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Essay 2026

2026

The flaws of neoclassical economics

Neoclassical economics provides valuable analytical tools which to this day are being used in teaching economics and explaining the functioning of economies. However, foundational assumptions about, e.g., rationality, general equilibrium, and institutional neutrality fail to capture how real economies function. This paper concludes with where the economic science stands today in  attempting to capture real economic life as much as possible.

Som fifty years ago something happened which broadened the way economics was understood. It happened in a small town South-east of New York City: Princeton, more precisely: Princeton University. It was there that a professor in psychology, Daniel Kahneman ran into something which surprised him greatly; the assumptions applied by economists regarding human behaviour. This is how he told the story:

‘One day in the early 1970s, Amos Tversky handed me a mimeographed essay by a Swiss economist named Bruno Frey, which discussed the psychological assumptions of economic theory…..Bruno Frey barely recalls writing the piece, but I can still recite its first sentence: ‘The agent of economic theory is rational, selfish, and his tastes do not change. I was astonished. My economist colleagues worked in the building next door, but I had not appreciated the profound difference between our intellectual worlds. To a psychologist, it is self-evident that people are neither fully rational nor completely selfish, and that their tastes are anything but stable….Here was an opportunity for an interesting conversation across the boundaries of the disciplines. I did not anticipate that my career would be defined by that conversation.’

 

Assumptions

Homo economicus is a key assumption of classical and neoclassical economics. Kahneman was not the first scholar to conclude that there was a gap between the assumed behaviour of homo economicus and how people in day-to-day life behave, which he playfully demonstrated in his 2011 bestseller Thinking, Fast and Slow.

Another important (neo)classical notion is laissez-faire: let the market run its course, unhindered by outside forces (such as government), and everything will be fine as economic equilibrium will be the result. Forty years before Kahneman presented his critique, Cambridge economist John Maynard Keynes argued that in real life there was neither such a thing as laissez-faire, nor that someone’s private interest would benefit the public good, an important observation attributed to Adam Smith. Keynes observed:

‘It is not true that individuals possess a prescriptive ‘natural liberty’ in their economic actions. …The world is not so governed from above that private and social interests always coincide…. Nor is it true that self-interest generally is enlightened; more often individuals acting separately to promote their own ends are too ignorant or too weak to attain even these. …. We cannot, therefore, settle on abstract grounds, but must handle on its merits in detail….. to determine what the State ought to take upon itself to direct by public wisdom, and what it ought to leave, with as little interference as possible, to individual exertion.’

Keynes revolutionized economics

 

At the end of this quote, Keynes hinted at the role of the state in correcting market failures. In 1936, he elaborated the government’s crucial role in overcoming massive market failures in his master piece The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, triggering the Keynesian Revolution. He analysed the economy, not from the traditional microeconomic point of view, but from an aggregate, macroeconomic vantage point. Keynes also questioned the classical rational behaviour assumption, arguing that economic behaviour is also inspired by ‘animal spirts’. By triggering the Keynesian Revolution, Keynes dethroned neoclassical economics as the leading school of thought.

 

The comeback of neoclassical economics

 

Neoclassical economics was not defeated; it kept on evolving quietly under the radar. During the early 1970s, neoclassical economics experienced a resurgence. What happened was that Keynesians had not foreseen, nor prevented, stagflation - the toxic mix of high inflation combined with high unemployment. Keynesians had a strong belief in the Phillips Curve, which said that there was an inverse relation between inflation and unemployment: a bit of inflation would bring unemployment down. Keynesians could not explain why the Phillips Curve had lost its  relevance.

 

Meanwhile, neoclassical economists, such as Milton Friedman, had been developing new ideas. Friedman understood what stagflation’s problem was and offered solutions.

 

Friedman had this to say about the role of economists developing new ideas: ‘Only a crisis -actual or perceived – produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until politically impossible becomes politically inevitable.’

 

In the course of the 1960s, he already explained that the real unemployment rate was kept lower than the natural rate of unemployment, an idea Friedman had borrowed from Edmund Phelps. Friedman also argued that there was too much money in circulation, resulting in even more inflation.

Later, during the 1970s, the New Classical Economics school of thought gained prominence; promoted by, in particular, Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent, taking neoclassical assumptions on board.

 

In sum, Keynesianism was out, and neoclassical economics became the dominated school of thought.

 

New Institutional Economics

 

As of the 1980s, New Institutional Economics (NIE) exposed the shortcomings of neoclassical economics’ assumptions. It also proposed a more realistic approach, away from abstract models, in explaining economic growth or stagnation. NIE is now an important new branch of the economic sciences.

 

Neoclassical assumptions were questioned once again. This time by Douglass North, the new institutional economist. His Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, captures in concise terms the relevance of institutions in the process of economic growth. From a historical perspective, institutions comprise the underlying determinant of sustained economic growth. Institutions, as North defined them, are the constraints that structure human interaction. These constraints can be formal (i.e., laws) and informal (such as norms, beliefs) ones. Together they define the incentive structure, embodied in institutions of societies which determine economic growth, or the lack of it.

 

North developed a more realistic theory of doing economics, in exposing neoclassical economics’ shortcomings. He argued that neoclassical theory is frictionless, in which institutions don’t exist. Neoclassicals maintain that development occurs through perfectly functioning markets. In such a situation, the costs of acquiring information and the costs involved in transactions don’t exist - the efficient competitive solution of neoclassical economics obtains! Even though economic actors may initially have erroneous models, the informational feedback process will correct initially incorrect models, leading surviving market participants to the correct and efficient models. North concluded that in neoclassical economics institutions won’t matter, nor would time. However, institution do matter and, in addition, market transactions take time and involve transaction costs.

 

North was instrumental in establishing an entirely new school of institutional economics, of which Daron Acemoglu is the most prominent contemporary representative. Together with James Robinson he wrote Why Nations Fail (2012); like North before them, both were awarded last year’s Nobel Prize in Economics. Let me briefly tell you what Acemoglu and Robinson propose.

 

Acemoglu and Robinson sought to determine whether economic development would encourage liberalism. Based on an extensive historical analysis of growth trajectories of many countries, they identified two types of institutions: inclusive and extractive ones. Inclusive institutions promote prosperity, while extractive institutions (as the term implies) frustrate growth since the economic gains of growth are only shared by a small group that exploits others. Inclusive institutions encourage investment, while extractive ones discourage it. The authors also found, and this is important, that richer economies developed liberal democratic reforms.

 

What laid behind these insights? They found that, inspired by the mortality rate, countries experiencing a high mortality rate (such as those plagued by deadly tropical diseases), the colonial powers exploited native labour. This happened in many Sub-Saharan African countries and in many Latin American countries. Countries registering low mortality rates, such as in English-speaking offshoots (i.e., America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), attracted European settles providing them with the opportunity to reap the fruits of their labour, thanks to the protection of private property and the development of free markets (both important institutions, first developed in England). What also happened, as mentioned before, is that more prosperous economies have instituted liberal democratic reforms.

 

Acemoglu and Robinson also tackled the question why some countries developed poor institutions. They observe that in a highly unequal society the poor could threaten revolution. Any commitment by the elites to redistribute wealth in response was not credible;  they could always change their mind when the threat disappeared. As a result, unequal states were prone to instability. Checks and balances represented a response to this commitment: if elites were restrained, their promises to redistribute would be taken seriously and any revolutionary threat would be forestalled. This is why European states expanded the democratic franchise in the early 19th century.

 

In sum, Acemoglu and Robinson present an impressive and persuasive model, based upon historical developments They moved development economics away from abstract growth models.

 

Neoclassical economics remained unshaken

 

Undeterred by the development of these new insights in economics, neoclassical economists carried on, this time under the name of New Classical school economists. I already mentioned Economics Nobel Laureates Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent. They developed the rational expectations model. What is it about?

It can be best described as a consistent application of the hypothesis that rational individuals and firms behave in situations of change, with uncertainty about the future, imperfect information and costly information gathering. This does not imply that all agents have the same information, or that all agents know the true economic model; it simply means that agents are forward-looking and adjust their behaviour in response to anticipated future events.

Microeconomic foundation for macroeconomics

People and firms make rational predictions and decisions by considering the economic environment, market conditions, and their own experiences, thereby strengthening the case for macro models to be based on microeconomics. In other words, New Classicals lifted microeconomic notions to the level of macroeconomics. They express faith in the stability of the market, and, not least important, in general equilibrium. They are suspicious of government intervention. They advocate predictable government policy rules, while Neo-Keynesians argue, not surprisingly, that market failures of a macroeconomic nature occur, and that the government has to do something about them.

Given Lucas’s belief in market clearing equilibrium, it is no surprise that in his 2003 Presidential Address to the American Economic Association, he said the following:

‘Macroeconomics was born as a distinct field in the 1940s, as a part of the intellectual response to the Great Depression. The term then referred to the body of knowledge and expertise we hoped would prevent the recurrence of that economic disaster. My thesis in this lecture is that macroeconomics in this original sense has succeeded: its central problem of depression-prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes, and has in fact been solved for many decades.’

Only four years later, the financial crisis broke out followed by the Great Recession.

What New Classicals introduced was accepted by the profession, in particular by younger economists at the time. Early critics included the not-so-young Economics Nobel laureate and Neo-Keynesian, Robert Solow. In an interview he observed that the habit of labelling New Classical Economics as the rational expectations school is a misleading habit. All of the propositions associated with that school of thought come from the hypothesis of market clearing, and not from the rational expectations hypothesis. In addition, Solow observed that it is hard to believe that common economic agents strictly behave in a rational manner. Analytically speaking, New Classical Economics is attractive, but weak in its assumptions, Solow said. The assumptions they apply in their market-clearing-equilibrium, are simply unrealistic. Solow admitted that his own work applies different assumptions, and discussing them with New Classicals proved to be difficult.  

Not just Solow was critical, Edmund Phelps, for example, also does not believe that individuals behave as Lucas and Sargent argued. Phelps had been developing theories in which expectations play a crucial part. He maintains that ‘a nation’s economy is not generally on an equilibrium path characterized by correct (at least unbiased) expectations and, barring new developments, it is in the process of learning the correct expectations as the economy evolves.’ He concludes: ‘As I saw it, the New Classicals, with their adherence to ‘rational expectations’, showed they had little or no sense of a modern economy – an economy that, at its core, is driven by the judgement, intuitions, and imagination of a modern people.’ Phelps is implicitly referring to what the psychologist Daniel Kahneman would call Humans, and to Keynes’s animal spirits.

 

Enter behavioural notions

In 2011, Daniel Kahneman’s published Thinking, Fast and Slow. This fascinating book contains an elaborate critique of the rational agent model.

He presents Econs and Humans, underscoring that ‘Humans’ don’t necessarily act rationally. Moreover, they have limited information, and are not consistent and logical in their decisions. Kahneman observed that the term Econs is applied by economists, such as Lucas, while the term Humans is used by psychologists. Humans are ‘System 1’ types (fast, intuitive and emotional). Kahneman also introduces the’ System 2’ type, which is slower, more deliberative, and more logical. Humans are real people - we recognize their behaviour, not least our own. Econs pretend to act along System 2 lines, but – and economists overlook this - they are distracted by all kinds of phenomena, such as how an issue is being presented, as explained below.

Kahneman argued that every significant choice we make in life comes with some uncertainty. This is why students of decision-making hope that some of the lessons learned in a model situation apply to more interesting everyday problems. However, Kahneman added, tongue-in-cheek, that decision theorists study simple gambles, that other decision theorists had developed.

This field of research has a theory, called expected utility theory, which provided the foundation of the rational-agent model and remains, to this day, the most important theory in the social sciences. For example, economists adopted expected utility theory in a dual role: (i) as a logic that prescribes how decisions should be made, and (ii) as a description of how Econs make choices.

Regarding decision-making, Kahneman gave the following example. The way in which a question is formulated influences the outcome of an investigation about willingness to donate organs. Research in Europe revealed that high-donation countries applied an opt-out form, while low-contribution countries had an opt-in form; i.e., you had to check a box to become a donor. Kahneman concluded that the low-contribution outcome was best explained by the laziness of System 2. The choice was controlled by an utterly inconsequential feature (i.e., checking a box)  of the situation. This is just one point against the rational-agent theory.

Another assumption is that humans have consistent preferences. However we cannot trust our preferences to reflect our interests, even if based on personal experience, Kahneman argued. Tastes and decisions are shaped by memories, which can be wrong. Studies suggest that humans don’t have consistent preferences and would know how to maximize them - another cornerstone of the rational-agent model.

Kahneman found that there is an inconsistency built into the design of our minds. We want pain to be brief and pleasure to last longer. But our memory, which is a function of System 1, has evolved to represent the most intense moment of an episode of pain or pleasure and the feelings when the episode was at its end. In other words, memory is led by duration neglect and peak-end rule. The result is that a memory that neglects duration will not serve our preference for long pleasure and short pains.

 

Kahneman concluded that a theory (like the rational-agent model) worthy of its name asserts that certain events are impossible: they will not happen if the theory is true. When an ‘impossible’ event is observed (such as the 2007 financial crisis and subsequent Great Recession), the theory is falsified. Kahneman then sank the knife: ‘Theories can survive for a long time after conclusive evidence falsifies them, and the rational agent model certainly survived the evidence we have seen, and much other evidence as well.’ He concluded: ‘A significant difference between believers in the rational-agent model and the skeptics who question it is that the believers simply take it for granted that the formulation of a choice cannot determine preferences on significant problems. They will not even be interested in investigating the problem – and so we are often left with inferior outcomes.’ 

Returning to neoclassical economics

 

One of neoclassical economics hero’s is Friedrich Hayek. He compared the price system with a system of telecommunications. The market, reflecting prices obtaining, provides the information consumers and investors need to make informed decisions. Distortions of this system, for example caused by inflation or wage and price controls, give the wrong signals. In situations like these, prices no longer reflect the most efficient modes of production. This will result in resources being employed in inefficient and unproductive activities. But eventually, the market will eliminate the distortions and equilibrium is restored.

 

This is what the efficient market hypothesis says: financial markets would accurately reflect all available information. The rational expectations theory provided a foundation for the efficient market hypothesis, suggesting that individuals incorporate all relevant information into their expectations leading to efficient market outcomes.

 

The Grossman-Stiglitz paradox

 

What Hayek presented sounds plausible, but is it? Joseph Stiglitz and Sanford Grossman disagree. Right from the start they wonder if competitive equilibrium is defined as a situation in which prices are such that all arbitrage profits are eliminated, is it possible that a competitive economy always be in equilibrium? Clearly not, is their response. In their paper, they introduce the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox. It states that perfectly informationally efficient markets are an impossibility since, if prices perfectly reflected available information, there would be no profit to gathering information, in which case there would be little reason to trade and markets would eventually collapse.

Let us take the stock market. If stock prices at every moment reflected all of the available information about the economic outlook, and other factors pertinent to individual companies, investors wouldn’t have any incentive to search out and process it. But if nobody processes information, stock prices won’t reflect that information, and the market won’t be efficient. Grossman and Stiglitz conclude that for the market to function effectively, there must be some level of inefficiency.

 

Hayek ignored market failures. Grossman and Stiglitz demonstrate that information is not fully revealed by market prices, comparing information with air: its adequate provision is a precondition for other things to take place. However, when this information is lacking, or is only partially available, Hayek’s celebrated telecommunications system can’t work. Insights in so-called bounded rationality, nuance the picture sketched by Grossman and Stiglitz.

Why neoclassical economics is not written off.

Given neoclassicals’ flaws, such as unrealistic assumptions about human behaviour, unrealistic assumptions about the functioning of markets, and neglect of institutional factors, one wonders why neoclassical economics is not written off altogether?

There are appealing reasons for its perseverance. One can think of the following ones:

First, the theory itself. It is an elegant and relatively simple one. Take this description: Neoclassical economics begins with the proposition that the economy is comprised of rational self-interested individuals (i.e., consumers and firms) who maximise their utility through voluntary exchanges in markets which, when free from external interferences, produce an efficient equilibrium. At first glance, this description is appealing. Economic actors operate sensibly, inspired by the notion that they are free to make decisions on how to spend their money. Let’s face it, in economic matters people are fairly rational, and dropping simple assumptions would complicate economic modelmaking. Prices play a prominent part in an economic decision-making process: If the price of a good is too high, it won’t be sold. If an investment is too risky, funds won’t be devoted to it. When prices give the wrong signal, as Hayek argued, an automatic process ensues, eventually resulting in an efficient equilibrium.

And as Adam Smith wrote in many instances (but not in all): each private producer is not just contributing to his or her economic well-being but often also to the public good.

The government is responsible for ensuring that the market can function free of external influences. The government should also address market failures. The government itself is supposed to only undertake public tasks that individual market participants cannot undertake.

This model is not just simple, logical and elegant, it is also very useful for educational purposes in demonstrating students how homo economicus, and the economy at large, are supposed to function. Indeed, another strong point in favour of neoclassical economics.

Now, what about neoclassical economics’ assumptions? This is what Milton Friedman wrote about assumptions in his famous The Methodology of Positive Economics. He argued that theories should be evaluated not on the basis of the realism of their assumptions but exclusively on the basis of the accuracy of their predictions resulting from their hypotheses. This is what he argued: A hypothesis must be descriptively false in its assumptions; it takes account of none of the many attendant circumstances, since its very success shows these assumptions to be irrelevant for the phenomena to be explained.’

So, Friedman, like a magician, made assumptions disappear. Needless to say, Friedman’s opinion was contested. His long-time opponent, Paul Samuelson objected to Friedman’s claim about the irrelevance of assumptions. Samuelson retorted that based on the principles of logic, true assumptions can only produce true conclusions. But false assumptions can produce both true and false conclusions. Economics, Samuelson concluded, needed true conclusions.

Another strong point in favour of neoclassical economic is its emphasis on the central role of the market. After all, the market and the price system provide the incentives to invest, work hard, and reap the profits, all of which contribute to economic growth. There is simply no other economic system, than the one based upon neoclassical principles that register better economic results.

This message was persuasively communicated by associations composed of liberal-minded scientists, such as Hayek’s-inspired Mont Pèrelin Society, and think-tanks - inspired by the philosophy of Friedman - receiving funds from donors with deep pockets, to spread the gospel of the market (and small government) among politicians - in particular Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher at the time - the media, and opinion leaders. Surely, the market has its downsides – it can be unforgiving for those whose business went under and for workers who lost their jobs. However, this aspect received little attention from them. Redistribution policies neither constitute a prominent part in the neoclassical play book.

These persuasive selling points, could not prevent what happened in the first decade of this century. Neoclassical economics’ flaws - in its New Classical School guise - were embarrassingly exposed during the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the ensuing Great Recession. Markets failed spectacularly. It turned out that their models had little explanatory and predictive power. They could not simultaneously explain both the duration and magnitude of actual cycles. Lucas’s statement that macroeconomics’ central problem of depression-prevention had been solved, proved to be wrong. Corrective Keynesian actions had to be taken by the  government to prevent economic disasters.

This is what then Chairman of the Fed, Alan Greenspan, confessed during an interrogation by members of the American House of Representatives. Greenspan said: I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organisations, specifically banks, is such that they were best capable of protecting shareholders and equity in firms…I discovered a flaw in the model that I perceived is the critical functioning structure that defines how the world works. I had been going for 40 years with considerable evidence that it was working exceptionally well. Greenspan was apparently one of the believers in the way neoclassical economics works in practice.

 

Toward the neoclassical synthesis

In a New York Times column, Paul Krugman describes what he understands neoclassical economics to be: ‘We imagine an economy consisting of rational self-interested players, and suppose that economic outcomes reflect a situation in which each player is doing the best he, or she, can, given the actions of all the other players. If nobody has market power, this comes down to the textbook picture of perfectly competitive markets with all the marginal whatevers equal.’ Krugman then observes that some economists, like Greenspan, really believe that life is like this, but they have a significant impact on our discourse.

Krugman then observes that the rest of us are well aware that this is just a metaphor. Nonetheless, most of what Krugman and his allies do is sort of neoclassical because they take, as Klugman calls it, the ‘maximization-and-equilibrium world’ as a starting point, which is then modified - but not too much in the direction of realism.

He explains why this dressed-down neoclassical approach is taken. It is simple, also realising that in the real world people are fairly rational, and more or less self-interested. If one were to integrate qualifiers, this would complicate the model. So, keep it as simple as possible! Since introducing dynamics into a model is challenging, it is best, adds Krugman, to take as the end state of such a dynamic process an equilibrium, as this may reveal the researchers much of what they want to know.

Krugman also wonders what truly non-neoclassical economics would look like. It would involve, inspired by Kahneman, rejecting both the simplification of maximizing behaviour, going for full behavioural, as well as rejecting the simplification of equilibrium, as Solow had argued, while going for a dynamic story with no end state. Krugman also mentions agent-based economics, which relies on computing, while making simplified but unrealistic assumptions, like those of neoclassical economics. 

So he explains why neoclassical notions are not discarded. The qualifiers, as Krugman calls them, fall into the domain of behavioural economists and other specialised fields, as they would complicate the model too much.

Conclusion

In the real economy, the government has a much larger role to play than the limited role prescribed by neoclassical economics. This conclusion is of course not new. Paul Samuelson developed the so-called neoclassical consensus. It recognises, like Keynes had done, the merits of the government’s corrective role in the economy, not just in addressing booms, busts, price stickiness, and market failures, but also in promoting social justice and social stability.

During periods of economic stability, such as during the Great Moderation of the 1980s and 1990s, let the market run its course and keep government’s involvement small. However, when things go wrong, the government must be called in to restore stability. The neoclassical paradigm, did not foresee such a situation from happening. Neoclassicals could not sufficiently explain, nor predict, what happens in the real world.

This understanding triggered a renewed neoclassical synthesis, which forms the basis of mainstream economics today. In this synthesis, New Keynesians accepted the relevance of Friedman-inspired monetary policies and Lucas’s rational expectations hypothesis, providing a microeconomic foundation for Keynesian economics. While New Classical economists accepted the New Keynesian notion that for several reasons (e.g., stickiness) wages and prices do not move quickly to a long-term equilibrium.

The flaws of neoclassical economics also led to the emergence of new branches of the economic science, attempting to explain economic phenomena, while applying more realistic assumptions. It is unlikely, as Krugman suggests, that realism will ever be fully incorporated in economic models, simply because real world economies do not function along the lines of universal, predictable laws, such as those of physics. However, one should not exclude the possibility, propelled by advanced AI, that these new branches may produce instruments that can be incorporated into more realistic models.

References

Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. (2012) Why Nations Fail; The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty. London: Profile Books

Burns, J. (2023) Milton Friedman; the Last Conservative. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux

Friedman, M. (1953) The Methodology of Positive Economics; Essays in Positive Economics Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Grossman, Sanford J.; Stiglitz, Joseph E. (June 1980) On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets. In: American Economic Review 70(3):393–408.

Kahneman, D. (2011) Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux

Keynes, J.M. (1931) The End of Laissez Faire. In: Essays in Persuasion. London: MacMillan & Co

Klamer, A. (1984) The New Classical Macroeconomics; Conversations with New Classical Economists and Their Opponents. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books

Krugman, P. The New York Times, 28 August, 2012

Krugman, P. (2013) End This Depression Now. New York: Norton & Company

Marshall, A. (1977) Principles of Economics London: MacMillan

North, D. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Phelps, E. (2023) My Journeys in Economic Theory. New York: Columbia University Press

 

Peter de Haan                                                                                                                                                                                                         August 2025 

Kahneman, D. (2011) Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 269.

Keynes, J.M. (1931) The End of Laissez Faire. In: Essays in Persuasion. London: MacMillan & Co, 312.

Alfred Marshall is the author of Principles of Economics. In this celebrated classic he observed that the great founder of classical economics, Adam Smith, had given many instances in The Wealth of Nations of the ways in which self-interest may lead the individual trader to act injuriously to the community. Source: Principles of Economics (1977). London: MacMillan, 627. Smith steadily insisted on the frequent opposition that there is between private interests and the public good.

Lorie Tarsis, a student of Keynes’s at the time commented: And finally what Keynes supplied was hope: hope that prosperity could be restored and maintained without the support of prison camps, executions and bestial interrogations. Remember that during the 1930s, fascism and communism were on the rise.

Burns, J. (2023) Milton Friedman; the Last Conservative. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Burns used Friedman’s words as a motto of her book.

 

Emeritus Professor in Economics, Edmund Phelps, provided the microeconomic foundation for the Keynesian model of unemployment. In his 1965 paper ‘Phillips Curves, Expectation of Inflation and Optimal Unemployment Over Time’, Phelps introduced the term natural rate of unemployment. Source: Phelps, E. (2023) My Journeys in Economic Theory. New York: Columbia University Press, 65.

North, D. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. (2012) Why Nations Fail; The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty. London: Profile Books.

Quote from Krugman, P. (2013) End This Depression Now. New York: Norton & Company, 91.

Klamer, A. (1984) The New Classical Macroeconomics; Conversations with New Classical Economists and Their Opponents. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 127-148. 

Solow quoted the economist Frank Ramsey who compared such a discussion with the following conversation: ‘I went to Grantchester today.’ ‘That is funny, I didn’t.’

My Journeys in Economic Theory, 95.

Ibid., 96-97.

 

Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002 for his work integrating psychological research into economics, particularly concerning human judgment and decision making under uncertain circumstances.

Thinking, Fast and Slow, 374.

Grossman, Sanford J.; Stiglitz, Joseph E. (June 1980)"On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets". American Economic Review.70(3):393–408.

Unlike the traditional economic assumption of perfect rationality, bounded rationality recognizes that people use simple rules of thumb to make decisions. The concept of bounded rationality was introduced by Herbert Simon. It highlights that decision-makers strive to make rational choices but are often limited by the information available to them and their cognitive processing abilities. Bounded rationality is particularly significant in behavioural economics, as it helps explain adaptive real-life decision-making processes that deviate from classical economic theories.

Friedman, M. (1953) The Methodology of Positive Economics; Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

The New York Times, 28 August, 2012.

2023 November

Essay 2025

2025

Spinoza’s legacy

Liberating the mind from superstition and religious straightjackets, as Spinoza proposed, triggers freedom of thought, tolerance, and innovation. He was the first philosopher who prepared the ground for the Enlightenment, which brought about modern economies characterised by sustained economic development.

Introduction

During most of human’s existence economic stagnation was the rule. True, now and again, there were periods of relative prosperity but they did not last. Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) had an explanation. He observed that prosperity triggered population growth. But agricultural production lagged behind resulting in famines. Consequently, the population shrank again and economic growth fizzled out. What he overlooked however, was that the growth of productivity in agriculture could break the cycle – the growing population could indeed be fed by a more productive agricultural sector.

Productivity growth is the principal explanation for sustained economic growth resulting in higher incomes, better health and education; in short, in a better life. Productivity started to grow during the Industrial Revolution. It was then that technical innovations were applied in industrial and agricultural production processes. Subsequent innovations contributed to further productivity growth. This prompted the question what exactly  inspired these innovations?

 

The Enlightenment was the crucial intellectual change in Europe before the Industrial Revolution. Economic historian Joel Mokyr developed an interesting hypothesis in this realm. In A Culture of Growth; The Origins of the Modern Economy, he argues  that it was the Enlightenment that triggered  the Industrial Revolution. More precisely, Mokyr maintains that it was the Industrial Enlightenment that brought the Industrial Revolution about.

Francis Bacon (1561-1626) played an important part in changing the intellectual outlook at the time. Bacon said that one could attain material progress through controlling nature, and nature could only be harnessed by understanding her. So, it was the scientific analysis of how natural forces work that brought about material progress. This is what Bacon had in mind: broadening the view of scholars beyond religious notions towards scientific investigation and - equally relevant - the spread of attained knowledge. Think of Denis Diderot’s (1713-1784) Grande Encyclopedie, which spread newly acquired knowledge. All this led to an intellectual and cultural sea change in Europe. Nothing of the sort happened in the Ottoman Empire, India, China, Latin America and Africa.  

Spinoza’s life

While Bacon was one of the trailblazers of the Enlightenment, Baruch, or Benedictus, de Spinoza (1632–1677) )was certainly another inspirator. British historian Jonathan Israel  argues that Spinoza was the first great philosopher who, in a systematic manner, presented the values of democracy, tolerance, individual liberty and equality, based upon a purely secular social and ethical theory. As for tolerance, the same qualities that make people tolerant also make them receptive to new ideas. And, says Mokyr, ideas eventually ignited the Industrial Revolution.

Israel argues that Spinoza was the principal philosopher of the so-called Radical Enlightenment. Spinoza prepared the ground for democrats, egalitarians, and proponents of freedom and tolerance. Israel provides a popular interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy. American philosopher Steven Nadler shares Israel’s appreciation of Spinoza to a large extent. Nadler finds Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise one of the most important works of Western thought, as this book provided the foundation on which liberal, secular and democratic thinking could be constructed. As so often, there are other scholars who present a different interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy. Before elaborating the relationship between the Enlightenment and sustained economic development, I present Spinoza’s life and philosophy, including various interpretations of the latter.

Being from Portuguese descent, Spinoza was born in Amsterdam. In 1656  he was expelled (herem)  by Amsterdam’s Sephardic community. Despite recent attempts, it was never rescinded. Subsequently he moved to many places, among them Leiden and Rijnsburg (a village close to Leiden) where he associated himself with Collegiants, an anti-clerical sect of Remonstrants, who had tendencies towards rationalism. Finally, he settled in The Hague where he  wrote his magnum opus Ethics. He died in 1677 and was buried there at the Nieuwe Kerk. Unlike René Descartes (1596-1650), who was a professional scholar and teacher (and also lived for a time in Leiden), Spinoza rejected the chair of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg. He made a living by polishing lenses. Astronomer Christiaan Huygens (1629-1695) praised the quality of Spinoza’s lenses which he used in his telescope.  

Let me first  explain why Spinoza was expelled by Amsterdam’s Sephardic community. His ideas about God, the soul, and his denial that Moses had written the Torah were simply too radical, let alone his thoughts about God’s election of the Hebrews, as expressed in his Theologico-Political Treatise (see box below).

The ancient Hebrews  did not surpass other nations in their wisdom or in their proximity to God. They were neither intellectually nor morally superior to other peoples. They were ‘chosen’ only with respect to their social organisation and political good fortune, thanks to Moses, their undisputed Leader. Moses was a true patriarch. God or Nature gave them a set of laws (through a wise law giver, Moses), which they obeyed, and made their surrounding enemies weaker than them. The natural result of this ‘internal’ and ‘external’ aid is that their society was well-ordered and their autonomous government persisted for a long time. Their election by God was thus a temporal and conditional one, and their kingdom is now long gone.

 

Spinoza challenged the accepted notion of a transcendent God. He denied the immortality of the soul, nor did he accept the notion that the commandments of the Torah and rabbinic legal principles were given by God. Indeed, he challenged the fundamentals of revealed religion. In sum, Spinoza left Judaism behind.

Spinoza was a gadfly not just for Amsterdam’s Sephardic community, but also for those who embraced traditional opinions on religious, ethical, and societal issues. British philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) believed that Spinoza must have been perceived as ‘a man of appalling wickedness’. But he found Spinoza ‘the noblest and most lovable of the great philosophers.’ Russell added that some others have surpassed him, but ethically he was supreme.

Religion

Religion constitutes a prominent subject in Spinoza’s philosophy, but not in a purely theological sense; religion’s role  in Spinoza’s thinking can, as Kal observes, be compared with the one played by myths or ideologies.  Spinoza observed that religion and religious institutions had too large a grip on people and on the way people went about their business. He strongly felt that religious leaders had too much power and authority over people. People had to be liberated from their grip; they should be given the freedom to think for themselves. However, Spinoza’s freedom of thought is not  the same as this term is now understood.

God and Nature

Spinoza elaborated his  thoughts about God. For him, God existed only in a philosophical sense, thereby preventing God’s anthropomorphizing. Discovering and experiencing God, said Spinoza, is through philosophy and science. An anthropomorphic God acting as a judge over man can only have negative effects on human freedom and actions, as it would foster a life enslaved to hope and fear and the superstitions to which such emotions can arise. God and Nature are one and the same, argued Spinoza; Nature’s universal laws reflect God’s decisions, which follow from ‘the necessity and perfection of heavenly Nature.’ God does not transcend nature: God is Nature. God or nature do not act for any ends, and things do not exist for any set purposes - God  is not a goal-oriented planner, so to speak. Hence, all talk of God’s purposes, intentions, goals, preferences or aims is just a anthropomorphizing fiction. Spinoza added that God neither performs miracles - a  very bold statement at the time. Spinoza explained ‘miracles’ in his typical rational manner. After all Spinoza was  a rationalist, like Descartes, who was the principal representative of the Age of Reason.

Spinoza differed from Descartes’s dualism- that of  mind and body. Spinoza argued that the human being is a union of two ‘substances’, as he put it. The human mind and body are two expressions of one and the same person. The soul, like the body, is not immortal.

 

Ethics

Spinoza elaborated his thoughts about society, and the good life in Ethics, which was published in 1677, after his death. This work shows that man’s happiness and well-being lie not in a life dedicated to passions and material goods, nor in the attachment to superstitions that pass as religion, but in a life of reason. Spinoza strongly believed in the cognitive powers of human beings.

Regarding passions, Spinoza argued that one needed to free oneself from a reliance on the senses and the imagination. Passions are beyond one’s control. The more one allows oneself to be controlled by them, the less free one is. What one needs to do, suggested Spinoza, is to rely on our rational faculties. The result is self-control and a calmness of mind.

Spinoza’s ‘free person’ engages in ethical, benevolent, behaviour towards other people. He takes care of the well-being of other people by applying his rational benevolence to insure that the beneficiaries achieve relief from disturbances. It is in his best interest to relate to other rationally virtuous individuals, in forming a harmonious society. However, human beings do not always act under the guidance of reason. And at this point Spinoza ushers in the role of the State.

The State

The state is to ensure that individuals are protected  from the self-interest of other individuals.  Hence the transition from a state of nature to a civil state involves the renunciation  of certain natural rights, such as the right to avenge oneself, and of judging good and evil. These rights and judgments should be the prerogatives of the state.

Spinoza’s ideal is a tolerant, secular and democratic polity. This he  found in Holland at the time (see box below). In Theologico-Political Treatise Spinoza argued that he was fortunate to live in a State in which citizens were allowed unrestricted freedom to judge and to worship God as these citizens deemed fit, and in which nothing was considered more valuable than this freedom. This statement reflected an ideal situation. That is probably why, on the same page, Spinoza ironically observed that he was often surprised to encounter people who profess to be Christians, i.e. is to practice love, joy, peace, restraint and  loyalty, yet fight others with exceptional intensity and extend one another the most bitter hatred. As a result, concluded Spinoza, one sooner recognises  one’s religious convictions  than one based upon a person’s virtues.

 

Philosophy and religion, reason and faith, represent two distinct and exclusive spheres; neither should tread in the domain of the other. The freedom to philosophise can be granted without doing harm to true religion, i.e., not turning religion into superstition but to practicing justice and charity to one’s neighbour. To sum up, Spinoza presented a society characterised by tolerance, benevolence, freedom of thought and freedom of religion.

Democracy

Spinoza argued, as I mentioned,  that religious authorities should not meddle into political affairs, nor in those of philosophers. It would be in anybody’s interest to live under the law of reason. It would be best to handing over laws to a sovereign (be it a monarch or to a central authority holding power) who will be keeping all the members of society to the agreement, by playing on their fear of the consequences of breaking the ‘social contract’.

But how is this democratic handing over of power and rights achieved? Spinoza provides the answer in Theologico-Philosophical Treatise. Instead of religion constituting a threat to the stability and freedoms of a society, religion plays a very  important double role in this book: religion for the common man and religion for those who can think and reason. It is instrumental in creating a so-called religious democracy, in which a central authority nudges  the population to freely handing over their rights and power to this authority. The central authority applies religion, true religion as Spinoza called it, to enforce obeyance from the commoners. As regards the ones who can think and reason, while conforming to the unavoidable universality of nature’s laws, they will – again based upon their common sense - accept to form part of society, as the state so dictates. Subsequently, they will be able to live as a free person. In fact, argued Spinoza, people handed over their rights and power to God, and not to a fellow human being. Hence while handing over their power and rights to God, they preserve their freedom. Spinoza added that it would be advisable that those who can think and reason be granted some freedom. If not, they might undertake activities that would undermine the regime’s exclusive power. And it is this power  that ensures the state’s sustainability.

Spinoza distinguishes different forms of government: Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy. As a Monarchy may degenerate into a Tyranny, a Aristocracy into an Oligarchy,  Spinoza concluded that the type of government that serves the ends for which government is instituted, and which best reflects the freedom which nature allows people to enjoy, was democracy. It is the most natural form of government arising out of the social contract just mentioned. After all, in a democracy the people obey only laws issued from the central authority.

It should be underscored, as Kal elaborately argues, that Spinoza’s democracy is not the same democracy as we understand it to be. In Spinoza’s description the citizens of a society hand over their power (and thus their rights) to a central authority. This authority is, therefore, bestowed with full authority  over its citizens. The more citizens hand over their power and rights, the more powerful the central authority would be. As a result, it would not have to be afraid of any opposition, as the citizens have a blind faith in their leaders.  

In Theologico-Political Treatise Spinoza defines democracy as follows: She [democracy; PdH] is therefore defined as a general association of people, who together wield the highest  right regarding everything she wishes to undertake or establish. Spinoza’s democracy is thus characterised by exclusive power of the central authority, resulting from the free transfer of the  citizens’ power and rights  to this authority. This smacks of an authoritarian form of government; some critics even accuse Spinoza of being an avant la lettre  fascist. Kal rejects such a qualification. Instead he characterises Spinoza as a revolutionary conservative. Kal adds that  Spinoza does not embrace a future-focussed free and open individualism, which is modernity’s central trademark.

Freedom of thought

Israel and Nadler admire Spinoza for the freedoms he professed. Some others, such as Kal, sketch a more nuanced  picture. Freedom of thought and freedom of expression should be understood in the context of what Spinoza  exactly understood by the term. Surely, the subtitle of Theologico-Political Treatise is about the freedom to philosophise. However, two types of freedom should be distinguished, referring to Spinoza’s differentiation between religion and philosophy.  The freedom  for the common man and freedom for those who can think and reason. The common man enjoys some freedom of thought. However, limited by the accepted religion as proclaimed by the central authority; so, freedoms limited  by religious obligations and acceptance of God’s existence and benevolence.

As for those who can think and reason, there are no restrictions, as they do not enter the domain of religion, which does not  contain any intellectual pretentions. These people are free to philosophise, based upon Nature’s order.  Regarding philosophers’ political relevance, Spinoza observed that when one of them  demonstrates that a particular law would not make sense, and shares this opinion with the central authority, while not violating that particular law, this philosopher makes a useful contribution to the public good. Spinoza adds that the central authority should allow people who can think ample freedom to do so, to prevent them from stirring up discontent among commoners. Tolerance is the right attitude.

 

In Theologico-Political Treatise, Spinoza wrote that ‘this freedom (of expression; PdH) is of the first importance in fostering the sciences and the arts, for only those whose judgment is free and unbiased can attain success in these fields.’ I’d say that this was a truly inspirational and liberating statement for independent thinkers and curious minds, who - together – created the  Enlightenment.

Spinoza proposed democracy, tolerance, benevolence, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and equality before the law. Having presented them around the middle of the seventeenth century, these notions were not just new; they were going against the Zeitgeist. Indeed, one of Spinoza’s central themes was freedom. However not in our contemporary sense but freedom in the context of his philosophy.

Freeing up the mind, which Spinoza, and subsequent representatives of the Enlightenment, professed led to new scientific insights, inventions of new techniques and their successful application in production processes. All these new ideas and phenomena were developed in Europe by a relatively small band of philosophers, scientists, and practitioners, such as self-made engineers, instrument makers and industrialists.

Why the Industrial Revolution was  limited to Europe

Surely, there had been great  inventions before the Industrial Revolution. Think of water mills, the horse collar, gun powder, the printing press, what have you. But they did not lead to accelerated technological progress. Well before the Industrial Revolution China had introduced impressive inventions, among them cast iron, the plough, the stirrup, gunpowder, printing, and the magnetic compass. So, why did the Industrial Revolution not originate in China, and why had these early inventions not led to accelerated technological progress in China? 

The answer can best be given by telling the story of Joseph Needham (1900-1995). Needham taught biochemistry at Cambridge University. He firmly believed that all advanced technologies had been developed in England or in other European countries. It so happened that he had a female student, Lu Gwei-djen, whose father was a professor of history of science at Peking University. When Needham once told his students that a certain technology was invented in Europe, Lu corrected him by telling that the invention had taken place in China; she even told him in which book he could find it.

This triggered his curiosity. He started to study the history of Chinese science and technology. It so happened that during the Second World War, Needham was posted as British cultural counsellor in Chongqing. While travelling in China, Li Yuese (Needham’s Chinese name) collected a lot of historical materials. Needham studied in which year a certain technology, tool or machine was invented. He discovered that before the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries technology flowed one way: from East to West, as China had invented a wide variety of instruments and techniques, mentioned above. But in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, some technologies started to flow from West to East. And after the middle of the eighteenth century, the flow was exclusively from West to East.

The Needham Puzzle

These movements from East to West and then from West to East, formed the basis for the Needham Puzzle: why had China initially been so advanced compared to other countries, and why was China not any longer technologically ahead of the rest of the world? in Demystifying the Chinese Economy, Chinese economist Justin Lin deals with these questions. He proposes a theory to unravel the Needham puzzle, going back to the Industrial Revolution. The defining phenomenon, argues Lin, was the acceleration of technological innovation. This is why the gap between the  West and China became ever wider. In addition, England developed more new industries than China, such as the chemical, automobile, aerospace, and information technology industries.

Lin introduces the technology distribution curve (shaped like a Bell curve), divided in low technology at the left half, and high technology at the right half of the curve. Factors like talent, newly developed material (such as steel), and knowledge move the technology distribution curve to the right: the more a country avails of these three factors, the greater the chance that more new technological inventions will ensue. He then presents three hypotheses: (i) the more trials and errors that are carried out, the greater the probability of inventing a new technology; (ii) the more advanced the current technology, the lower the probability of inventing a new technology; and (iii) after the discovery of one technology (like steel) more tools are being invented. Based on these hypotheses, Lin answers three questions:

  1. Why was China advanced in premodern times? At the time, invention was based on experience. China had a large population and the larger the population, the larger the number of craftsmen and peasants, and the greater the chance for inventions. Hence abundant human resources laid the basis for technological progress in those early days.

  2. Why did China lag behind Europe in modern times? In Europe after the eighteenth century, invention was based on experiment and no longer on experience. Trials and errors were now mainly based on intentional experiments. A scientist in a lab could do more trials than thousands of craftsmen and peasants. So population numbers were no longer an issue. To counter the diminishing experiment results effect, European countries increased basic research, triggering more technological innovations. The precondition for basic research was the Scientific Revolution which, even before the Industrial Revolution, took place in the West (as also argued by Mokyr). The Scientific Revolution contributed to the Industrial Revolution in two ways: (i) it introduced a revolution in methodology (i.e., controlled experiment replaced experience), and (ii) it facilitated the shift to the right of Lin’s technology distribution curve.

  3. Why did a Scientific Revolution not also take place in China? Modern science uses mathematical models to formalise its hypotheses and applies controlled or reproducible experiments to test them. Mathematical language is much better than natural languages in disseminating new knowledge. China had a bureaucratic system whereas Europe had a feudal system, more favourable to mercantilist values. With the collapse of the feudal system, capitalism and modern science could fully emerge. In China, merchants had a low position in the Confucian system; they were barred from the civil service examination system. China also did not promote the development of good mathematicians nor did it warm to scientific experiments. When civil service examinations were introduced by the Qin Dynasty, mathematics was one of the subjects. However, towards the end of the sixteenth century, Emperor Shenzong decided that mathematics was of little use and scrapped the subject. Without people mastering mathematical tools, the Scientific Revolution could not take place in China.

China’s initial inventions and prosperity had a lot to do with its civil service system. However, when the basis for technological innovation shifted from experience to experiment , like it did in Europe, the civil service system lost its superiority; worse, it even hindered scientific and technological progress. The key issue, concludes Lin, was the absence of the Scientific Revolution in China, without which the Industrial Revolution could not have happened there. And without the Industrial Revolution, technology could not accelerate. That is why capitalism, though sprouting in China, failed to develop there fully since the eighteenth century, until four decades ago when China’s economy took-off.

China, once a forerunner in innovations and technological prowess, ended at the wrong side of The Great Divergence, resulting from the economic take-off of European economies as opposed to economic stagnation of practically all other economies.

Mokyr summarised these historical developments very well:

While most societies …were able to generate some technological progress, it typically consisted of one-off limited advances that had limited consequences, …and the growth it generated fizzled out. In only one case did such accumulation of knowledge become sustained and self-propelling … That one instance occurred in Western Europe during and after the Industrial Revolution…. The big difference between Europe and the rest of the world was the Enlightenment and its implications for scientific and technological progress. But the rise of the Enlightenment …. was the culmination of a centuries’ long process of intellectual change among the European literate elite.  

And it was Spinoza who prepared the ground for the Enlightenment.

Democracy revisited

As we  saw, Spinoza argued that democracy, as he described it, was the best form of government. If you had to answer the question what system promotes economic development  better in a poor country: democracy or a benevolent autocracy, which one would you chose? I would not be surprised if you chose autocracy; your thinking may be that a poor country needs a strong leader to pull off economic growth, unhindered by troublesome opposition groups.  If your answer would be along these lines, you are in good company. Take New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, who some time ago wrote the following about China:

One-party non-democracy certainly has its drawbacks. But when it is led by a reasonably enlightened group of people, ……. it can also have great advantages. That one party can just impose the politically difficult but critically important policies needed to move a society forward in the 21st century.

Friedman may have suggested that democracy would retard economic growth. But was he right? According to Daron Acemoglu he would have been wrong. Acemoglu and colleagues wrote a paper in which economic growth of 175 countries was analysed during the period 1960 – 2010. This growth was paired with the political systems of the countries concerned.

The paper’s main finding is that over the long run democracy has a significant positive effect of around 20% on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. The paper’s other findings suggest that democracy contributes to future GDP growth by increasing investment, encouraging economic reforms, improving the collection of taxes, provision of public goods like schooling and health care, and reducing social unrest. The paper underlines that the findings do not imply that non-democracies never invest in public goods or enact far-reaching economic reforms. However, the average democracy is more likely to do so than the average non-democracy.

Another question is whether economic growth precedes democracy or is it the other way around? The authors conclude that the impact of democracy does not depend on the level of economic development. In other words, democracy doesn’t need growth first to take-off. Take Portugal: the democratisation of the country after the Salazar dictatorship resulted from mounting discontent with Salazar’s military regime. Once in 1976 democracy was established, Portugal’s economic growth started to improve. Subsequently, the government introduced the National Health Scheme, cutting infant mortality in half. School enrolment almost doubled over the next 30 years. Or take South Korea, a dictatorship before 1987. The dictators intended to continue their rule, but this met with massive student protests. Although in the past pro-democracy protests had also been staged, this time the government gave in. It helped that the regime was afraid that the country’s image would be badly affected in anticipation of the  Olympics to be held in South Korea in 1988. Hence democracy was ushered in and economic growth shot up to 4.7% a year during the next two decades.

As this essay is about the relation between the inspirational forces of the Enlightenment and sustained economic development, the question is whether Spinoza was right in proposing democracy, being the political system best suited  to free the minds, which in turn is crucial in promoting sustained economic growth. Spinoza favoured tolerance, freedom of expression, and equality before the law. He believed that democracy was the best system to organise a society and to ensure that the ‘social contract’ would not be broken. Acemoglu et al. came to the conclusion that democracy is the political system best suited for sustained economic growth.

China’s future

Mokyr presented a thought experiment towards the end of The Culture of Growth:

Imagine a New Atlantis run by a central administration in which technological progress is brought about by civil servants supported by a benign and progress-minded bureaucracy. Could such an organization have brought about the modern world without anything resembling the European Enlightenment? The economist’s logic would probably judge such a scenario as unlikely. It is one thing for such a political situation to be brought about in a single period; the likelihood that it could be sustained and avoid being corrupted and disrupted by greedy and ignorant outside invaders or inside rent-seekers in the long run seems dim.

After having read this text, I couldn’t help thinking of China’s future. After all, terms like central administration, technological progress, a prominent role of civil servants and bureaucracy at large, are all applicable to China. So far, its leaders have rebuffed the notion that democracy would be the sole system capable of creating and maintaining sustained economic growth. Indeed, China has been able to sustain spectacular economic growth over the past four decades. And after the outbreak of Covid-19 in Wuhan, the country handled the pandemic more effectively than e.g., the US, and Europe. 

As we have seen, a central theme of Spinoza’s democracy, is society’s unity. Pluralism had to be prevented so as to preserve unity. Surely, some freedoms were permitted as long as this unity was not in jeopardy. German philosopher Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) developed a political philosophy in which he portrayed dualism between a liberal society and an authoritarian state, in which an emancipated citizen can be found next to an autocratic monarch. Hegel introduced the notion of subjective liberty. However, this does not represent true liberty. True liberty can only be attained when one would conform to the rules of the state, thus achieving objective freedom. In actual practice, a citizen will adjust to  society’s ‘rules of the economic game’, and for the rest, one will mind  one’s own business.

He elaborates this dualism as follows. In the context of societal and economic life, entrepreneurial citizens live and work pretty freely, but within a conservative, authoritarian state, which expects from its citizens to be law-abiding and loyal  to the autocratic leadership. Such a hybrid system is typical for contemporary China.

President Xi Jinping and the Communist Party have a firm grip on the country and its economic development. Under Mr Xi, the Communist Party reinstated itself into every organ of society.  He also ensured that the party operates inside private enterprises and NGOs - Mr Xi’s mantra: stability is paramount! China’s autocratic one-party system may also be able to achieve sustained economic growth in the long run. At any event, China firmly believes that it is successfully developing according to its unique economic model rather than getting wealthy through the market.

Obviously it is far too early to evaluate the political and economic sustainability of China’s unique development model. Only in the (very) long term success of China’s  model can be confirmed or must be refuted. So, what are the perspectives? Although they seem to be quite good, I will look into some drawbacks of China’s economic and political outlook.

Made in China 2025

Technological progress tops China’s economic agenda. The leadership rightly understands that technological progress boosts productivity. In May 2015, Prime Minister Li Keqiang launched Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025), a high-tech expansion program. Its objective is to further develop China’s manufacturing sector into a technology-intensive powerhouse less reliant on foreign suppliers. MIC 2025 consists of 10 key strategic sectors, such as Artificial Intelligence, 5G, aerospace, robotics, semi-conductors, electric vehicles and green energy at large, biotech, and pharmaceuticals. These sectors will boost China’s international prominence, expected to capture global markets, perhaps surpassing American exporters.

The government had already invested $300 billion in MIC 2025. After Covid-19, another whopping $1.4 trillion was invested in the plan. This investment raised concerns, ranging from public investment overstretch to unfair international competition. Regarding the former, commentators inside and outside China observe that MIC 2025 is absorbing a disproportionate part of risky state-funded expenditure in new technologies. Others say that it would be better for a middle-income country like China to bet on market-based innovation to become a high-income country. Moreover, MIC 2025 is an exclusive, state-dominated, undertaking, and running the risk of wasteful investments. China’s competitors claim, as in the past, that the Chinese government is subsidizing its industries, thereby distorting the free functioning of the international market.

Through MIC 2025 the standard of living of the average Chinese citizen will improve. MIC 2025 will also provide employment for university graduates, many of whom are still being educated at American and European top universities. This triggers two questions. First, will China will have built up sufficient high-tech research capacity at home to match the high-tech demand from MIC 2025? Another question, although not directly related to MIC 2025, is whether the growing number of highly-educated citizens will accept having their freedoms restricted by the government? Is there, in other words, a relationship between the level of educational achievement and the demand for freedom of thought? If so, would this then be accommodated by the regime? I don’t know, but the prospects seem dim, given Xi’s firm grip on the population, as, for example, human rights activists and the average Uyghur would attest.

MIC 2025 reminds me of the Soviet Union’s investment in a few strategic industries at the time: heavy industry, defence (think e.g. of the development of the hydrogen bomb) and aerospace, while neglecting other economic, social, and political demands. The end-result was the implosion of the Soviet Empire, leaving behind an impoverished population, economic stagnation typified by outdated loss-making, poorly diversified industries, and corruption. Word has it that Mr Xi was horrified at how the Soviet Union’s Communist Party had evaporated overnight. 

MIC 2025, investing in sectors  that will dominate the Fourth Industrial Revolution, makes economic sense. However, as I mentioned before, MIC 2025 may result in wasting scarce financial resources. It may also trigger  obstruction from international competitors claiming that China applies unfair competition.

A comparison with the Soviet Union’s trajectory may not be justified altogether, given many differences between the former Soviet Union and contemporary China. Yet what I want to flag is that state-conducted investment in a limited number of sectors, may overlook necessary investments in other vital aspects of China’s society which could undermine its cohesion and resilience.  In this sense, The Economist observed that there is a rather large contrast between China’s world-class physical infrastructure  - featuring, among others, the longest high-speed rail network - and its badly lagging soft infrastructure, with a social safety-net akin to those of much poorer countries.

The political outlook

President- for-life Xi Jinping is the undisputed ruler; he has no identifiable rival, or successor. But is his rule indeed undisputed? Not necessarily. Senior Lowy Institute Fellow, Richard McGregor recently published a little book: Xi Jinping: The Backlash, zooming in on some of Xi’s policies which are meeting resistance inside China and abroad. China’s politics have gone back in time, echoing the Maoist era. The anger towards Xi is building up, says McGregor. Mr Xi has unwound most of the political advances that were instrumental to China’s economic success. After having built up a personality  cult, Xi stifles criticism and, say his critics, has mishandled relations with Washington. Criticism is getting louder – not just criticism on Xi’s economic policies, also deeper undercurrents are unmistakable.

Xi’s anti-corruption campaign ended the careers (and emptied bank accounts) of scores of senior Party and army officials at the national and lower levels. Millions of officials have been investigated and punished. Xi destroyed the lives of millions of people in the elite, who now all hold a personal grudge against him. McGregor observes: ‘Xi might have won popular support but he also earned himself a bucketload of bitter enemies, all itching for revenge.’

In 2018 the National People’s Congress created a new agency: the National Supervision Commission, which took in the operations of the Party’s anti-graft body, thereby extending the extra-judicial reach of the Party, resulting in alienating large sections of the legal intelligentsia, representing yet another group having an axe to grind with the President. 

As for China’s position overseas, McGregor argues that the backlash against Xi Jinping is reaching full bloom, due to Xi’s assertive policy not just against America but also vis-à-vis countries from Germany, Canada to Malaysia and India to Kenya; let alone vis-a-vis neighboring countries South Korea, The Philippines, Japan and Vietnam. Take the relationship between China and Germany. Before the launch of MIC 2025, Germany took a laidback position towards China. This attitude was in particular taken by German automakers whose largest export market is, indeed, China. But once MIC 2025 was launched, the Germans got nervous. China is now perceived as a hostile power wanting to replace German cars by Chinese vehicles. Berlin-based Mercator Institute, a think tank, observed  about MIC 2025:

‘In essence, Made in China 2025 aims for substitution. China seeks to gradually replace foreign with Chinese technology at home, and prepare the ground for Chinese technological companies entering international markets.’

The countries that feel threatened by China’s economic and geopolitical ambitions are now consulting like-minded countries  to find common ground in their relationship with China. What is at stake is maintaining a global rules-based system, including collectively accepted sanctions. 

There is more: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a huge infrastructure investment program, involving many countries from the East to the West. It is to ensure smooth transportation lines from and to China to facilitate imports of raw materials and exports of finished products. But it also is a hefty geopolitical instrument. While China is prepared to provide state-backed lending for the investment  of participating countries’ infrastructure through BRI, China is also  ‘buying’ political support from these countries in the international arena, such as the United Nations. Should borrowing countries not be able to repay their loans (which happens more and more), China can decide to seize or block the separate bank account which recipient countries were forced to open. In exceptional cases, like the port loan to Sierra Leone, China can take over the port, should Sierra Leone default. China is also investing in European (e.g., Servia, Hungary and Montenegro) and Asian countries (Cambodia and Laos),  putting the European Union and ASEAN  on the alert.  

BRI is being criticized for its overreach. In addition, international concerns are expressed about the increasingly unsustainable debt levels of countries having received BRI-related  loans. The IMF already warned for ‘debt distress’. Xi has listened and, subsequently, scaled back BRI’s ambitions. However, BRI loan defaults and the large debts incurred by, among others, Chinese loss-making state companies may further undermine Xi’s position.

Summing up, if Spinoza would have been alive, he would conclude that China reflects the opposite of what he proposed: democracy, tolerance, freedom of thought and expression. He would be bound to conclude that China’s model could not last. Even liberal-minded scholars would acknowledge that the People’s Republic is on the way to become the world’s largest economy, pulling hundreds of millions Chinese citizens out of poverty. But would China indeed present a better development model than the market-based democracies in the past? Mokyr is skeptical, as reflected in the above quotation:

It is one thing for such a political situation to be brought about in a single period; the likelihood that it could be sustained and avoid being corrupted and disrupted by greedy and ignorant outside invaders or inside rent-seekers in the long run seems dim.

All I can say is that time will tell. However, there are the backlashes I presented which may undermine not just the Chinese leadership’s confidence but, eventually, may put an end to the system.

Peter de Haan, 

 

Mokyr, J. (2017) A Culture of Growth; The Origins of the Modern Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Israel, J. (2007) In Strijd met Spinoza; Het failliet van de Nederlandse Verlichting (1670-1800). Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 5. Spinoza’s Theologico-Philosophical Treatise includes the statement that any person may think what that person  wishes and express these thoughts.In De List van Spinoza, Vincent Kal analyses Theologico-Philosophical Treatise from a conservative vantage point. On p. 265  Kal observes that this freedom of thought begins where religious disciplining ends. Freedom of thought in the domain of philosophy is based upon the order of Nature, which is beyond the state’s purview. This is why the state does not need to limit philosophers’ freedom of thought. On p. 267 Kal observes that Spinoza argued that people who philosophise belong to the educated classes. Giving them this freedom prevent them from mobilising the masses against the State. Source: Kal, V. (2020) De List van Spinoza; De Grote Gelijkschakeling. Amsterdam: Prometheus.

Russell, B. (1979) A History of Western Philosophy. London: Unwin Hyman Ltd, 552.

Ibid., 552.

Ibid., 7.

Theologico-Political Treatise, 86.

True religion, a simplified version of religion and a practical orientation for the common man, to be understood by commoners, is applied by the authorities to maintain obeyance, and thus control over these

people. Spinoza argued that superstition had to be removed from religion. In addition, religion had to play a constructive role in society, preventing that power hungry theologians would usurp it.

De List van Spinoza, Chapter  15: Democratie als waarborg voor macht (Democracy as a safeguard for power).

The term Modernity includes more than Kal’s interpretation of the term; the modern world consists of various political and philosophical systems than only individual liberalism. 

Lin, J. (2012) Demystifying the Chinese Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 30-53.

Acceleration is promoted by bringing together knowledge and brilliant minds to develop new ideas and innovations. A couple of random examples: Ptolemeus III (246-222BC) established the world’s first large library at Alexandria, Egypt. At the time, Egypt was a prosperous country. Ptolemeus, himself a Greek, wanted to assemble all available knowledge in the world in this library. He sent out emissaries to collect important documents, so as to include them, properly catalogued, in the library’s collection. As of the 17th century, Leiden University attracted world famous scholars. As mentioned, Descartes was one of them. Swedish botanist Carl  Linnaeus was another. More recently, Albert Einstein regularly visited Leiden to lecture and to meet professor  Hendrik Lorentz (whom he admired) and brainstorm with professor Paul Ehrenfest. Niels Bohr also visited regularly, not in the least since Leiden’s physics and astronomy faculties were world famous at the time, thus attracting brilliant scholars. During one of his visits, Einstein took the time to visit Spinoza’s house in Rijnsburg (now a small museum), as Spinoza’s philosophy had inspired him to write Weltanschauung. Before the Second World War, Cambridge University attracted many economists during John Maynard Keynes’s tenure there at King’s College. Among them, Friedrich Hayek, Tibor Scitovsky, John Kenneth Galbraith and Milton Friedman who was a Keynesian before he changed his views. Silicon Valley is, of course, a very prominent contemporary place attracting brilliant minds, who, together, developed many innovations.

A Culture of Growth, 339.

Acemoglu, D., Naidu, S., Restrepo, P., Robinson, J. (1 May 2015)  Democracy Does Cause Growth. To be downloaded via www.economist.com/democracy

A Culture of Growth, 341.

‘By 2012, …. private firms were responsible for about half of all investments in China …Xi’s ascension marked a turning point for entrepreneurs. Since 2012 this picture of private, market-driven growth has given way to a resurgence of the role of the state in resource allocation and a shrinking role for the market and private firms.’ Source:  McGregor, R. (2019) Xi Jinping: The Backlash, 53.

Germany’s Industry 4.0 Strategy, is not state-dominated; it invites foreign investors.

The Economist. Socialism’s Precariat, May 19th 2020, 37-38. The outbreak of Covid-19 exposed this contrast in an embarrassing manner. After the outbreak, the government gave an extra 12 yuan ($1.70) a week to its poor. Those with nothing can apply for a guaranteed minimum income (dibao). But this offers on average only 600 yuan a month. True, the State Council  recently announced that it would increase both unemployment and dibao benefits, but no details were supplied.  Government expenditures on health, education, and social assistance are lower in China than the average among China’s peers. Should economic growth and employment opportunities falter, inadequate social services might eventually result in widespread social unrest.

 

McGregor, R. (2019) Xi Jinping: The Backlash. Melbourne: Penguin Random House Australia.

Ibid., 35.

Ibid., 97.

Francis Fukuyama et al. observe that not in all cases this seems to work: ‘Today many of the nations that are the largest recipients of Chinese lending have the poorest, rather than the best, bilateral relations  with China. High levels of Chinese investment in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Ecuador provide the starkest example, as local agencies mired in debt have generated a substantial backlash. Many South Asian nations that are amongst the largest recipients of Chinese Belt and Road lending have shifted to realign strategically with India, Japan, or the United States’. Source: Batainich, B., Bennon, M., Fukuyama, F. How the Belt and Road Gained Steam: Causes and implications of China’s Rise in Global Infrastructure. Stanford: CDDRL Working Paper, (May, 2019), 28-29.   The authors also mention on p. 29 that the American Congress passed the BUILD Act, to help US companies competing  with Chines state-backed financing overseas. Yet US programs pale in comparison with those of China’s international lending institutions.   

2023 November

Essay 2023

2023

Talk for Namibian senior civil servants on November 2023

What is this talk about


To start of I will tell you about the evolution of the world’s countries in terms of income per head over a period of 35 year, followed by a brief overview of the changing global geopolitical situation, and what the economic consequences would be for the world at large and for sub Saharan Africa in particular. Subsequently I will share with you my views on what factors make countries grow and prosper – I will argue that the main factor is productivity.


Mauritius and Botswana are Africa’s economic star performers. I will deal with the question what factors explain their respective success and, based on this, I hope to draw - together with you – a few suggestions that may further productivity growth of Namibia’s economic sectors.


Marein will send you the full text of my lecture which also includes a column I wrote about productivity growth some time ago.

Stellenbosch Cape Town South Africa
2022 January

Essay 2022

Talk for Namibian senior civil servants on January 2022

Development economics’ central question is: what factors promote or hinder economic growth?

The problem is that we don’t have the one and only answer - there are various possible ones.


Regarding economic development theories, there are not just one but three generations of development economists. The third generation even includes different schools of thought on the matter, ranging from the institutional, via the geographical to the historical school of development.

I have dealt with them in some detail in my book Whatever Happened to the Third World? I will start my talk by telling you why, over the past forty years, the Third World as one bloc fell apart and evolved into three different groups of countries.
 

Namibia 2 846 (1).JPG
March

Essay March  2021

Is China’s economic development policy home-grown?

The short answer is that it isn’t. Before explaining why, I recount my first visit to China that took place in August 1985.

The Chinese government had invited three European NGOs: Oxfam, Deutsche Welthunger Hilfe, and Novib (a Dutch NGO which I represented), to visit fourteen locations in so-called autonomous regions to appraise projects that needed financial and technical support.

The mission had been suggested by UNDP’s Resident Representative at the time. After having received an extensive briefing of UNDPs Resident Representative in Beijing, the mission started off in Guangxi, located in China’s South East. Subsequently the mission visited Hunan (Mao’s province of birth), Henan, and Hubei. A variety of proposed projects, ranging from cattle and fish rearing to furniture production were shown to us.  What struck me was that our Chinese interlocutors did not have a clue about cost - and sales prices, nor of profit and loss. 

During the time of our 1985 mission, the market apparently played no role in the places we visited.

Shanghai6_edited.jpg
April

Essay April 2021

What is economics?

Inspired by technological innovation, economic development first triggered more leisure time, then affluence and, more recently,

the Digital Revolution. Three economists, John Maynard Keynes, Tibor Scitovsky and Noreena Hertz, analysed their  respective society’s challenges and opportunities.  It seemed as if Keynes and Scitovsky  went beyond the boundaries of the economic science, or didn’t they?

Almost a century ago celebrated British economist John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) wrote a remarkable little essay entitled: Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren. Remarkable, not so much as Keynes himself did not have children, but for the attractive possibilities he sketched for future generations. He foresaw a society which would be a paradise of abundance, leisure, beauty, grace, and variety, in which love of money would come to be regarded as a mental disease. This would be made possible thanks to the economy’s rapid increase in productivity  providing the possibilities for future generations to work less and enjoy life more.

Enjoying the Nature

 © 2023 Jovana Stulic

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