorentz (1853-1928), Holland’s most famous physicist and Nobel laureate at the time. Ehrenfest stimulated young Tinbergen to apply mathematics to economic problems.[4] This was a defining inspiration for Tinbergen’s professional life.
Another inspiration was Tinbergen’s upbringing in a politically progressive family. He was an idealist - a lifelong peace loving social-democrat, inspired by the upbringing of his parents, and his membership of the Arbeiders Jeugd Centrale (AJC) (Workers Youth Central), a club for youngsters in which the ideals of socialism were promoted. Tinbergen’s early association with the Remonstrant Brotherhood also contributed to his ethical formation.
These vital inspirations, his upbringing, Ehrenfest, and his appreciation of the ethical dimension of socialism which in the course time would become more policy-oriented, prompted him to bid farewell to physics and to become an economist.
1.2 Ehrenfest and Tinbergen
Paul Ehrenfest was neither a socialist nor an economist; he was a brilliant physicist. Albert Einstein (1879-1955) visited him regularly in Leiden to brainstorm. Ehrenfest had the gift to, in a Socratic manner, unearth the essence of a scientific problem. This helped Einstein in clarifying problems he was struggling with. Ehrenfest also received visits from other world famous physicists, such as Bohr, Becquerel, and Fermi. He turned Leiden into the place-to-be for physicists.
Tinbergen admired Ehrenfest; he adored him like a father, according to Erwin Dekker, Tinbergen’s biographer.[5] During the second half of the 1920s, Tinbergen wrote his PhD thesis supervised by Ehrenfest. One chapter was about economics. Ehrenfest had suggested his young student to study economics on the side, as Ehrenfest took a lively interest in it. He had, for example, shared his mathematical analysis of oligopolistic competition with Tinbergen, and introduced him to the mathematical economics of Arthur Bowley, Knut Wicksell, Vilfredo Pareto, and Francis Edgeworth.
This may sound remarkable to the contemporary reader; however, before the outbreak of the Great Depression in 1929, the economy, like physics, was believed to be a system driven by the forces of nature. It was believed that these forces were much more powerful than those of the state.[6]
While working on his thesis, Tinbergen contributed articles to scientific journals about economic topics, such as measuring the business cycle. In doing so, he made a distinction between seasonal fluctuations, structural developments, and the movement of the business cycle as such. He wondered which explanation was consistent with the movement of the cycle. Tinbergen believed that, as in physics, cumulative variables played an important part in a business cycle’s movement. Take the movement of inventories: they will increase in a cycle’s downturn, and diminish once the upswing presents itself. Ehrenfest had enthusiastically read Tinbergen’s business cycle article and wrote him that he should pursue a career in economics. He predicted that much good would come out of it.
Tinbergen followed Ehrenfest’s advice, not least because he firmly believed that he should apply his analytical and mathematical talents to contribute to a better society. He could then not have foreseen that he, together with Ragnar Frisch (1895-1973), would develop an entirely new dimension of the economic science: econometrics.
Once he had become an economist, Tinbergen gave up the idea of analogies between physics and economics. He was preoccupied with the question how economic research could be made relevant for policy makers. His biographer Dekker observes that, with the help of scientific tools, Tinbergen’s work was directed at achieving political and social aims, inspired by socialist ideals. In most of Tibvergen’s writings, the interaction between societal and economic problems shines through.
Tinbergen also took an interest in statistics. In 1927 he joined, as a conscientious objector, the Netherlands’ Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), where he continued analysing the business cycle. In an ironical sense, Tinbergen was lucky that only a few months after he had joined the CBS, the Great Depression broke out.
1.3 The Econometric Society
Meanwhile, Frisch had established the Econometric Society. Econometrics, according to Frisch, consisted of a combination of economic theory, statistics, and mathematics. Its aim is to estimate economic relationships, to test theories and to evaluate policies. Econometrics transforms theoretical claims into testable empirical propositions that can be expressed in a precise mathematical form and statistically estimates their parameters.[7] In 1931, the first reunion took place in Lausanne, Switzerland. Tinbergen attended the meeting. Two years later, Tinbergen hosted the Econometric Society meeting in Leiden. Ehrenfest was to deliver a speech. This did not happen as he tragically committed suicide just before the event. In a farewell letter to his students he wrote that he had lost contact with physics and mathematics; it was the essence of his despair.
1.4 The business cycle
In 1933, Tinbergen published a popular book entitled De Konjunktuur (The Business Cycle) in which he boldly proposed that government should play a prominent role in the economy, supported by more planning. He strongly felt that it was his duty to help bring mass unemployment down and to reform the capitalist system.[8] For Tinbergen science was no longer a weapon in the ideological battle. Science should be applied as a means to analyse a particular problem, identify its causes and, while addressing them, help overcome political differences. In other words, science could lead the way to solutions and political consensus.
Tinbergen became convinced that science could serve as an instrument in achieving political aims - for him no science pour science. Indeed, in the course of his professional life he became more and more associated with politics. However, he was sceptical about the democratisation process taking place. Surely, as he admitted, education could be a great help in the emancipation of the masses, but miracles should not be expected. Societal progress was to be promoted by a relatively small well-educated section of society, of which he formed part.
Tinbergen expressed concerns about the functioning of democracies. In 1964, for example, he argued that for the majority of developing countries parliamentary democracy would not work. In the few instances where it did, it was due to exceptional leadership or exceptional circumstances. He also repeated his conviction that development, whether it was economic or cultural, was brought about by elites.
Much to Tinbergen’s regret he observed that people in welfare states had become too materialistic, while he, again like Keynes, had hoped to see improvement in cultural, social, and moral values as well.
1.5 The first macroeconomic model
An impressive example of Tinbergen’s political engagement was his contribution to the Social Democratic Workers Party’s Labour Plan. It consisted of the construction of the first ever macroeconomic model of a national economy. Dekker argues that this was Tinbergen’s most important contribution to the economic science.[9] Tinbergen worked in an area where politics and economics straddle. He often would be more driven by ideological considerations rather than by scientific inspirations, concludes Dekker.[10] The biographer also observes that for Tinbergen ideals and science were important. However, both had to serve political progress.[11]
In the early 1930s, Tinbergen argued that not one but various equilibria could exist in an economic system. He based this new insight on the proposals of Dutch economist Tjalling Koopmans (who was trained as a physicist, like Tinbergen). Keynes concluded likewise in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, which came out in 1936.
Keynes analysed the economy as a whole, thereby introducing a new way of looking at economics: macroeconomics was born, so to speak. No longer market dynamics and price movements called the shorts, other factors and actors also played a part, in particular government. A positive side-effect of macroeconomics was the need to collect macroeconomic data, such as measuring Gross Domestic Product (GDP), national saving and investment, etc..
Keynes was criticised for presenting a static model. Roy Harrod (1900-1978) made Keynes’s theory dynamic, in which he introduced a moving equilibrium in a growing economy.[12] In 1935, Tinbergen also developed a dynamic theoretical model. A theory is dynamic if it contains variables, such as investments, from different time periods. This model was supposed to represent the economy in an attempt to find a balance between real economic life and the model’s simplicity. Not just one general model would suffice; no, depending on their purpose, various models could be developed.
We perceive a model world as credible by being able to think of it as a world that could be real– not in the sense of assigning positive subjective probability to the event that it is real, but in the sense that it is compatible with what we know, or think we know, about the general laws governing events in the real world.[13]
Surely, models represent a simplified version of the real world.[14] Tinbergen stressed that it was important to analyse which consequence adjustments of the model’s assumptions would have on the outcome over the long term.[15] Tinbergen‘s idea was that the outcome of a certain policy were to a large extent defined by the structure of an economy.
Tinbergen and Frisch’s model was based upon the idea of a circular flow, translated into mathematical terms. [16] Frisch was the theoretical mathematician, while Tinbergen was focussed on the model’s policy relevance. Their first model consisted of 18 equations and 18 variables. However, it fell short of demonstrating how much each variable exerted its influence. A year later, in 1936, a fully completed model of the Dutch economy (this time consisting of 24 equations and 24 variables) saw the light, filled with statical data of the 1920s.
This extended model was truly econometrics in action: the combination of mathematics, statistics and economic theory. However, traditionally trained economists had difficulties understanding the mathematics involved. Tinbergen proposed his employer to expand CBS’s department in charge of research of the business cycle so that more economists would become familiar with the model’s mathematics.
Around the time of this model’s launch, Tinbergen had developed a clear vison about how econometrics had to be further developed. Its characteristics would have to be: (i) dynamic, (ii) a combination of theory and empirics, (iii) emphasizing institutional characteristics, and (iv) optimistic in its outlook. Tinbergen felt, as noted, that econometrics could also serve as a referee in political-economic debates.
Should learning about economic phenomena process essentially inductively or deductively? This intriguing question is dealt with by Reiss. John Stuart Mill was an early proponent of the deductive approach, observes Reiss. This was so Mill thought that the economic world was too complex and could not be controlled experimentally. Mill’s ‘theory first’ view became the dominant opinion in economics. However, from time to time, inductivists offered alternatives, engaging theorists in methodological debates. Representatives of the German Historical School and Austrian School entered into a fierce debate. The Germans promoted an evidence-based, inductive model of economic study against the deductive approach of the Austrians. The Germans won, but not forever. Tinbergen’s ally Tjalling Koopmans criticized inductivism. The situation now is that the so-called ‘Mostly Harmless Econometrics’ movement applies an inductive approach, but their critics, such as James Hackman and Angus Deaton apply a deductivist approach. In 2013, Reiss predicted that the latter would once more win and that, consequently, a new school of inductivist econometrics would arise in about 50 years. [17]
Regarding the institutional dimension, Tinbergen had institutions in mind which together formed the organisation of an economy, including markets (e.g., of monopolies, oligopolies, or markets of perfect competition). As he was aware of ongoing changes in a society’s economic structure, he was sceptical about econometric models’ predictive capacity. Nonetheless, instability should always be prevented as much as possible. The economy could, Tinbergen argued, be steered into a desired direction through the implementation of the right policies and with the help of appropriate institutions. He presented economic consequences of various policies with his characteristic aplomb. This was not always appreciated as others were not so sure about them. Tinbergen remained undeterred (some said he was stubborn); he had a unwavering trust in his abilities and approach.
1.6 Public interest
Yet, Tinbergen was neither blind nor deaf for the changing mood in society and in economics. Later in life, he broadened his objectives beyond socialist ideals to serve the public interest triggered by the ongoing emancipation of the working class. As a result, he did not any longer write for the labour movement; his aim became broader: to contribute to a better organisation of the economy, so as to better manage public finance and, above all, to ensure political stability.
Economics was becoming an integral subject of politics in the modernising world. This implied a much wider coverage of economics than what used to be the standard as, for example, reflected in Lionel Robbins’ celebrated Essay on The Nature and Significance of Economic Science. Therein, the economic science was portrayed as autonomous, free from any political and ethical notions. Robbins’ definition of economics, underscores this tellingly: ‘….the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.’[18]
Tinbergen had a clear idea of what economics was about: it constituted the process of the satisfaction of human needs. This process takes place within a context of natural, technical, and societal/ institutional circumstances, which are assumed as given.
Later in life, he would say that the central problem of economics was the comparison of different economic systems. The normative role of economics was to identify the most optimal order of an economy. During the 1950s, Tinbergen became convinced that the crucial question for the economist was: how and by whom are political and economic decisions made and what would be the best structure of the economic decision tree? He expected more of improvements in this structure than of Keynesian anti-cyclical approaches.
This change of the political mood had its impact on the composition of political parties. After the end of World War II (WWII), broadly composed people’s parties emerged which were to dominate the political arena, without giving up their original socio-democratic, liberal, conservative, or religious inspiration. But let us return to Tinbergen’s activities during the 1930s.
1.7 The business cycle revisited
Towards the end of the 1930s, Tinbergen started to work for the League of Nations. For the League he produced a report on the business cycle, elaborating the model which he had designed earlier. This model was supposed to test the relevance of various business cycle theories at hand. The result was not welcomed by traditional political economists. Keynes, not at all warming to the application of more and more mathematics to economics, acidly observed that the statistics applied by Tinbergen had been grossly inadequate. He added that it had been a nightmare to have to read the report.[19] This is what Robert Skidelsky, Keynes’s biographer, observed: ‘There is no doubt that Keynes’s philosophic objection to induction gave a strong anti-empirical bias to his economics, despite his repeated calls for better data. While he aimed to choose models capable of explaining the ‘facts of experience’, his models are not derived from experience, but from introspection.’[20]
Tjalling Koopmans urged Tinbergen to write a strongly worded reaction on Keynes’s criticism, which he had published in The Economic Journal, of which Keynes was the Editor, by the way. Keynes had invited Tinbergen to send a reaction. Tinbergen complied; but not as strongly worded as Koopmans had suggested. Keynes reacted as follows: ‘No one could be more frank, more painstaking, more free from subjective bias or parti pris than Professor Tinbergen. There is no one, therefore, so far as human qualities go, whom it would be safer to trust with black magic. That there is anyone I would trust with it at the present stage or that this brand of statistical alchemy is ripe to become a branch of science, I am not yet persuaded. But Newton, Boyle and Locke all played with alchemy. So let him continue.'[21]
Worse, Frisch, his scientific soulmate, observed that Tinbergen’s model could not work as a test instrument for business cycle theories, which, as noted, had been the original purpose. Obviously, Frisch’s conclusion pained Tinbergen, but they continued to cooperate. The relationship between Tinbergen and Keynes would remain a cool one, to put it mildly. Their personalities and their respective approach to the business cycle and the economy at large were simply too diverse.
1.8 New perspectives
Tinbergen’s work at the League of Nations prepared him for the post-war period: assisting newly independent nations. During 1944, when WWII was in its end phase, he published International Economic Co-operation. In it, he presented conditions for the creation of a stable international economic order. His proposed international monetary system was to prevent devaluation and would manage an internationally coordinated business cycle policy. Tinbergen believed that the business cycle was an international phenomenon which should be controlled by international stability policies and the creation of new institutions. The system’s ultimate objective was to achieve high production figures and global stability. His proposals about the establishment of an international clearing fund and a bank for reconstruction and development were not very far from what Keynes had proposed and what was agreed during the 1944 Bretton Woods conference: the creation of The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
1.10 Changing perspectives
During WWII, Tinbergen continued to work for CBS while also writing books and articles. One book stood out, published in 1944: De les van dertig jaar: economische mogelijkheden en ervaringen (Lesson learned from thirty years: economic possibilities and experiences). Tinbergen wrote in critical terms about Roosevelt’s New Deal, while Hitler’s approach to the Great Depression met with his appreciation: ‘For Germany the period 1933-1939 was one in which production and employment increased dramatically.’[22] Tinbergen observed that before Hitler assumed the position of Reichskanzler, the German bureaucracy had prepared plans for the implementation of large public works. Hitler implemented them, in line with what Keynes would propose three years later in The General Theory.
During the 1930s, new policy instruments were developed to get a grip on the economy. This helped economists, not least Tinbergen, to come up with proposals to steer the economy into the desired direction. And that this steering was indeed possible, was proven by what Germany’s and Italy’s fascist regimes had demonstrated. Much earlier, the Soviet Union had started to apply central economic planning. In sum, the mood was that the economy could be designed in whatever political system, ranging from socialist to liberal, in which the government could (and should) intervene.
This was of course quite different from the traditional notions of the economy being a natural phenomenon, obeying the laws of nature. Tinbergen observed that economics had matured - it had become a true science! Therefore, economists would command more prestige and influence. Government was more and more perceived as manager of the economy. Mathematic expertise in economics was best suited to advise government of whichever colour or stripe. After WWII, some economists believed that they had a moral responsibility to use their knowledge for the betterment of society. Needless to say, Tinbergen was one of them.
1.11 Crossroads
After WWII had ended, the question was whether Tinbergen would pursue an academic career, for example, in joining a prestigious American or British university, or would he opt for a position in which he could influence policy making? He chose the latter.[23]
In 1945, Tinbergen was appointed Director of the Netherlands’ Centraal Plan Bureau (CPB) (Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis). He concentrated his work on the technology of economic planning, while not overlooking emancipatory social and cultural objectives.
As for the planning part, it took seven years before CPB began using an improved version of Tinbergen’s 1936 model. CPB still uses this model, by the way. Meanwhile Tinbergen had become an influential voice in government’s policy making; this was exactly what he wanted. He argued that economic policy should be designed by experts and not by unqualified and ideologically biased people. However, Tinbergen was above all a scientist; he lacked the necessary political intuition and cunning.
Economic stability remained Tinbergen’s main objective. To achieve this, he argued that economic planning in broad terms was needed, while allowing sufficient manoeuvring space for the private sector. However, leaving the market to itself would result in a sub-optimal situation; it would not contribute to the economy’s stability. Institutional reforms were called for, including the correction of market failures. He identified three factors that, together, create order in the economy: (i) the market, (ii) expertise, and (iii) cooperation.
1.12 Decision models
The models developed in the 1930s had been constructed from the vantage point of spectators, so to speak. During the 1950s, more sophisticated models were developed in which the policy maker played an active part. They became known as decision models, in which alternative decisions were explicitly built into the model as essential variables. These models gained not just international recognition but criticism as well. Robert Lucas, for example, argued that the model assumed that citizens would not adjust their attitude in case new policies would be introduced, while, as Lucas argued, they certainly would.[24]
1.13 The economist’s role
Tinbergen’s thinking changed over time. In his early idealistic AJC days, he believed that changes would be brought about by society, while Tinbergen the economist argued that economic change would be promoted by policy makers at the macro level, advised by economic experts. These experts and policy makers participated in the decision making process. It was the role of the expert economist to take some distance from the model, to compare different institutional frameworks and different ‘rules of the game’, and - based upon them - propose the most optimal economic order. This was, argued Tinbergen, the challenge par excellence for the economic science.[25]
During his CPB directorship Tinbergen was closely associated with policy makers. In 1954, Tinbergen bade farewell to the CPB and resumed his role as academic economist, casting his net wider.
1.14 Entering a cosmopolitan world
In 1951, Tinbergen attended a conference in New Delhi, hosted by India’s International Statistical Institute. It was the first time Tinbergen visited a poor developing country. The poverty he saw in New Delhi’s slums shocked him. He decided then and there to help promote economic growth and development of poor countries and to develop proposals about an international economic order in which newly independent developing countries would get a voice. Tinbergen became more and more drawn to development economics. The bottleneck was, as he observed, the scarcity of capital, which was urgently needed to increase a developing country’s productivity in agriculture and, above all, in manufacturing. This was best achieved with the help of development planning.
In 1956, Tinbergen visited India for the second time to help design India’s Second Five Year Plan. In sum, he was now fully involved in development planning from a theoretical and practical point of view. A year later, Tinbergen was appointed professor of development planning at the Nederlandse Economische Hogeschool (Rotterdam School of Economics), the predecessor of Rotterdam’s Erasmus University.
Tinbergen shared the optimistic spirit of the first generation of development economists: growth and development of poor countries could be brought about! Modernisation of the economies was possible through capital infusions and productivity boosts in resp. of the agricultural and emerging industrial sectors. The West should help poor countries in the process, not out of a sense of solidarity but inspired by self-interest. After all, should modernisation fail, conflicts and mass migration would ensue, concluded Tinbergen.
Modernisation was ‘do-able’, provided the process was planned properly - a one-size-fits-all business-like planning approach was required. However, the first generation of development economists, including Tinbergen, overlooked the specific country context within which economic growth and development had to take place. This was not all. Also missing was the neglect of emancipatory movements in societies transiting from traditional to modern societies. This oversight is remarkable as Tinbergen’s inspiration was driven by idealistic and emancipatory convictions, while he offered only technical tools and solutions to achieve them.
Planning should not be limited to national boundaries, planning on a global scale should be the aim! Tinbergen banked on the United Nations to help bring this about in pursuit of worldwide integration. He calculated that development aid of Western countries should amount to 1 percent of their Gross Domestic Product, the so-called Tinbergen norm.
In 1961, Tinbergen welcomed the establishment of the group of non-aligned nations, hoping that the G-77, as they became known, would strongly represent their shared economic and political interests on the world stage.
1.15 Planning development
Tinbergen’s international fame was rising to the extent that the United Nations (UN) adopted development planning as a principal tool for development. The UN requested Tinbergen to design a strategy for the decade 1970-1980 - better known as the Second Development Decade. His ideas (and ideals, I add) about international peace and justice went down well among international diplomats. He was less successful in converting politicians. As his pupil and former Netherlands’ Minister for Development Cooperation, Jan Pronk, commented: Tinbergen was more a diplomat than a politician. Nonetheless, Tinbergen had gathered great prestige as a development planner. He received numerous requests to study and write about development planning from various prestigious institutions, ranging from the Ford Foundation to the World Bank. Several manuals and books saw the light, some produced by a team of researchers under Tinbergen’s leadership. The Design of Development was such a manual, written for the World Bank in 1958. And in 1964, Central Planning came out, commissioned by the Ford Foundation.
In 1967, Tinbergen himself published Development Planning. He described the various steps in the planning process, starting with the macro phase, followed by the regional phase and, subsequently, the micro- or project phase, in which specific investment projects were to be identified. During the plan’s second phase, input-output analyses were to be undertaken for the sectors involved. The planning exercise was an indicative one, Tinbergen stressed, as achieving the plan’s aims would require voluntary cooperation of entrepreneurs.
Tinbergen did, as noted, not pay much attention to the specific historical, social, political, and economic context of the country in which the planning was to take place. In other words, Tinbergen was not much interested in taking stock of a country’s unique context. He applied his planning model, consisting of targets, instruments, plans, and results, in a uniform manner, irrespective the specific country situation. In addition, he had one explanation for economic stagnation: economic development was hindered by a combination of disinterest in material improvement, an aversion against complex techniques, short-sightedness, a dislike of insecurity, and a lack of initiative and individualism.[26] American economist Albert Hirschman observed that Tinbergen, and other early development economists for that matter, overlooked the likelihood of political and social turmoil during the development process.
Dekker quotes the experience of one of Tinbergen’s collaborators in a field study involving many countries around the world. When the team returned from their long trip and delivered their findings to Tinbergen, this collaborator’s jaw dropped when Tinbergen showed him the report’s conclusions which he had already drafted without knowing the results of the field work. In the end, the team was given the task to fill in some sections of the report. Their field reports were included in appendices.
1.16 Converging worlds
During the early 1960s, when the Cold War between East and West was heating up, Tinbergen warned against the dangers of further polarisation. He proposed that a dialogue between the two blocs, which were politically and economically so different, would lower the tensions, so that peaceful co-existence could materialise. He also foresaw a converging trend between the two blocs. In 1961, he published an article entitled: Do Communist and Free Economies Show a Converging Pattern? He observed that the Soviet Union had reintroduced the role of managers in state companies, salary scales were not any longer reflected in physical but in monetary terms, freedom of consumption had been introduced and, much to Tinbergen’s liking, the application of mathematical planning tools had been adopted.
A converging process also took place in the West: the public sector had greatly gained in relevance, tax returns had increased, anti-cartel legislation had received more attention, different economic sectors had been nationalised, education was more and more being financed by the state, and economic planning had become an accepted phenomenon.
An optimal order would gradually emerge somewhere in the middle of a scale with at one extreme democracy and at the other dictatorship. This new order would also help overcome cultural, social and economic differences. Would these developments not bring the West and East closer together? And could, therefore, the threat of a nuclear war not be mitigated or, better even, ruled out? Funds spent on armaments could then be devoted to development assistance, argued Tinbergen. In addition, the G-77 could find inspiration from this converging trend in better shaping their institutional structures and economic development.
He did not get much support for his proposals. Soviet ideologues argued that world peace was not undermined by communism but by capitalism and imperialism. Tinbergen’s critics in the Western world accused him of naiveté and being blind for the atrocities committed in the name of communism.
Perhaps it was characteristic for Tinbergen to look at trends from an analytical, scientific perspective without properly taking into consideration the political realities at hand. Towards the end of the past century, the debate about converging systems was overtaken by unprecedented historical events. In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. Two years later the Soviet Union imploded and a good many former East European satellite states of the USSR are now members of the European Union.
Meanwhile, China started an impressive and fast growth trajectory fuelled by state capitalism, catapulting the country to the status of superpower Yet China’s Communist Party is fully in charge of political and economic developments. There is no more talk of convergence. On the contrary, a new Cold War may be looming.
1.17 Income distribution
Economists are involved in fundamental debates. Reiss observes in this vein that economists contribute to normative discussions. For example, providing normative accounts of rationality, well-being, and justice must now be regarded as one of the aims of economics.[27] He concludes by noting that the reason to engage in the discussion of the aims of economics is that many of these discussions are meaningless unless conducted in a context of a relatively well-specified scientific purpose. Precisely the aims just mentioned can provide such a purpose.[28]
Analysing income distribution involves, besides economic considerations, aspects of justice and well-being. Social democrats, contrary to Marxists, attempted to gradually and peacefully reform capitalism from within. In the Netherlands, among other countries, the social-democratic approach was successful in that the emancipation of the working class contributed to the emergence of a more or less egalitarian society. Nonetheless, Tinbergen was concerned about the gap between top and bottom income earners. Income distribution (and the inequalities involved) prompts the philosophical question: what is a just, or unjust, distribution?
In 1977, Tinbergen had published a book, together with co-author Jan Pen, about income distribution.[29] They approached the subject from an egalitarian vantage point. Their criteria for such a just income distribution are quite straightforward. Now, what would they be? First, income differences originating from privileged positions and tradition are unacceptable. Scarcity in the supply of professions result in temporary income increases. Once this scarcity is taken away (for example as more medical specialists have entered the labour market) this scarcity top-up should be taken away. Income differences are justified if and when people exert more effort. Income differences resulting from a monopolistic position are unjustified. University graduates, who typically earn high. salaries should pay higher taxes to partly compensate for the high costs involved in the provision of academic schooling. The incomes of managers of large companies are too high, explained by the fact that these salaries are established by their peers.
After his retirement from Academe, Tinbergen returned to his old interest: income distribution. Was it fair and just that there were large differences between income earners? Could the term ‘just’ be objectively established? No, it couldn’t, according to most economists. Yet Tinbergen took up the challenge and tried to find an answer. However, he was not successful in establishing an objective standard for a fair and just income distribution.
In looking for solutions to bridge the gap, he proposed a tax on talent: those who were endowed with scarce talents should pay more taxes than less talented persons. John Rawls’ 1971 classic A Theory of Justice dealt with the issues which Tinbergen had been trying to resolve. Rawls argued that for moderately well-off societies, rational choosers would first wish to safeguard their basic political and personal liberties, after which they would judge basic social and economic institutions according to their tendency to promote the interests of the least well-off group in society. As a result, no one would find their basic liberties threatened. In line with the social contract framework, economic and social institutions would be designed, in the utilitarian spirit, to advance the interests of the worst-off group: Inequality was only justified if this would improve the position of the least well-off group.[30] There are methodological issues which economists would find hard to deal with. For example, terms used by Rawls such as ‘priority of liberty’ and ‘fairness’ are rather vague and cannot easily be incorporated into economic models. In addition, Rawls does not define what a worst-off group would be. Tinbergen rejected Rawls theory as he felt it was insufficiently quantifiable. It is not surprising that Tinbergen had methodological difficulties with Rawls’s theory, since, as one critical observer noted that these principles would not be convincing to those who come from radically different starting points.[31]
1.18 Attempting to create a world economy
Can a rational and well-ordered global society be brought about with the help of scientific and technological progress? After the end of WWII, there was a spirit of getting things done supported by progress made in technology, industrial development and the sciences. Tinbergen also believed it could be done. In 1961 he published Shaping the World Economy, in which this belief was radiated throughout the book.
However, this optimism was gradually lost during the 1970s, when it dawned that there might come an end to economic growth. Moreover, the OPEC-inspired oil crisis, stagflation, and a less prominent role of government in the economy, all put spikes in the wheel of the spirit of boundless global progress.
Undeterred, Tinbergen kept on devoting his work to global issues, ranging from world peace to environmental concerns. When chaos or dangerous instability was imminent, Tinbergen proposed that planning would help in solving the problems at hand. He blamed politicians to be short-sighted, not having the long-term in mind when taking decisions. Therefore, an old Tinbergen advice: technical experts had to propose solutions. This does not just sounds naïve, Tinbergen’s consistent attitude to de-politicise problems was not always very effective, as he later admitted.
People’s natural self-interest could be complemented by moral convictions. However, this difficult process was best led by Tinbergen’s ‘small elite’, who understood the relevance of these convictions. The result would bring about three central objectives: stability, harmony, and peace. Indeed, they would not evolve spontaneously, like Adam Smith’s invisible hand; they had to be promoted by this small elite.
Part II Tinbergen’s philosophical inspirations
Tinbergen did not like much to talk about philosophical subjects. When challenged, he asked: how can philosophical issues be scientifically analysed and measured? Moreover, philosophy was not a very practical science. What he, in the end, was after was to limit the subjective component in normative concepts as much as possible. Critics argued that Tinbergen tried to integrate normative and ethical notions into science. At first sight these notions should not be mixed, but this is not the case. Daniel Hausman and Michael McPherson, for example, argue that ‘progress on both normative and positive issues would be more sustained if economists recognized and scrutinized the normative dimensions of their work.’[32] The authors add that economists are not value-free social engineers. In deciding what to study and in thinking about how to apply economics to practical problems, economists must think about ethical matters.[33] They cannot avoid ethics altogether. After all, one needs to understand the moral commitments of human beings, for they may be of great economic importance. Dekker observes that for Tinbergen this was precisely the way to include his socialist notions into his scientific work; it was scientific socialism.[34].
Tinbergen was invited by Michael Szenberg to share his life’s philosophy. He accepted the invitation. His contribution is entitled Solving the Most Urgent Problems First, which appeared in Eminent Economists.[35] This is what Tinbergen wrote under the subheading: My value system.
‘In retrospect, adding much from later experience and the course of world politics, I am inclined to regard sympathy for the suffering of the underdog and tolerance as the basic elements of my ethical creed. I am a member of the Remonstrant Protestant Church, which has always laid strong emphasis on tolerance and humaneness. I would not call myself religious, but I am a product of Christianity interpreted in my own way. My choice of democratic socialism, my ideal of European federalism, and my priorities for the Third World all have that source of inspiration. Two of the biggest evils in this world seem to me to be excessive and egotistic nationalism and war. Warfare was probably necessary and even helpful in times gone by. It is now completely dehumanized by technical and organizational developments that have vastly multiplied the number of innocent victims. Nuclear weapons, as the last step, have maximized the absurd nature of wars, while mental slowness carries the danger that often the military establishment tends to fight the ‘previous war’ with the new weaponry. If this were to happen now, it would put an end to our history.’[36]
Tinbergen’s philosophy, or his value system (refer above box), was partly based on democratic socialism. Where does this term come from? We have to return to the 1930’s when Tinbergen contributed to the formulation of the Labour Plan, a joint publication of the Association of Socialist Labour Unions and the Social Democratic Workers Party of the Netherlands. This plan’s objectives were not just to solve unemployment but also to provide a hopeful socio-democratic alternative to rapidly advancing fascism at the time. The Labour Plan was inspired by its Belgian counterpart, which was written by Hendrik de Man, a prominent Belgian socialist philosopher and professor at the University of Frankfurt. De Man was critical of Karl Marx’s Verelendungs theory. Capitalism did not result in ever more poverty of the working classes. On the contrary, a larger and better-off middle class had emerged. De Man observed that the proletariat’s material well-being had improved, but culturally it had deteriorated. A revolution could not possibly be brought about by a section of society which was only interested in its material wellbeing, concluded de Man. Political parties with a socialist inspiration should broaden their philosophy by emphasizing cultural and ethical values, such as liberty, equality, fraternity and justice, which would be attractive not just for workers but for everybody. De Man argued that socialism was in fact a broad societal movement not by the workers but for the workers. His critics observed that de Man’s cultural socialism was an elitist interpretation of socialism.
His upbringing, membership of AJC, and de Man’s cultural socialism had given Tinbergen a deep respect for culture, personal ethics and a sober life style. Now and again he reminded his fellow social-democrats that socialism was not just about material wellbeing; they should not forget to also promote these immaterial values. During WWII, Tinbergen became involved in a movement that wanted to break down traditional political dividing lines so as to create a broad-based political movement. Their philosophy was one of democratic socialism aimed at personal growth (along the lines of Christian traditions and modern humanism) as well as the emancipation of lower classes of society. So from his AJC years onwards Tinbergen was strongly inspired by notions about liberty, equality, justice, peace, and stability. It proved to be difficult for him to capture them in scientific terms. Yet, Tinbergen certainly was inspired by these ‘imponderabilia’, as he called them.
In an uncertain economic environment, in which nobody can predict what the future will look like, Tinbergen felt that one had to prepare as best as possible for the future with the help of planning to prevent conflicts, instability, and war. This was the economist’s responsibility, argued Tinbergen. Dekker observes that Tinbergen never walked away from this responsibility, but at the same time doubted whether he had done enough. Perhaps this also explains why Tinbergen kept working to the last days of his life. This is a tragic end of a life so uncompromisingly devoted to the betterment of the world. But, in this sense, each life is tragic for the simple reason that it ends.
Conclusion
Tinbergen was arguably one of the most telling examples of an influential economist who consistently combined science and moral convictions. He fitted perfectly the image Schumpeter had sketched in Science and Ideology: all great economists had a particular vision which gave their academic work direction and colour.[37] Tinbergen attempted to reach a synthesis between science and his value system.
In his private life he was austere: he did not drink alcohol or smoke, nor did he possess a car. Some of Tinbergen’s collaborators felt tense in his presence, as they felt not being able to live up to Tinbergen’s spartan standards. Paul Samuelson characterised him as a humanistic saint.
Dekker concludes that Tinbergen’s value system shaped his scientific work, but - adds Dekker – it was also the other way around, in that his research also shaped his vison on life and the world.[38] But was this indeed the case? I would argue that Tinbergen’s philosophical convictions had been firmly moulded in his youth by his parents, his membership of the AJC, and his association with the Remonstrant Brotherhood. These influences, I believe, provided the moral ground, as a solid philosophical basis for his work as an economist, whether it concerned the inclusion of social and cultural aspects in his econometric models, creating harmonious political relations, countering world poverty, or criticizing unequal income distribution.
Tinbergen was not a positivist; he did not limit himself to empirics. He strongly felt that science should contribute to the achievement of ideals, the good life (as Keynes also felt) and, typical for Tinbergen, an optimal societal order. Some economists observed that Tinbergen would also have been a good candidate for the Nobel Prize for Peace.
Keynes argued that economics is indeed a moral science. Despite their differences, Keynes would gladly have admitted that Tinbergen greatly contributed to the moral dimension of economics.
Tinbergen never gave up his optimism about what could be achieved, despite sometimes harsh criticism from fellow economists such as Frisch and Keynes. He shied away from polemics. He evaded conflicts and banked upon the good intentions of his adversaries. I am afraid that this was an unrealistic attitude; people can be vindictive in all walks of life, also in the sciences.
What was his lasting contribution? Dekker concludes that it is the wide acceptance of the fact that economic policy is the expert’s domain, who indicates how various policy instruments can be applied to achieve economic and social objectives.
The promise that economics could serve society in the direction Tinbergen wanted, attracted him to the economic science, and to play the role of expert. In the end economics is a means to achieve the goals of economic growth and broad social welfare. This is what it was all about for the great economist Jan Tinbergen.
[1] Tinbergen’s brother Niko was awarded the Nobel Prize for Biology in 1973.
[2] Klant, J.J. (1975) Wat is Economie? Leiden: H.E. Stenfert Kroese, 14.
[3] Hicks, J. (1979) Causality in Economics. Oxford: Blackwell, xi.
[4] His mathematical proficiency must have been his mother’s influence; she was a mathematics teacher.
[5] Dekker, E. (2021) Jan Tinbergen; een Econoom op Zoek naar Vrede. Amsterdam: Boom, 71.
[6] More can be said about the relationship between economics and physics. The quantitative tools developed in 1900 by Louis Bachelier to study the French stock market were taken up by Albert Einstein to prove the existence of atoms. And Norbert Wiener formalised them into a mathematical framework that remains at the heart of today’s financial models.
[7] Reiss, J. (2013) Philosophy of Economics; A Contemporary Introduction. New York: Routledge, 162.
[8] He shared this conviction with Keynes whose major preoccupation was unemployment, along with the attempt, in his own words ‘to save capitalism from its demise’.
[9] Jan Tinbergen, 102. Philosopher Julian Reiss observes that economics is heavily model-based (more specifically, that economic explanations are often based on models), and that all models are false in a variety of ways. Models always give simplified and often idealized accounts of the phenomena they are models of. Source: Philosophy of Economics, 119. No model explains everything. However, on page 120, Reiss admits that: ‘Not always, to be sure, but often enough economic models succeed in explaining.’ And on page 128, Reiss refers to Nancy Cartwright’s view of models being true ‘in the abstract’; they represent not what is true but rather what would be true in the absence of interferences.
[10] Ibid., 102.
[11] Ibid., 128.
[12] Thirlwall, A.P, Pacheco-Lopez, P. (2017) The Economics of Development. Tenth Edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 103.
[13] Sugden, R. (2009) Credible Worlds, Capacities and Mechanisms. In: Erkentnis, 18.
[14] Hayek disagreed: ‘The chief insight gained by modern economists is that the market is essentially an ordering mechanism, growing up without anybody wholly understanding it, that enables us to utilize widely dispersed information about the significance of circumstances of which we are mostly ignorant. However, the various planners…. and dirigistes have still not yet grasped this.’ Source: Hayek, F.A. Coping With Ignorance. In: Imprimis July 1978, Volume 7, Issue 7.
[15] In the early 1930s, a Commission had been established In Sweden to make proposals, with a long-term perspective in mind, to fight unemployment. Tinbergen liked the commission’s proposals, which included a permanent new role for the government in the economy.
[16] Their model reminds me of Bill Phillips’ MONIAC (Monetary National Income Analogue Computer), a mechanic model of the United Kingdom’s economy. It consists of a system of water tanks and tubes connecting all important aspects of an economy, ranging from national income, taxes, import, export, savings and investment. By manipulating the pegs, the circulating flow of water through the tubes could be increased or decreased. The MONIAC was used as a teaching aid at the London School of Economics(LSE) until 1992. The LSE donated this remarkable machine to London’s Science Museum, where it is on display, as I witnessed myself.
[17] Philosophy of Economics, 172.
[18] Robbins, L. An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science. London, 1932, 16. Robbins’ definition is not too far from Alfred Marshall’s: ‘Political economy or economics is a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life; it examines that part of individual and social action which is most closely connected with the attainment and with the use of the material requisites of well-being.’ Source: Marshall, A. (1977) The Principles of Economics. (Eighth edition) London: The English Language Book Society and Macmillan, 1.
[19] Dekker describes a memorable encounter between Tinbergen and Keynes at the time. Tinbergen proudly told Keynes that his model precisely calculated a particular elasticity of minus 2, as Keynes had predicted. Keynes was not impressed, yet congratulated Tinbergen with the fact that the latter finally had established the correct elasticity. Tinbergen later wrote that Keynes had found his own intuition more reliable than Tinbergen’s econometric estimation. Tinbergen added: perhaps justified. Source: Jan Tinbergen, 167.
[20] Skidelsky, R. (2010) Keynes; A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 43 -44.
[21] Keynes, J.M. On a Method of Statistical Business-Cycle Research. A Comment. The Economic Journal, Vol. 50, no. 197 (March, 1940).
[22] Ibid., 203. I translated the Dutch text.
[23] In 1956, Tinbergen, as a Fulbright scholar, was invited to visit Harvard where he lectured on problems about domestic stability and growth. He also conducted a seminar about development planning at a Quakers-inspired college which impressed him more than Harvard. At the end of his stay he argued that world poverty could be eradicated through a combination of technical abilities of the Western world, Quaker-like humility, and the patience of the Orient. An unusual combination, I’d say.
[24] ‘Given that the structure of an econometric model consists of optimal decision rules of economic agents, and that optimal decision rules vary systematically with changes in the structure…relevant to the decision maker, it follows that any change in policy will systematically alter the structure of econometric models.’ Lucas added: ‘Policy makers, if they wish to forecast the response of citizens, must take the latter into their confidence.’ Source: Bowles, S. (2016) The Moral The Economy; Why Good Incentives are no Substitute for Good Citizens. New Haven: Yale University Press, 154.
[25] Jan Tinbergen, 244.
[26] Ibid., 273.
[27] Philosophy of Economics, 9.
[28] Ibid., 9.
[29] Pen, J., Tinbergen, J. (1977) Naar een Rechtvaardiger Inkomensverdeling. (Towards a More Just Income Distribution). Amsterdam: Elsevier
[30] ‘Rawls’s ideal society would, however, rely only minimally on redistributive taxes and transfers as an equalizing measure. On grounds of efficiency, liberty, and opportunity, Rawls emphasized efforts to equalize the starting points of members of successive generations in preference to redistributing unequal outcomes.’ Source: Hausman, D. and McPherson, M. (1996), Economic Analysis and Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 157.
[31] Nonetheless, Amartya Sen defends Rawls: ‘Rawls provided a significant enrichment of the literature of inequality in the social sciences, which has often tended to concentrate too exclusively on disparities in social status or economic outcomes, while ignoring disparities in the process of operation, for example, those associated with excluding people from offices on grounds of their race or colour or gender.’ Source: Sen, A. (2009) The Idea of Justice. London: Allen Lane, 64.
[32] Ibid., 207. On the next page, Hausman and McPherson ask: ‘Should one rest content with evaluating policies solely according to their consequences for satisfying people’s preferences … or should one strive to include in one’s evaluation the consequences for freedom, equality, justice and indicators of quality of life that go beyond preference satisfaction? Although the former path may keep economics nearer and perhaps in appearance more ‘scientific’, the latter will, we contend, make it more useful and sensible.’ Regarding the distinction between positive science and normative science, the authors argue that ‘Normative science consists of inquiries into matters of policy or values. Normative economics consists of the application of positive economics to explore questions that are of immediate evaluative relevance.’, Ibid., 213.
[33] Ibid., 211.
[34] Jan Tinbergen, 347.
[35] Szenberg, M. (1992) Eminent Economists; Their Life Philosophies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[36] Ibid., 277.
[37] Schumpeter, A. (1949) Science and Ideology, American Economic Review, Vol.39, 345-359.
[38] Jan Tinbergen, 367.
Essay 2026
The flaws of neoclassical economics
Neoclassical economics provides valuable analytical tools which to this day are being used in teaching economics and explaining the functioning of economies. However, foundational assumptions about, e.g., rationality, general equilibrium, and institutional neutrality fail to capture how real economies function. This paper concludes with where the economic science stands today in attempting to capture real economic life as much as possible.
Som fifty years ago something happened which broadened the way economics was understood. It happened in a small town South-east of New York City: Princeton, more precisely: Princeton University. It was there that a professor in psychology, Daniel Kahneman ran into something which surprised him greatly; the assumptions applied by economists regarding human behaviour. This is how he told the story:
‘One day in the early 1970s, Amos Tversky handed me a mimeographed essay by a Swiss economist named Bruno Frey, which discussed the psychological assumptions of economic theory…..Bruno Frey barely recalls writing the piece, but I can still recite its first sentence: ‘The agent of economic theory is rational, selfish, and his tastes do not change. I was astonished. My economist colleagues worked in the building next door, but I had not appreciated the profound difference between our intellectual worlds. To a psychologist, it is self-evident that people are neither fully rational nor completely selfish, and that their tastes are anything but stable….Here was an opportunity for an interesting conversation across the boundaries of the disciplines. I did not anticipate that my career would be defined by that conversation.’
Assumptions
Homo economicus is a key assumption of classical and neoclassical economics. Kahneman was not the first scholar to conclude that there was a gap between the assumed behaviour of homo economicus and how people in day-to-day life behave, which he playfully demonstrated in his 2011 bestseller Thinking, Fast and Slow.
Another important (neo)classical notion is laissez-faire: let the market run its course, unhindered by outside forces (such as government), and everything will be fine as economic equilibrium will be the result. Forty years before Kahneman presented his critique, Cambridge economist John Maynard Keynes argued that in real life there was neither such a thing as laissez-faire, nor that someone’s private interest would benefit the public good, an important observation attributed to Adam Smith. Keynes observed:
‘It is not true that individuals possess a prescriptive ‘natural liberty’ in their economic actions. …The world is not so governed from above that private and social interests always coincide…. Nor is it true that self-interest generally is enlightened; more often individuals acting separately to promote their own ends are too ignorant or too weak to attain even these. …. We cannot, therefore, settle on abstract grounds, but must handle on its merits in detail….. to determine what the State ought to take upon itself to direct by public wisdom, and what it ought to leave, with as little interference as possible, to individual exertion.’
Keynes revolutionized economics
At the end of this quote, Keynes hinted at the role of the state in correcting market failures. In 1936, he elaborated the government’s crucial role in overcoming massive market failures in his master piece The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, triggering the Keynesian Revolution. He analysed the economy, not from the traditional microeconomic point of view, but from an aggregate, macroeconomic vantage point. Keynes also questioned the classical rational behaviour assumption, arguing that economic behaviour is also inspired by ‘animal spirts’. By triggering the Keynesian Revolution, Keynes dethroned neoclassical economics as the leading school of thought.
The comeback of neoclassical economics
Neoclassical economics was not defeated; it kept on evolving quietly under the radar. During the early 1970s, neoclassical economics experienced a resurgence. What happened was that Keynesians had not foreseen, nor prevented, stagflation - the toxic mix of high inflation combined with high unemployment. Keynesians had a strong belief in the Phillips Curve, which said that there was an inverse relation between inflation and unemployment: a bit of inflation would bring unemployment down. Keynesians could not explain why the Phillips Curve had lost its relevance.
Meanwhile, neoclassical economists, such as Milton Friedman, had been developing new ideas. Friedman understood what stagflation’s problem was and offered solutions.
Friedman had this to say about the role of economists developing new ideas: ‘Only a crisis -actual or perceived – produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until politically impossible becomes politically inevitable.’
In the course of the 1960s, he already explained that the real unemployment rate was kept lower than the natural rate of unemployment, an idea Friedman had borrowed from Edmund Phelps. Friedman also argued that there was too much money in circulation, resulting in even more inflation.
Later, during the 1970s, the New Classical Economics school of thought gained prominence; promoted by, in particular, Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent, taking neoclassical assumptions on board.
In sum, Keynesianism was out, and neoclassical economics became the dominated school of thought.
New Institutional Economics
As of the 1980s, New Institutional Economics (NIE) exposed the shortcomings of neoclassical economics’ assumptions. It also proposed a more realistic approach, away from abstract models, in explaining economic growth or stagnation. NIE is now an important new branch of the economic sciences.
Neoclassical assumptions were questioned once again. This time by Douglass North, the new institutional economist. His Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, captures in concise terms the relevance of institutions in the process of economic growth. From a historical perspective, institutions comprise the underlying determinant of sustained economic growth. Institutions, as North defined them, are the constraints that structure human interaction. These constraints can be formal (i.e., laws) and informal (such as norms, beliefs) ones. Together they define the incentive structure, embodied in institutions of societies which determine economic growth, or the lack of it.
North developed a more realistic theory of doing economics, in exposing neoclassical economics’ shortcomings. He argued that neoclassical theory is frictionless, in which institutions don’t exist. Neoclassicals maintain that development occurs through perfectly functioning markets. In such a situation, the costs of acquiring information and the costs involved in transactions don’t exist - the efficient competitive solution of neoclassical economics obtains! Even though economic actors may initially have erroneous models, the informational feedback process will correct initially incorrect models, leading surviving market participants to the correct and efficient models. North concluded that in neoclassical economics institutions won’t matter, nor would time. However, institution do matter and, in addition, market transactions take time and involve transaction costs.
North was instrumental in establishing an entirely new school of institutional economics, of which Daron Acemoglu is the most prominent contemporary representative. Together with James Robinson he wrote Why Nations Fail (2012); like North before them, both were awarded last year’s Nobel Prize in Economics. Let me briefly tell you what Acemoglu and Robinson propose.
Acemoglu and Robinson sought to determine whether economic development would encourage liberalism. Based on an extensive historical analysis of growth trajectories of many countries, they identified two types of institutions: inclusive and extractive ones. Inclusive institutions promote prosperity, while extractive institutions (as the term implies) frustrate growth since the economic gains of growth are only shared by a small group that exploits others. Inclusive institutions encourage investment, while extractive ones discourage it. The authors also found, and this is important, that richer economies developed liberal democratic reforms.
What laid behind these insights? They found that, inspired by the mortality rate, countries experiencing a high mortality rate (such as those plagued by deadly tropical diseases), the colonial powers exploited native labour. This happened in many Sub-Saharan African countries and in many Latin American countries. Countries registering low mortality rates, such as in English-speaking offshoots (i.e., America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), attracted European settles providing them with the opportunity to reap the fruits of their labour, thanks to the protection of private property and the development of free markets (both important institutions, first developed in England). What also happened, as mentioned before, is that more prosperous economies have instituted liberal democratic reforms.
Acemoglu and Robinson also tackled the question why some countries developed poor institutions. They observe that in a highly unequal society the poor could threaten revolution. Any commitment by the elites to redistribute wealth in response was not credible; they could always change their mind when the threat disappeared. As a result, unequal states were prone to instability. Checks and balances represented a response to this commitment: if elites were restrained, their promises to redistribute would be taken seriously and any revolutionary threat would be forestalled. This is why European states expanded the democratic franchise in the early 19th century.
In sum, Acemoglu and Robinson present an impressive and persuasive model, based upon historical developments They moved development economics away from abstract growth models.
Neoclassical economics remained unshaken
Undeterred by the development of these new insights in economics, neoclassical economists carried on, this time under the name of New Classical school economists. I already mentioned Economics Nobel Laureates Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent. They developed the rational expectations model. What is it about?
It can be best described as a consistent application of the hypothesis that rational individuals and firms behave in situations of change, with uncertainty about the future, imperfect information and costly information gathering. This does not imply that all agents have the same information, or that all agents know the true economic model; it simply means that agents are forward-looking and adjust their behaviour in response to anticipated future events.
Microeconomic foundation for macroeconomics
People and firms make rational predictions and decisions by considering the economic environment, market conditions, and their own experiences, thereby strengthening the case for macro models to be based on microeconomics. In other words, New Classicals lifted microeconomic notions to the level of macroeconomics. They express faith in the stability of the market, and, not least important, in general equilibrium. They are suspicious of government intervention. They advocate predictable government policy rules, while Neo-Keynesians argue, not surprisingly, that market failures of a macroeconomic nature occur, and that the government has to do something about them.
Given Lucas’s belief in market clearing equilibrium, it is no surprise that in his 2003 Presidential Address to the American Economic Association, he said the following:
‘Macroeconomics was born as a distinct field in the 1940s, as a part of the intellectual response to the Great Depression. The term then referred to the body of knowledge and expertise we hoped would prevent the recurrence of that economic disaster. My thesis in this lecture is that macroeconomics in this original sense has succeeded: its central problem of depression-prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes, and has in fact been solved for many decades.’
Only four years later, the financial crisis broke out followed by the Great Recession.
What New Classicals introduced was accepted by the profession, in particular by younger economists at the time. Early critics included the not-so-young Economics Nobel laureate and Neo-Keynesian, Robert Solow. In an interview he observed that the habit of labelling New Classical Economics as the rational expectations school is a misleading habit. All of the propositions associated with that school of thought come from the hypothesis of market clearing, and not from the rational expectations hypothesis. In addition, Solow observed that it is hard to believe that common economic agents strictly behave in a rational manner. Analytically speaking, New Classical Economics is attractive, but weak in its assumptions, Solow said. The assumptions they apply in their market-clearing-equilibrium, are simply unrealistic. Solow admitted that his own work applies different assumptions, and discussing them with New Classicals proved to be difficult.
Not just Solow was critical, Edmund Phelps, for example, also does not believe that individuals behave as Lucas and Sargent argued. Phelps had been developing theories in which expectations play a crucial part. He maintains that ‘a nation’s economy is not generally on an equilibrium path characterized by correct (at least unbiased) expectations and, barring new developments, it is in the process of learning the correct expectations as the economy evolves.’ He concludes: ‘As I saw it, the New Classicals, with their adherence to ‘rational expectations’, showed they had little or no sense of a modern economy – an economy that, at its core, is driven by the judgement, intuitions, and imagination of a modern people.’ Phelps is implicitly referring to what the psychologist Daniel Kahneman would call Humans, and to Keynes’s animal spirits.
Enter behavioural notions
In 2011, Daniel Kahneman’s published Thinking, Fast and Slow. This fascinating book contains an elaborate critique of the rational agent model.
He presents Econs and Humans, underscoring that ‘Humans’ don’t necessarily act rationally. Moreover, they have limited information, and are not consistent and logical in their decisions. Kahneman observed that the term Econs is applied by economists, such as Lucas, while the term Humans is used by psychologists. Humans are ‘System 1’ types (fast, intuitive and emotional). Kahneman also introduces the’ System 2’ type, which is slower, more deliberative, and more logical. Humans are real people - we recognize their behaviour, not least our own. Econs pretend to act along System 2 lines, but – and economists overlook this - they are distracted by all kinds of phenomena, such as how an issue is being presented, as explained below.
Kahneman argued that every significant choice we make in life comes with some uncertainty. This is why students of decision-making hope that some of the lessons learned in a model situation apply to more interesting everyday problems. However, Kahneman added, tongue-in-cheek, that decision theorists study simple gambles, that other decision theorists had developed.
This field of research has a theory, called expected utility theory, which provided the foundation of the rational-agent model and remains, to this day, the most important theory in the social sciences. For example, economists adopted expected utility theory in a dual role: (i) as a logic that prescribes how decisions should be made, and (ii) as a description of how Econs make choices.
Regarding decision-making, Kahneman gave the following example. The way in which a question is formulated influences the outcome of an investigation about willingness to donate organs. Research in Europe revealed that high-donation countries applied an opt-out form, while low-contribution countries had an opt-in form; i.e., you had to check a box to become a donor. Kahneman concluded that the low-contribution outcome was best explained by the laziness of System 2. The choice was controlled by an utterly inconsequential feature (i.e., checking a box) of the situation. This is just one point against the rational-agent theory.
Another assumption is that humans have consistent preferences. However we cannot trust our preferences to reflect our interests, even if based on personal experience, Kahneman argued. Tastes and decisions are shaped by memories, which can be wrong. Studies suggest that humans don’t have consistent preferences and would know how to maximize them - another cornerstone of the rational-agent model.
Kahneman found that there is an inconsistency built into the design of our minds. We want pain to be brief and pleasure to last longer. But our memory, which is a function of System 1, has evolved to represent the most intense moment of an episode of pain or pleasure and the feelings when the episode was at its end. In other words, memory is led by duration neglect and peak-end rule. The result is that a memory that neglects duration will not serve our preference for long pleasure and short pains.
Kahneman concluded that a theory (like the rational-agent model) worthy of its name asserts that certain events are impossible: they will not happen if the theory is true. When an ‘impossible’ event is observed (such as the 2007 financial crisis and subsequent Great Recession), the theory is falsified. Kahneman then sank the knife: ‘Theories can survive for a long time after conclusive evidence falsifies them, and the rational agent model certainly survived the evidence we have seen, and much other evidence as well.’ He concluded: ‘A significant difference between believers in the rational-agent model and the skeptics who question it is that the believers simply take it for granted that the formulation of a choice cannot determine preferences on significant problems. They will not even be interested in investigating the problem – and so we are often left with inferior outcomes.’
Returning to neoclassical economics
One of neoclassical economics hero’s is Friedrich Hayek. He compared the price system with a system of telecommunications. The market, reflecting prices obtaining, provides the information consumers and investors need to make informed decisions. Distortions of this system, for example caused by inflation or wage and price controls, give the wrong signals. In situations like these, prices no longer reflect the most efficient modes of production. This will result in resources being employed in inefficient and unproductive activities. But eventually, the market will eliminate the distortions and equilibrium is restored.
This is what the efficient market hypothesis says: financial markets would accurately reflect all available information. The rational expectations theory provided a foundation for the efficient market hypothesis, suggesting that individuals incorporate all relevant information into their expectations leading to efficient market outcomes.
The Grossman-Stiglitz paradox
What Hayek presented sounds plausible, but is it? Joseph Stiglitz and Sanford Grossman disagree. Right from the start they wonder if competitive equilibrium is defined as a situation in which prices are such that all arbitrage profits are eliminated, is it possible that a competitive economy always be in equilibrium? Clearly not, is their response. In their paper, they introduce the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox. It states that perfectly informationally efficient markets are an impossibility since, if prices perfectly reflected available information, there would be no profit to gathering information, in which case there would be little reason to trade and markets would eventually collapse.
Let us take the stock market. If stock prices at every moment reflected all of the available information about the economic outlook, and other factors pertinent to individual companies, investors wouldn’t have any incentive to search out and process it. But if nobody processes information, stock prices won’t reflect that information, and the market won’t be efficient. Grossman and Stiglitz conclude that for the market to function effectively, there must be some level of inefficiency.
Hayek ignored market failures. Grossman and Stiglitz demonstrate that information is not fully revealed by market prices, comparing information with air: its adequate provision is a precondition for other things to take place. However, when this information is lacking, or is only partially available, Hayek’s celebrated telecommunications system can’t work. Insights in so-called bounded rationality, nuance the picture sketched by Grossman and Stiglitz.
Why neoclassical economics is not written off.
Given neoclassicals’ flaws, such as unrealistic assumptions about human behaviour, unrealistic assumptions about the functioning of markets, and neglect of institutional factors, one wonders why neoclassical economics is not written off altogether?
There are appealing reasons for its perseverance. One can think of the following ones:
First, the theory itself. It is an elegant and relatively simple one. Take this description: Neoclassical economics begins with the proposition that the economy is comprised of rational self-interested individuals (i.e., consumers and firms) who maximise their utility through voluntary exchanges in markets which, when free from external interferences, produce an efficient equilibrium. At first glance, this description is appealing. Economic actors operate sensibly, inspired by the notion that they are free to make decisions on how to spend their money. Let’s face it, in economic matters people are fairly rational, and dropping simple assumptions would complicate economic modelmaking. Prices play a prominent part in an economic decision-making process: If the price of a good is too high, it won’t be sold. If an investment is too risky, funds won’t be devoted to it. When prices give the wrong signal, as Hayek argued, an automatic process ensues, eventually resulting in an efficient equilibrium.
And as Adam Smith wrote in many instances (but not in all): each private producer is not just contributing to his or her economic well-being but often also to the public good.
The government is responsible for ensuring that the market can function free of external influences. The government should also address market failures. The government itself is supposed to only undertake public tasks that individual market participants cannot undertake.
This model is not just simple, logical and elegant, it is also very useful for educational purposes in demonstrating students how homo economicus, and the economy at large, are supposed to function. Indeed, another strong point in favour of neoclassical economics.
Now, what about neoclassical economics’ assumptions? This is what Milton Friedman wrote about assumptions in his famous The Methodology of Positive Economics. He argued that theories should be evaluated not on the basis of the realism of their assumptions but exclusively on the basis of the accuracy of their predictions resulting from their hypotheses. This is what he argued: A hypothesis must be descriptively false in its assumptions; it takes account of none of the many attendant circumstances, since its very success shows these assumptions to be irrelevant for the phenomena to be explained.’
So, Friedman, like a magician, made assumptions disappear. Needless to say, Friedman’s opinion was contested. His long-time opponent, Paul Samuelson objected to Friedman’s claim about the irrelevance of assumptions. Samuelson retorted that based on the principles of logic, true assumptions can only produce true conclusions. But false assumptions can produce both true and false conclusions. Economics, Samuelson concluded, needed true conclusions.
Another strong point in favour of neoclassical economic is its emphasis on the central role of the market. After all, the market and the price system provide the incentives to invest, work hard, and reap the profits, all of which contribute to economic growth. There is simply no other economic system, than the one based upon neoclassical principles that register better economic results.
This message was persuasively communicated by associations composed of liberal-minded scientists, such as Hayek’s-inspired Mont Pèrelin Society, and think-tanks - inspired by the philosophy of Friedman - receiving funds from donors with deep pockets, to spread the gospel of the market (and small government) among politicians - in particular Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher at the time - the media, and opinion leaders. Surely, the market has its downsides – it can be unforgiving for those whose business went under and for workers who lost their jobs. However, this aspect received little attention from them. Redistribution policies neither constitute a prominent part in the neoclassical play book.
These persuasive selling points, could not prevent what happened in the first decade of this century. Neoclassical economics’ flaws - in its New Classical School guise - were embarrassingly exposed during the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the ensuing Great Recession. Markets failed spectacularly. It turned out that their models had little explanatory and predictive power. They could not simultaneously explain both the duration and magnitude of actual cycles. Lucas’s statement that macroeconomics’ central problem of depression-prevention had been solved, proved to be wrong. Corrective Keynesian actions had to be taken by the government to prevent economic disasters.
This is what then Chairman of the Fed, Alan Greenspan, confessed during an interrogation by members of the American House of Representatives. Greenspan said: I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organisations, specifically banks, is such that they were best capable of protecting shareholders and equity in firms…I discovered a flaw in the model that I perceived is the critical functioning structure that defines how the world works. I had been going for 40 years with considerable evidence that it was working exceptionally well. Greenspan was apparently one of the believers in the way neoclassical economics works in practice.
Toward the neoclassical synthesis
In a New York Times column, Paul Krugman describes what he understands neoclassical economics to be: ‘We imagine an economy consisting of rational self-interested players, and suppose that economic outcomes reflect a situation in which each player is doing the best he, or she, can, given the actions of all the other players. If nobody has market power, this comes down to the textbook picture of perfectly competitive markets with all the marginal whatevers equal.’ Krugman then observes that some economists, like Greenspan, really believe that life is like this, but they have a significant impact on our discourse.
Krugman then observes that the rest of us are well aware that this is just a metaphor. Nonetheless, most of what Krugman and his allies do is sort of neoclassical because they take, as Klugman calls it, the ‘maximization-and-equilibrium world’ as a starting point, which is then modified - but not too much in the direction of realism.
He explains why this dressed-down neoclassical approach is taken. It is simple, also realising that in the real world people are fairly rational, and more or less self-interested. If one were to integrate qualifiers, this would complicate the model. So, keep it as simple as possible! Since introducing dynamics into a model is challenging, it is best, adds Krugman, to take as the end state of such a dynamic process an equilibrium, as this may reveal the researchers much of what they want to know.
Krugman also wonders what truly non-neoclassical economics would look like. It would involve, inspired by Kahneman, rejecting both the simplification of maximizing behaviour, going for full behavioural, as well as rejecting the simplification of equilibrium, as Solow had argued, while going for a dynamic story with no end state. Krugman also mentions agent-based economics, which relies on computing, while making simplified but unrealistic assumptions, like those of neoclassical economics.
So he explains why neoclassical notions are not discarded. The qualifiers, as Krugman calls them, fall into the domain of behavioural economists and other specialised fields, as they would complicate the model too much.
Conclusion
In the real economy, the government has a much larger role to play than the limited role prescribed by neoclassical economics. This conclusion is of course not new. Paul Samuelson developed the so-called neoclassical consensus. It recognises, like Keynes had done, the merits of the government’s corrective role in the economy, not just in addressing booms, busts, price stickiness, and market failures, but also in promoting social justice and social stability.
During periods of economic stability, such as during the Great Moderation of the 1980s and 1990s, let the market run its course and keep government’s involvement small. However, when things go wrong, the government must be called in to restore stability. The neoclassical paradigm, did not foresee such a situation from happening. Neoclassicals could not sufficiently explain, nor predict, what happens in the real world.
This understanding triggered a renewed neoclassical synthesis, which forms the basis of mainstream economics today. In this synthesis, New Keynesians accepted the relevance of Friedman-inspired monetary policies and Lucas’s rational expectations hypothesis, providing a microeconomic foundation for Keynesian economics. While New Classical economists accepted the New Keynesian notion that for several reasons (e.g., stickiness) wages and prices do not move quickly to a long-term equilibrium.
The flaws of neoclassical economics also led to the emergence of new branches of the economic science, attempting to explain economic phenomena, while applying more realistic assumptions. It is unlikely, as Krugman suggests, that realism will ever be fully incorporated in economic models, simply because real world economies do not function along the lines of universal, predictable laws, such as those of physics. However, one should not exclude the possibility, propelled by advanced AI, that these new branches may produce instruments that can be incorporated into more realistic models.
References
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. (2012) Why Nations Fail; The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty. London: Profile Books
Burns, J. (2023) Milton Friedman; the Last Conservative. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux
Friedman, M. (1953) The Methodology of Positive Economics; Essays in Positive Economics Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Grossman, Sanford J.; Stiglitz, Joseph E. (June 1980) On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets. In: American Economic Review 70(3):393–408.
Kahneman, D. (2011) Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux
Keynes, J.M. (1931) The End of Laissez Faire. In: Essays in Persuasion. London: MacMillan & Co
Klamer, A. (1984) The New Classical Macroeconomics; Conversations with New Classical Economists and Their Opponents. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books
Krugman, P. The New York Times, 28 August, 2012
Krugman, P. (2013) End This Depression Now. New York: Norton & Company
Marshall, A. (1977) Principles of Economics London: MacMillan
North, D. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Phelps, E. (2023) My Journeys in Economic Theory. New York: Columbia University Press
Peter de Haan August 2025
Kahneman, D. (2011) Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 269.
Keynes, J.M. (1931) The End of Laissez Faire. In: Essays in Persuasion. London: MacMillan & Co, 312.
Alfred Marshall is the author of Principles of Economics. In this celebrated classic he observed that the great founder of classical economics, Adam Smith, had given many instances in The Wealth of Nations of the ways in which self-interest may lead the individual trader to act injuriously to the community. Source: Principles of Economics (1977). London: MacMillan, 627. Smith steadily insisted on the frequent opposition that there is between private interests and the public good.
Lorie Tarsis, a student of Keynes’s at the time commented: And finally what Keynes supplied was hope: hope that prosperity could be restored and maintained without the support of prison camps, executions and bestial interrogations. Remember that during the 1930s, fascism and communism were on the rise.
Burns, J. (2023) Milton Friedman; the Last Conservative. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Burns used Friedman’s words as a motto of her book.
Emeritus Professor in Economics, Edmund Phelps, provided the microeconomic foundation for the Keynesian model of unemployment. In his 1965 paper ‘Phillips Curves, Expectation of Inflation and Optimal Unemployment Over Time’, Phelps introduced the term natural rate of unemployment. Source: Phelps, E. (2023) My Journeys in Economic Theory. New York: Columbia University Press, 65.
North, D. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. (2012) Why Nations Fail; The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty. London: Profile Books.
Quote from Krugman, P. (2013) End This Depression Now. New York: Norton & Company, 91.
Klamer, A. (1984) The New Classical Macroeconomics; Conversations with New Classical Economists and Their Opponents. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 127-148.
Solow quoted the economist Frank Ramsey who compared such a discussion with the following conversation: ‘I went to Grantchester today.’ ‘That is funny, I didn’t.’
My Journeys in Economic Theory, 95.
Ibid., 96-97.
Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002 for his work integrating psychological research into economics, particularly concerning human judgment and decision making under uncertain circumstances.
Thinking, Fast and Slow, 374.
Grossman, Sanford J.; Stiglitz, Joseph E. (June 1980)"On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets". American Economic Review.70(3):393–408.
Friedman, M. (1953) The Methodology of Positive Economics; Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
The New York Times, 28 August, 2012.
Essay 2025
Spinoza’s legacy
Liberating the mind from superstition and religious straightjackets, as Spinoza proposed, triggers freedom of thought, tolerance, and innovation. He was the first philosopher who prepared the ground for the Enlightenment, which brought about modern economies characterised by sustained economic development.
Introduction
During most of human’s existence economic stagnation was the rule. True, now and again, there were periods of relative prosperity but they did not last. Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) had an explanation. He observed that prosperity triggered population growth. But agricultural production lagged behind resulting in famines. Consequently, the population shrank again and economic growth fizzled out. What he overlooked however, was that the growth of productivity in agriculture could break the cycle – the growing population could indeed be fed by a more productive agricultural sector.
Productivity growth is the principal explanation for sustained economic growth resulting in higher incomes, better health and education; in short, in a better life. Productivity started to grow during the Industrial Revolution. It was then that technical innovations were applied in industrial and agricultural production processes. Subsequent innovations contributed to further productivity growth. This prompted the question what exactly inspired these innovations?
The Enlightenment was the crucial intellectual change in Europe before the Industrial Revolution. Economic historian Joel Mokyr developed an interesting hypothesis in this realm. In A Culture of Growth; The Origins of the Modern Economy, he argues that it was the Enlightenment that triggered the Industrial Revolution. More precisely, Mokyr maintains that it was the Industrial Enlightenment that brought the Industrial Revolution about.
Francis Bacon (1561-1626) played an important part in changing the intellectual outlook at the time. Bacon said that one could attain material progress through controlling nature, and nature could only be harnessed by understanding her. So, it was the scientific analysis of how natural forces work that brought about material progress. This is what Bacon had in mind: broadening the view of scholars beyond religious notions towards scientific investigation and - equally relevant - the spread of attained knowledge. Think of Denis Diderot’s (1713-1784) Grande Encyclopedie, which spread newly acquired knowledge. All this led to an intellectual and cultural sea change in Europe. Nothing of the sort happened in the Ottoman Empire, India, China, Latin America and Africa.
Spinoza’s life
While Bacon was one of the trailblazers of the Enlightenment, Baruch, or Benedictus, de Spinoza (1632–1677) )was certainly another inspirator. British historian Jonathan Israel argues that Spinoza was the first great philosopher who, in a systematic manner, presented the values of democracy, tolerance, individual liberty and equality, based upon a purely secular social and ethical theory. As for tolerance, the same qualities that make people tolerant also make them receptive to new ideas. And, says Mokyr, ideas eventually ignited the Industrial Revolution.
Israel argues that Spinoza was the principal philosopher of the so-called Radical Enlightenment. Spinoza prepared the ground for democrats, egalitarians, and proponents of freedom and tolerance. Israel provides a popular interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy. American philosopher Steven Nadler shares Israel’s appreciation of Spinoza to a large extent. Nadler finds Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise one of the most important works of Western thought, as this book provided the foundation on which liberal, secular and democratic thinking could be constructed. As so often, there are other scholars who present a different interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy. Before elaborating the relationship between the Enlightenment and sustained economic development, I present Spinoza’s life and philosophy, including various interpretations of the latter.
Being from Portuguese descent, Spinoza was born in Amsterdam. In 1656 he was expelled (herem) by Amsterdam’s Sephardic community. Despite recent attempts, it was never rescinded. Subsequently he moved to many places, among them Leiden and Rijnsburg (a village close to Leiden) where he associated himself with Collegiants, an anti-clerical sect of Remonstrants, who had tendencies towards rationalism. Finally, he settled in The Hague where he wrote his magnum opus Ethics. He died in 1677 and was buried there at the Nieuwe Kerk. Unlike René Descartes (1596-1650), who was a professional scholar and teacher (and also lived for a time in Leiden), Spinoza rejected the chair of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg. He made a living by polishing lenses. Astronomer Christiaan Huygens (1629-1695) praised the quality of Spinoza’s lenses which he used in his telescope.
Let me first explain why Spinoza was expelled by Amsterdam’s Sephardic community. His ideas about God, the soul, and his denial that Moses had written the Torah were simply too radical, let alone his thoughts about God’s election of the Hebrews, as expressed in his Theologico-Political Treatise (see box below).
The ancient Hebrews did not surpass other nations in their wisdom or in their proximity to God. They were neither intellectually nor morally superior to other peoples. They were ‘chosen’ only with respect to their social organisation and political good fortune, thanks to Moses, their undisputed Leader. Moses was a true patriarch. God or Nature gave them a set of laws (through a wise law giver, Moses), which they obeyed, and made their surrounding enemies weaker than them. The natural result of this ‘internal’ and ‘external’ aid is that their society was well-ordered and their autonomous government persisted for a long time. Their election by God was thus a temporal and conditional one, and their kingdom is now long gone.
Spinoza challenged the accepted notion of a transcendent God. He denied the immortality of the soul, nor did he accept the notion that the commandments of the Torah and rabbinic legal principles were given by God. Indeed, he challenged the fundamentals of revealed religion. In sum, Spinoza left Judaism behind.
Spinoza was a gadfly not just for Amsterdam’s Sephardic community, but also for those who embraced traditional opinions on religious, ethical, and societal issues. British philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) believed that Spinoza must have been perceived as ‘a man of appalling wickedness’. But he found Spinoza ‘the noblest and most lovable of the great philosophers.’ Russell added that some others have surpassed him, but ethically he was supreme.
Religion
Religion constitutes a prominent subject in Spinoza’s philosophy, but not in a purely theological sense; religion’s role in Spinoza’s thinking can, as Kal observes, be compared with the one played by myths or ideologies. Spinoza observed that religion and religious institutions had too large a grip on people and on the way people went about their business. He strongly felt that religious leaders had too much power and authority over people. People had to be liberated from their grip; they should be given the freedom to think for themselves. However, Spinoza’s freedom of thought is not the same as this term is now understood.
God and Nature
Spinoza elaborated his thoughts about God. For him, God existed only in a philosophical sense, thereby preventing God’s anthropomorphizing. Discovering and experiencing God, said Spinoza, is through philosophy and science. An anthropomorphic God acting as a judge over man can only have negative effects on human freedom and actions, as it would foster a life enslaved to hope and fear and the superstitions to which such emotions can arise. God and Nature are one and the same, argued Spinoza; Nature’s universal laws reflect God’s decisions, which follow from ‘the necessity and perfection of heavenly Nature.’ God does not transcend nature: God is Nature. God or nature do not act for any ends, and things do not exist for any set purposes - God is not a goal-oriented planner, so to speak. Hence, all talk of God’s purposes, intentions, goals, preferences or aims is just a anthropomorphizing fiction. Spinoza added that God neither performs miracles - a very bold statement at the time. Spinoza explained ‘miracles’ in his typical rational manner. After all Spinoza was a rationalist, like Descartes, who was the principal representative of the Age of Reason.
Spinoza differed from Descartes’s dualism- that of mind and body. Spinoza argued that the human being is a union of two ‘substances’, as he put it. The human mind and body are two expressions of one and the same person. The soul, like the body, is not immortal.
Ethics
Spinoza elaborated his thoughts about society, and the good life in Ethics, which was published in 1677, after his death. This work shows that man’s happiness and well-being lie not in a life dedicated to passions and material goods, nor in the attachment to superstitions that pass as religion, but in a life of reason. Spinoza strongly believed in the cognitive powers of human beings.
Regarding passions, Spinoza argued that one needed to free oneself from a reliance on the senses and the imagination. Passions are beyond one’s control. The more one allows oneself to be controlled by them, the less free one is. What one needs to do, suggested Spinoza, is to rely on our rational faculties. The result is self-control and a calmness of mind.
Spinoza’s ‘free person’ engages in ethical, benevolent, behaviour towards other people. He takes care of the well-being of other people by applying his rational benevolence to insure that the beneficiaries achieve relief from disturbances. It is in his best interest to relate to other rationally virtuous individuals, in forming a harmonious society. However, human beings do not always act under the guidance of reason. And at this point Spinoza ushers in the role of the State.
The State
The state is to ensure that individuals are protected from the self-interest of other individuals. Hence the transition from a state of nature to a civil state involves the renunciation of certain natural rights, such as the right to avenge oneself, and of judging good and evil. These rights and judgments should be the prerogatives of the state.
Spinoza’s ideal is a tolerant, secular and democratic polity. This he found in Holland at the time (see box below). In Theologico-Political Treatise Spinoza argued that he was fortunate to live in a State in which citizens were allowed unrestricted freedom to judge and to worship God as these citizens deemed fit, and in which nothing was considered more valuable than this freedom. This statement reflected an ideal situation. That is probably why, on the same page, Spinoza ironically observed that he was often surprised to encounter people who profess to be Christians, i.e. is to practice love, joy, peace, restraint and loyalty, yet fight others with exceptional intensity and extend one another the most bitter hatred. As a result, concluded Spinoza, one sooner recognises one’s religious convictions than one based upon a person’s virtues.
Philosophy and religion, reason and faith, represent two distinct and exclusive spheres; neither should tread in the domain of the other. The freedom to philosophise can be granted without doing harm to true religion, i.e., not turning religion into superstition but to practicing justice and charity to one’s neighbour. To sum up, Spinoza presented a society characterised by tolerance, benevolence, freedom of thought and freedom of religion.
Democracy
Spinoza argued, as I mentioned, that religious authorities should not meddle into political affairs, nor in those of philosophers. It would be in anybody’s interest to live under the law of reason. It would be best to handing over laws to a sovereign (be it a monarch or to a central authority holding power) who will be keeping all the members of society to the agreement, by playing on their fear of the consequences of breaking the ‘social contract’.
But how is this democratic handing over of power and rights achieved? Spinoza provides the answer in Theologico-Philosophical Treatise. Instead of religion constituting a threat to the stability and freedoms of a society, religion plays a very important double role in this book: religion for the common man and religion for those who can think and reason. It is instrumental in creating a so-called religious democracy, in which a central authority nudges the population to freely handing over their rights and power to this authority. The central authority applies religion, true religion as Spinoza called it, to enforce obeyance from the commoners. As regards the ones who can think and reason, while conforming to the unavoidable universality of nature’s laws, they will – again based upon their common sense - accept to form part of society, as the state so dictates. Subsequently, they will be able to live as a free person. In fact, argued Spinoza, people handed over their rights and power to God, and not to a fellow human being. Hence while handing over their power and rights to God, they preserve their freedom. Spinoza added that it would be advisable that those who can think and reason be granted some freedom. If not, they might undertake activities that would undermine the regime’s exclusive power. And it is this power that ensures the state’s sustainability.
Spinoza distinguishes different forms of government: Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy. As a Monarchy may degenerate into a Tyranny, a Aristocracy into an Oligarchy, Spinoza concluded that the type of government that serves the ends for which government is instituted, and which best reflects the freedom which nature allows people to enjoy, was democracy. It is the most natural form of government arising out of the social contract just mentioned. After all, in a democracy the people obey only laws issued from the central authority.
It should be underscored, as Kal elaborately argues, that Spinoza’s democracy is not the same democracy as we understand it to be. In Spinoza’s description the citizens of a society hand over their power (and thus their rights) to a central authority. This authority is, therefore, bestowed with full authority over its citizens. The more citizens hand over their power and rights, the more powerful the central authority would be. As a result, it would not have to be afraid of any opposition, as the citizens have a blind faith in their leaders.
In Theologico-Political Treatise Spinoza defines democracy as follows: She [democracy; PdH] is therefore defined as a general association of people, who together wield the highest right regarding everything she wishes to undertake or establish. Spinoza’s democracy is thus characterised by exclusive power of the central authority, resulting from the free transfer of the citizens’ power and rights to this authority. This smacks of an authoritarian form of government; some critics even accuse Spinoza of being an avant la lettre fascist. Kal rejects such a qualification. Instead he characterises Spinoza as a revolutionary conservative. Kal adds that Spinoza does not embrace a future-focussed free and open individualism, which is modernity’s central trademark.
Freedom of thought
Israel and Nadler admire Spinoza for the freedoms he professed. Some others, such as Kal, sketch a more nuanced picture. Freedom of thought and freedom of expression should be understood in the context of what Spinoza exactly understood by the term. Surely, the subtitle of Theologico-Political Treatise is about the freedom to philosophise. However, two types of freedom should be distinguished, referring to Spinoza’s differentiation between religion and philosophy. The freedom for the common man and freedom for those who can think and reason. The common man enjoys some freedom of thought. However, limited by the accepted religion as proclaimed by the central authority; so, freedoms limited by religious obligations and acceptance of God’s existence and benevolence.
As for those who can think and reason, there are no restrictions, as they do not enter the domain of religion, which does not contain any intellectual pretentions. These people are free to philosophise, based upon Nature’s order. Regarding philosophers’ political relevance, Spinoza observed that when one of them demonstrates that a particular law would not make sense, and shares this opinion with the central authority, while not violating that particular law, this philosopher makes a useful contribution to the public good. Spinoza adds that the central authority should allow people who can think ample freedom to do so, to prevent them from stirring up discontent among commoners. Tolerance is the right attitude.
In Theologico-Political Treatise, Spinoza wrote that ‘this freedom (of expression; PdH) is of the first importance in fostering the sciences and the arts, for only those whose judgment is free and unbiased can attain success in these fields.’ I’d say that this was a truly inspirational and liberating statement for independent thinkers and curious minds, who - together – created the Enlightenment.
Spinoza proposed democracy, tolerance, benevolence, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and equality before the law. Having presented them around the middle of the seventeenth century, these notions were not just new; they were going against the Zeitgeist. Indeed, one of Spinoza’s central themes was freedom. However not in our contemporary sense but freedom in the context of his philosophy.
Freeing up the mind, which Spinoza, and subsequent representatives of the Enlightenment, professed led to new scientific insights, inventions of new techniques and their successful application in production processes. All these new ideas and phenomena were developed in Europe by a relatively small band of philosophers, scientists, and practitioners, such as self-made engineers, instrument makers and industrialists.
Why the Industrial Revolution was limited to Europe
Surely, there had been great inventions before the Industrial Revolution. Think of water mills, the horse collar, gun powder, the printing press, what have you. But they did not lead to accelerated technological progress. Well before the Industrial Revolution China had introduced impressive inventions, among them cast iron, the plough, the stirrup, gunpowder, printing, and the magnetic compass. So, why did the Industrial Revolution not originate in China, and why had these early inventions not led to accelerated technological progress in China?
The answer can best be given by telling the story of Joseph Needham (1900-1995). Needham taught biochemistry at Cambridge University. He firmly believed that all advanced technologies had been developed in England or in other European countries. It so happened that he had a female student, Lu Gwei-djen, whose father was a professor of history of science at Peking University. When Needham once told his students that a certain technology was invented in Europe, Lu corrected him by telling that the invention had taken place in China; she even told him in which book he could find it.
This triggered his curiosity. He started to study the history of Chinese science and technology. It so happened that during the Second World War, Needham was posted as British cultural counsellor in Chongqing. While travelling in China, Li Yuese (Needham’s Chinese name) collected a lot of historical materials. Needham studied in which year a certain technology, tool or machine was invented. He discovered that before the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries technology flowed one way: from East to West, as China had invented a wide variety of instruments and techniques, mentioned above. But in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, some technologies started to flow from West to East. And after the middle of the eighteenth century, the flow was exclusively from West to East.
The Needham Puzzle
These movements from East to West and then from West to East, formed the basis for the Needham Puzzle: why had China initially been so advanced compared to other countries, and why was China not any longer technologically ahead of the rest of the world? in Demystifying the Chinese Economy, Chinese economist Justin Lin deals with these questions. He proposes a theory to unravel the Needham puzzle, going back to the Industrial Revolution. The defining phenomenon, argues Lin, was the acceleration of technological innovation. This is why the gap between the West and China became ever wider. In addition, England developed more new industries than China, such as the chemical, automobile, aerospace, and information technology industries.
Lin introduces the technology distribution curve (shaped like a Bell curve), divided in low technology at the left half, and high technology at the right half of the curve. Factors like talent, newly developed material (such as steel), and knowledge move the technology distribution curve to the right: the more a country avails of these three factors, the greater the chance that more new technological inventions will ensue. He then presents three hypotheses: (i) the more trials and errors that are carried out, the greater the probability of inventing a new technology; (ii) the more advanced the current technology, the lower the probability of inventing a new technology; and (iii) after the discovery of one technology (like steel) more tools are being invented. Based on these hypotheses, Lin answers three questions:
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Why was China advanced in premodern times? At the time, invention was based on experience. China had a large population and the larger the population, the larger the number of craftsmen and peasants, and the greater the chance for inventions. Hence abundant human resources laid the basis for technological progress in those early days.
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Why did China lag behind Europe in modern times? In Europe after the eighteenth century, invention was based on experiment and no longer on experience. Trials and errors were now mainly based on intentional experiments. A scientist in a lab could do more trials than thousands of craftsmen and peasants. So population numbers were no longer an issue. To counter the diminishing experiment results effect, European countries increased basic research, triggering more technological innovations. The precondition for basic research was the Scientific Revolution which, even before the Industrial Revolution, took place in the West (as also argued by Mokyr). The Scientific Revolution contributed to the Industrial Revolution in two ways: (i) it introduced a revolution in methodology (i.e., controlled experiment replaced experience), and (ii) it facilitated the shift to the right of Lin’s technology distribution curve.
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Why did a Scientific Revolution not also take place in China? Modern science uses mathematical models to formalise its hypotheses and applies controlled or reproducible experiments to test them. Mathematical language is much better than natural languages in disseminating new knowledge. China had a bureaucratic system whereas Europe had a feudal system, more favourable to mercantilist values. With the collapse of the feudal system, capitalism and modern science could fully emerge. In China, merchants had a low position in the Confucian system; they were barred from the civil service examination system. China also did not promote the development of good mathematicians nor did it warm to scientific experiments. When civil service examinations were introduced by the Qin Dynasty, mathematics was one of the subjects. However, towards the end of the sixteenth century, Emperor Shenzong decided that mathematics was of little use and scrapped the subject. Without people mastering mathematical tools, the Scientific Revolution could not take place in China.
China’s initial inventions and prosperity had a lot to do with its civil service system. However, when the basis for technological innovation shifted from experience to experiment , like it did in Europe, the civil service system lost its superiority; worse, it even hindered scientific and technological progress. The key issue, concludes Lin, was the absence of the Scientific Revolution in China, without which the Industrial Revolution could not have happened there. And without the Industrial Revolution, technology could not accelerate. That is why capitalism, though sprouting in China, failed to develop there fully since the eighteenth century, until four decades ago when China’s economy took-off.
China, once a forerunner in innovations and technological prowess, ended at the wrong side of The Great Divergence, resulting from the economic take-off of European economies as opposed to economic stagnation of practically all other economies.
Mokyr summarised these historical developments very well:
While most societies …were able to generate some technological progress, it typically consisted of one-off limited advances that had limited consequences, …and the growth it generated fizzled out. In only one case did such accumulation of knowledge become sustained and self-propelling … That one instance occurred in Western Europe during and after the Industrial Revolution…. The big difference between Europe and the rest of the world was the Enlightenment and its implications for scientific and technological progress. But the rise of the Enlightenment …. was the culmination of a centuries’ long process of intellectual change among the European literate elite.
And it was Spinoza who prepared the ground for the Enlightenment.
Democracy revisited
As we saw, Spinoza argued that democracy, as he described it, was the best form of government. If you had to answer the question what system promotes economic development better in a poor country: democracy or a benevolent autocracy, which one would you chose? I would not be surprised if you chose autocracy; your thinking may be that a poor country needs a strong leader to pull off economic growth, unhindered by troublesome opposition groups. If your answer would be along these lines, you are in good company. Take New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, who some time ago wrote the following about China:
One-party non-democracy certainly has its drawbacks. But when it is led by a reasonably enlightened group of people, ……. it can also have great advantages. That one party can just impose the politically difficult but critically important policies needed to move a society forward in the 21st century.
Friedman may have suggested that democracy would retard economic growth. But was he right? According to Daron Acemoglu he would have been wrong. Acemoglu and colleagues wrote a paper in which economic growth of 175 countries was analysed during the period 1960 – 2010. This growth was paired with the political systems of the countries concerned.
The paper’s main finding is that over the long run democracy has a significant positive effect of around 20% on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. The paper’s other findings suggest that democracy contributes to future GDP growth by increasing investment, encouraging economic reforms, improving the collection of taxes, provision of public goods like schooling and health care, and reducing social unrest. The paper underlines that the findings do not imply that non-democracies never invest in public goods or enact far-reaching economic reforms. However, the average democracy is more likely to do so than the average non-democracy.
Another question is whether economic growth precedes democracy or is it the other way around? The authors conclude that the impact of democracy does not depend on the level of economic development. In other words, democracy doesn’t need growth first to take-off. Take Portugal: the democratisation of the country after the Salazar dictatorship resulted from mounting discontent with Salazar’s military regime. Once in 1976 democracy was established, Portugal’s economic growth started to improve. Subsequently, the government introduced the National Health Scheme, cutting infant mortality in half. School enrolment almost doubled over the next 30 years. Or take South Korea, a dictatorship before 1987. The dictators intended to continue their rule, but this met with massive student protests. Although in the past pro-democracy protests had also been staged, this time the government gave in. It helped that the regime was afraid that the country’s image would be badly affected in anticipation of the Olympics to be held in South Korea in 1988. Hence democracy was ushered in and economic growth shot up to 4.7% a year during the next two decades.
As this essay is about the relation between the inspirational forces of the Enlightenment and sustained economic development, the question is whether Spinoza was right in proposing democracy, being the political system best suited to free the minds, which in turn is crucial in promoting sustained economic growth. Spinoza favoured tolerance, freedom of expression, and equality before the law. He believed that democracy was the best system to organise a society and to ensure that the ‘social contract’ would not be broken. Acemoglu et al. came to the conclusion that democracy is the political system best suited for sustained economic growth.
China’s future
Mokyr presented a thought experiment towards the end of The Culture of Growth:
Imagine a New Atlantis run by a central administration in which technological progress is brought about by civil servants supported by a benign and progress-minded bureaucracy. Could such an organization have brought about the modern world without anything resembling the European Enlightenment? The economist’s logic would probably judge such a scenario as unlikely. It is one thing for such a political situation to be brought about in a single period; the likelihood that it could be sustained and avoid being corrupted and disrupted by greedy and ignorant outside invaders or inside rent-seekers in the long run seems dim.
After having read this text, I couldn’t help thinking of China’s future. After all, terms like central administration, technological progress, a prominent role of civil servants and bureaucracy at large, are all applicable to China. So far, its leaders have rebuffed the notion that democracy would be the sole system capable of creating and maintaining sustained economic growth. Indeed, China has been able to sustain spectacular economic growth over the past four decades. And after the outbreak of Covid-19 in Wuhan, the country handled the pandemic more effectively than e.g., the US, and Europe.
As we have seen, a central theme of Spinoza’s democracy, is society’s unity. Pluralism had to be prevented so as to preserve unity. Surely, some freedoms were permitted as long as this unity was not in jeopardy. German philosopher Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) developed a political philosophy in which he portrayed dualism between a liberal society and an authoritarian state, in which an emancipated citizen can be found next to an autocratic monarch. Hegel introduced the notion of subjective liberty. However, this does not represent true liberty. True liberty can only be attained when one would conform to the rules of the state, thus achieving objective freedom. In actual practice, a citizen will adjust to society’s ‘rules of the economic game’, and for the rest, one will mind one’s own business.
He elaborates this dualism as follows. In the context of societal and economic life, entrepreneurial citizens live and work pretty freely, but within a conservative, authoritarian state, which expects from its citizens to be law-abiding and loyal to the autocratic leadership. Such a hybrid system is typical for contemporary China.
President Xi Jinping and the Communist Party have a firm grip on the country and its economic development. Under Mr Xi, the Communist Party reinstated itself into every organ of society. He also ensured that the party operates inside private enterprises and NGOs - Mr Xi’s mantra: stability is paramount! China’s autocratic one-party system may also be able to achieve sustained economic growth in the long run. At any event, China firmly believes that it is successfully developing according to its unique economic model rather than getting wealthy through the market.
Obviously it is far too early to evaluate the political and economic sustainability of China’s unique development model. Only in the (very) long term success of China’s model can be confirmed or must be refuted. So, what are the perspectives? Although they seem to be quite good, I will look into some drawbacks of China’s economic and political outlook.
Made in China 2025
Technological progress tops China’s economic agenda. The leadership rightly understands that technological progress boosts productivity. In May 2015, Prime Minister Li Keqiang launched Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025), a high-tech expansion program. Its objective is to further develop China’s manufacturing sector into a technology-intensive powerhouse less reliant on foreign suppliers. MIC 2025 consists of 10 key strategic sectors, such as Artificial Intelligence, 5G, aerospace, robotics, semi-conductors, electric vehicles and green energy at large, biotech, and pharmaceuticals. These sectors will boost China’s international prominence, expected to capture global markets, perhaps surpassing American exporters.
The government had already invested $300 billion in MIC 2025. After Covid-19, another whopping $1.4 trillion was invested in the plan. This investment raised concerns, ranging from public investment overstretch to unfair international competition. Regarding the former, commentators inside and outside China observe that MIC 2025 is absorbing a disproportionate part of risky state-funded expenditure in new technologies. Others say that it would be better for a middle-income country like China to bet on market-based innovation to become a high-income country. Moreover, MIC 2025 is an exclusive, state-dominated, undertaking, and running the risk of wasteful investments. China’s competitors claim, as in the past, that the Chinese government is subsidizing its industries, thereby distorting the free functioning of the international market.
Through MIC 2025 the standard of living of the average Chinese citizen will improve. MIC 2025 will also provide employment for university graduates, many of whom are still being educated at American and European top universities. This triggers two questions. First, will China will have built up sufficient high-tech research capacity at home to match the high-tech demand from MIC 2025? Another question, although not directly related to MIC 2025, is whether the growing number of highly-educated citizens will accept having their freedoms restricted by the government? Is there, in other words, a relationship between the level of educational achievement and the demand for freedom of thought? If so, would this then be accommodated by the regime? I don’t know, but the prospects seem dim, given Xi’s firm grip on the population, as, for example, human rights activists and the average Uyghur would attest.
MIC 2025 reminds me of the Soviet Union’s investment in a few strategic industries at the time: heavy industry, defence (think e.g. of the development of the hydrogen bomb) and aerospace, while neglecting other economic, social, and political demands. The end-result was the implosion of the Soviet Empire, leaving behind an impoverished population, economic stagnation typified by outdated loss-making, poorly diversified industries, and corruption. Word has it that Mr Xi was horrified at how the Soviet Union’s Communist Party had evaporated overnight.
MIC 2025, investing in sectors that will dominate the Fourth Industrial Revolution, makes economic sense. However, as I mentioned before, MIC 2025 may result in wasting scarce financial resources. It may also trigger obstruction from international competitors claiming that China applies unfair competition.
A comparison with the Soviet Union’s trajectory may not be justified altogether, given many differences between the former Soviet Union and contemporary China. Yet what I want to flag is that state-conducted investment in a limited number of sectors, may overlook necessary investments in other vital aspects of China’s society which could undermine its cohesion and resilience. In this sense, The Economist observed that there is a rather large contrast between China’s world-class physical infrastructure - featuring, among others, the longest high-speed rail network - and its badly lagging soft infrastructure, with a social safety-net akin to those of much poorer countries.
The political outlook
President- for-life Xi Jinping is the undisputed ruler; he has no identifiable rival, or successor. But is his rule indeed undisputed? Not necessarily. Senior Lowy Institute Fellow, Richard McGregor recently published a little book: Xi Jinping: The Backlash, zooming in on some of Xi’s policies which are meeting resistance inside China and abroad. China’s politics have gone back in time, echoing the Maoist era. The anger towards Xi is building up, says McGregor. Mr Xi has unwound most of the political advances that were instrumental to China’s economic success. After having built up a personality cult, Xi stifles criticism and, say his critics, has mishandled relations with Washington. Criticism is getting louder – not just criticism on Xi’s economic policies, also deeper undercurrents are unmistakable.
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign ended the careers (and emptied bank accounts) of scores of senior Party and army officials at the national and lower levels. Millions of officials have been investigated and punished. Xi destroyed the lives of millions of people in the elite, who now all hold a personal grudge against him. McGregor observes: ‘Xi might have won popular support but he also earned himself a bucketload of bitter enemies, all itching for revenge.’
In 2018 the National People’s Congress created a new agency: the National Supervision Commission, which took in the operations of the Party’s anti-graft body, thereby extending the extra-judicial reach of the Party, resulting in alienating large sections of the legal intelligentsia, representing yet another group having an axe to grind with the President.
As for China’s position overseas, McGregor argues that the backlash against Xi Jinping is reaching full bloom, due to Xi’s assertive policy not just against America but also vis-à-vis countries from Germany, Canada to Malaysia and India to Kenya; let alone vis-a-vis neighboring countries South Korea, The Philippines, Japan and Vietnam. Take the relationship between China and Germany. Before the launch of MIC 2025, Germany took a laidback position towards China. This attitude was in particular taken by German automakers whose largest export market is, indeed, China. But once MIC 2025 was launched, the Germans got nervous. China is now perceived as a hostile power wanting to replace German cars by Chinese vehicles. Berlin-based Mercator Institute, a think tank, observed about MIC 2025:
‘In essence, Made in China 2025 aims for substitution. China seeks to gradually replace foreign with Chinese technology at home, and prepare the ground for Chinese technological companies entering international markets.’
The countries that feel threatened by China’s economic and geopolitical ambitions are now consulting like-minded countries to find common ground in their relationship with China. What is at stake is maintaining a global rules-based system, including collectively accepted sanctions.
There is more: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a huge infrastructure investment program, involving many countries from the East to the West. It is to ensure smooth transportation lines from and to China to facilitate imports of raw materials and exports of finished products. But it also is a hefty geopolitical instrument. While China is prepared to provide state-backed lending for the investment of participating countries’ infrastructure through BRI, China is also ‘buying’ political support from these countries in the international arena, such as the United Nations. Should borrowing countries not be able to repay their loans (which happens more and more), China can decide to seize or block the separate bank account which recipient countries were forced to open. In exceptional cases, like the port loan to Sierra Leone, China can take over the port, should Sierra Leone default. China is also investing in European (e.g., Servia, Hungary and Montenegro) and Asian countries (Cambodia and Laos), putting the European Union and ASEAN on the alert.
BRI is being criticized for its overreach. In addition, international concerns are expressed about the increasingly unsustainable debt levels of countries having received BRI-related loans. The IMF already warned for ‘debt distress’. Xi has listened and, subsequently, scaled back BRI’s ambitions. However, BRI loan defaults and the large debts incurred by, among others, Chinese loss-making state companies may further undermine Xi’s position.
Summing up, if Spinoza would have been alive, he would conclude that China reflects the opposite of what he proposed: democracy, tolerance, freedom of thought and expression. He would be bound to conclude that China’s model could not last. Even liberal-minded scholars would acknowledge that the People’s Republic is on the way to become the world’s largest economy, pulling hundreds of millions Chinese citizens out of poverty. But would China indeed present a better development model than the market-based democracies in the past? Mokyr is skeptical, as reflected in the above quotation:
It is one thing for such a political situation to be brought about in a single period; the likelihood that it could be sustained and avoid being corrupted and disrupted by greedy and ignorant outside invaders or inside rent-seekers in the long run seems dim.
All I can say is that time will tell. However, there are the backlashes I presented which may undermine not just the Chinese leadership’s confidence but, eventually, may put an end to the system.
Peter de Haan,
Mokyr, J. (2017) A Culture of Growth; The Origins of the Modern Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Israel, J. (2007) In Strijd met Spinoza; Het failliet van de Nederlandse Verlichting (1670-1800). Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 5. Spinoza’s Theologico-Philosophical Treatise includes the statement that any person may think what that person wishes and express these thoughts.In De List van Spinoza, Vincent Kal analyses Theologico-Philosophical Treatise from a conservative vantage point. On p. 265 Kal observes that this freedom of thought begins where religious disciplining ends. Freedom of thought in the domain of philosophy is based upon the order of Nature, which is beyond the state’s purview. This is why the state does not need to limit philosophers’ freedom of thought. On p. 267 Kal observes that Spinoza argued that people who philosophise belong to the educated classes. Giving them this freedom prevent them from mobilising the masses against the State. Source: Kal, V. (2020) De List van Spinoza; De Grote Gelijkschakeling. Amsterdam: Prometheus.
Russell, B. (1979) A History of Western Philosophy. London: Unwin Hyman Ltd, 552.
Ibid., 552.
Ibid., 7.
Theologico-Political Treatise, 86.
True religion, a simplified version of religion and a practical orientation for the common man, to be understood by commoners, is applied by the authorities to maintain obeyance, and thus control over these
people. Spinoza argued that superstition had to be removed from religion. In addition, religion had to play a constructive role in society, preventing that power hungry theologians would usurp it.
De List van Spinoza, Chapter 15: Democratie als waarborg voor macht (Democracy as a safeguard for power).
The term Modernity includes more than Kal’s interpretation of the term; the modern world consists of various political and philosophical systems than only individual liberalism.
Lin, J. (2012) Demystifying the Chinese Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 30-53.
Acceleration is promoted by bringing together knowledge and brilliant minds to develop new ideas and innovations. A couple of random examples: Ptolemeus III (246-222BC) established the world’s first large library at Alexandria, Egypt. At the time, Egypt was a prosperous country. Ptolemeus, himself a Greek, wanted to assemble all available knowledge in the world in this library. He sent out emissaries to collect important documents, so as to include them, properly catalogued, in the library’s collection. As of the 17th century, Leiden University attracted world famous scholars. As mentioned, Descartes was one of them. Swedish botanist Carl Linnaeus was another. More recently, Albert Einstein regularly visited Leiden to lecture and to meet professor Hendrik Lorentz (whom he admired) and brainstorm with professor Paul Ehrenfest. Niels Bohr also visited regularly, not in the least since Leiden’s physics and astronomy faculties were world famous at the time, thus attracting brilliant scholars. During one of his visits, Einstein took the time to visit Spinoza’s house in Rijnsburg (now a small museum), as Spinoza’s philosophy had inspired him to write Weltanschauung. Before the Second World War, Cambridge University attracted many economists during John Maynard Keynes’s tenure there at King’s College. Among them, Friedrich Hayek, Tibor Scitovsky, John Kenneth Galbraith and Milton Friedman who was a Keynesian before he changed his views. Silicon Valley is, of course, a very prominent contemporary place attracting brilliant minds, who, together, developed many innovations.
A Culture of Growth, 339.
Acemoglu, D., Naidu, S., Restrepo, P., Robinson, J. (1 May 2015) Democracy Does Cause Growth. To be downloaded via www.economist.com/democracy
A Culture of Growth, 341.
‘By 2012, …. private firms were responsible for about half of all investments in China …Xi’s ascension marked a turning point for entrepreneurs. Since 2012 this picture of private, market-driven growth has given way to a resurgence of the role of the state in resource allocation and a shrinking role for the market and private firms.’ Source: McGregor, R. (2019) Xi Jinping: The Backlash, 53.
Germany’s Industry 4.0 Strategy, is not state-dominated; it invites foreign investors.
The Economist. Socialism’s Precariat, May 19th 2020, 37-38. The outbreak of Covid-19 exposed this contrast in an embarrassing manner. After the outbreak, the government gave an extra 12 yuan ($1.70) a week to its poor. Those with nothing can apply for a guaranteed minimum income (dibao). But this offers on average only 600 yuan a month. True, the State Council recently announced that it would increase both unemployment and dibao benefits, but no details were supplied. Government expenditures on health, education, and social assistance are lower in China than the average among China’s peers. Should economic growth and employment opportunities falter, inadequate social services might eventually result in widespread social unrest.
McGregor, R. (2019) Xi Jinping: The Backlash. Melbourne: Penguin Random House Australia.
Ibid., 35.
Ibid., 97.
Francis Fukuyama et al. observe that not in all cases this seems to work: ‘Today many of the nations that are the largest recipients of Chinese lending have the poorest, rather than the best, bilateral relations with China. High levels of Chinese investment in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Ecuador provide the starkest example, as local agencies mired in debt have generated a substantial backlash. Many South Asian nations that are amongst the largest recipients of Chinese Belt and Road lending have shifted to realign strategically with India, Japan, or the United States’. Source: Batainich, B., Bennon, M., Fukuyama, F. How the Belt and Road Gained Steam: Causes and implications of China’s Rise in Global Infrastructure. Stanford: CDDRL Working Paper, (May, 2019), 28-29. The authors also mention on p. 29 that the American Congress passed the BUILD Act, to help US companies competing with Chines state-backed financing overseas. Yet US programs pale in comparison with those of China’s international lending institutions.
Essay 2023
Talk for Namibian senior civil servants on November 2023
What is this talk about
To start of I will tell you about the evolution of the world’s countries in terms of income per head over a period of 35 year, followed by a brief overview of the changing global geopolitical situation, and what the economic consequences would be for the world at large and for sub Saharan Africa in particular. Subsequently I will share with you my views on what factors make countries grow and prosper – I will argue that the main factor is productivity.
Mauritius and Botswana are Africa’s economic star performers. I will deal with the question what factors explain their respective success and, based on this, I hope to draw - together with you – a few suggestions that may further productivity growth of Namibia’s economic sectors.
Marein will send you the full text of my lecture which also includes a column I wrote about productivity growth some time ago.
